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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is about proof checking in type theory. We will investigate the question 
how to  m echanically verify m athem atical proofs. The com puter system s we consider 
are based on a type-theoretical framework. The m ethod we follow is to  develop a 
few representative case studies. This gives us the experience to  draw  conclusions 
and to  give recom m endations. In order to  formalize the theorem s presented in the 
case studies, we first have to  develop a lib rary  of formalized m athem atics. We will 
do this from scratch. During th is developm ent we will encounter several choices to  
make and problem s to  solve. One particu lar problem , nam ely equational reasoning, 
is studied in more depth  and a m ethod for dealing w ith it in a convenient way is 
presented in a separate chapter.
1.1 M otivation
H ardw are and software system s belong to  the m ost complex artifacts produced 
by the homo sapiens. These system s have appeared relatively late in the  hum an 
enterprise, some 50 years ago. The rise of these system s m arked the beginning of a 
new phase in the  industrial revolution.
I t is rem arkable th a t one of the few possible classes (arguably the only class) 
of ‘ob jec ts’ more complex th an  IT  (Inform ation Technology) products, already has 
been around more th an  two millennia. We m ean the timeless works of m athem atics 
w ith its concepts, com putations and proofs. One of the  early high points in this 
realm , paying proper a tten tion  to  all these three aspects, consists of the works of 
Archimedes (287-212 B.C.).
There appears to  be a striking difference between the quality  of IT  system s and 
th a t of m athem atics. The IT  systems, no tab ly  the software, often contain bugs: 
they  do not run  as they  are intended to. If one buys a disc w ith a program  on it, 
then  one usually sees th a t there is a w arranty  for the  proper functioning of the  disc, 
bu t not for th a t of the  program  itself! As em bedded software is used in m any vital 
com ponents of industrial products, like rockets, airplanes, power p lants and money 
transfer systems, the bugs in these system s have caused a lot of dam age and even 
fatalities. I t has been estim ated th a t the bug in the Pentium  chip a few years ago 
has caused a loss of 480 million US$ to  the m anufacturer. See (Peterson 1995) for 
other cases and docum entation.
M athem atics on the o ther hand  appears to  be usually correct. True, also m ath ­
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em atical papers sometimes contain errors. These are either found by the au thor, by 
some expert reader (who possibly w ants to  use the result) or are left unnoticed. In 
some sense th is is analogous to  the  situation  w ith errors in IT  system s. B ut there is 
an intrinsic reason to  believe th a t present day software system s contain com parable 
m ore bugs th an  m athem atical papers.
Before giving th is reason, let us look a t the  cause of errors in software. The 
reason is simple. P rogram s are large, som etim es consisting of more th an  a million 
lines, and they  have a refined action. A small oversight in one of the million lines 
is enough to  introduce an error. The com plexity of software is also the  underlying 
cause of the ‘second software crisis’: there are sim ply not enough people capable of 
producing the relevant software needed for todays industry. B ut worse is the  first 
and principal crisis: it is hard— if not impossible— to  produce satisfactory  software 
on time. B oth  crises are caused by the  difficulty to  instruct a com puter to  do 
simple tasks th a t hum ans seem to  do w ithout effort, let alone m ore difficult tasks. 
Since com puters do these tasks much more efficiently th an  hum ans, the rew ard for 
th is endeavor to  build software has been considered worthwhile. The m entioned 
com plexity is also the reason why testing  IT  system s is of lim ited value, since the 
num ber of cases to  be checked is more th an  astronom ical. An exhaustive test simply 
will take too long.
Back to  m athem atics. The sta tem ent th a t the  work of m athem aticians in general 
is m ore reliable th an  th a t of IT  specialists is puzzling, since we also said th a t 
m athem atics is m ore complex th an  IT . The reason for the  reliability of m athem atics 
is th a t this discipline has proofs. Proofs m ay be very complex, indeed more complex 
th an  software; bu t they  are crystal clear. This clarity  is a tool for the m athem atician  
to  purify his work from errors. The following m etaphor m ay explain the situation  
better. Trying to  find a proof is like searching for the  correct p a th  in a labyrin th  to  
the  exit. The search is com plicated and so is the resulting path . B u t the  fact th a t 
the  p a th  correctly leads to  the exit can be verified w ithout effort. This m eans th a t 
it is very easy to  specify the correctness of a path : ju s t follow the p a th  and see it 
leads to  the  goal ‘w ithout cheating’.
Given th is situation, the  challenge is to  design IT  system s such th a t the  fulfill­
m ent of their required properties can be w arranted w ith the same degree of certa in ty  
as the validity of m athem atical theorem s.
F o rm a l m e th o d s  in  I T  d e s ig n
One possibility is to  apply the m ethod of proving to  the construction of IT  systems. 
This idea came up in the  late 1960s under the nam e ‘formal m ethods’. The idea was 
to  have a language in which one could describe designs d of IT  system s together w ith 
the specification S  of the  desired properties of the system . If one then  could formally 
prove S (d), this would give the highest possible w arranty  th a t a realization of the 
design d has its required behavior. Proving out of the blue is usually impossible, so in 
the proof of S(d) one m ay assume th a t com ponents di of d satisfy a subspecification 
S\, i.e. th a t S i (di ) holds. These com ponents di e ither have to  be constructed  again, 
in which case the story  is repeated; or are bought from another m anufacturer, in 
which case the  seller is responsible th a t S i (di ) holds. Eventually  th is procedure 
leads to  elem entary com ponents de whose properties S"e are w arran ted  by the laws 
of nature.
A lthough the idea of using formal system s is in principle a good one, the ex­
1.1. MOTIVATION 3
isting technology is inadequate to  deal w ith some huge problems. The dom inating 
program m ing style is th a t of im perative languages (including variants like object 
oriented program m ing). This com putational model is less ap t to  be trea ted  by 
formal m ethods in a nice way. The reason is th a t a substan tia l program  d has a 
very large num ber of different com ponents. This implies th a t the proof of S (d) 
from S i(d i) will be complex. This com plexity is different from th a t of m athem atical 
proofs. Proofs in m athem atics are complex because of dep th  of abstraction. The 
intended proof of S (d) from the S i (di ) is complex because of their length consisting 
of ra th e r triv ial steps.
In order to  s ta te  the  m entioned problem s, we have to  be more explicit about 
w hat needs to  be done. Following ideas of (W upper and M eijer 1997) one can sta te  
th is as follows. One w ants a system  w ith a given behavior. In order to  construct 
such a system  one w rites down a formal specification S  of the  behavior and a 
formal design d of the  system. The design will usually be bu ilt up from com ponents 
d1, . . . , d n , where each di satisfies a subspecification S i . Now one w ants to  be sure 
th a t the  system  obeys the required behavior. The best one can strive after is to  
prove form ally th a t
i.e. S(d) formally follows from the assum ptions S i(d i) , ■ ■■, S n (dn ). At this point 
there are two problem s
1. How do we get the correct specification S?
2. How can we w arran t (+ ), knowing th a t the proof m ay be complex and hence
error prone?
A satisfactory  answer to  problem  2 was given by (de B ruijn  1970). He designed 
a language A utom ath  in which proofs can be represented precisely. A sta tem ent 
(+ ) being proved by p  now becomes
Now problem  2 becomes
2.1. How do we get the so-called proof object p?
2.2. How can we w arran t the  correctness of (+ + )?
Problem  2.2 has been addressed satisfactorily  by de Bruijn, as he succeeded to  
represent sta tem ents and proofs in such a way th a t (+ + )  becomes verifiable by a 
small program . A proof checking algorithm  w ith a small program  is said to  satisfy 
the de Bruijn  criterion. The final reliability of (+ + )  then  can be checked by anyone 
who cares to  inspect this program  (or is willing to  w rite a personal version of it).
So now we are left w ith problem  1 (how to  ob tain  a formal specification S ) 
and problem  2.1. (how to  ob tain  a proof-object p). For software w ritten  in the 
current im perative style problem  1 is already som ewhat awkward. Several speci­
fication languages have been proposed, e.g. VDM (Jones 1990). Now the formal 
specifications S, S 1, . . . , S n in such a language is in principle of a m anageable size. 
B ut the  problem  usually is w hether a formal specification S  does express correctly 
the intended behavior of the  system . Let us call th is the  specification problem. 
The other problem  (2.1) of constructing a proof-object P  for (+ + )  becomes the
S i ( d i ) , . . . ,S n ( d n )  h S(d) ( +  )
S i(d i ),■ ■ ■ ,Sn(dn) hp S(d). ( +  +  )
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bottleneck for software w ritten  in an im perative style. In fact to  achieve (+ + )  for 
large im perative program s is very difficult. M ost industria l software has not been 
verified th is way.
In spite of this failure for software verification, the program  to  prove correctness 
of hardw are has been successful, see (Goossens 1992, Rushby and von Henke 1993, 
Ruess, Shankar and Srivas 1996). This is so because hardw are seen from the right 
level of abstraction  is in general sim pler th a n  software. One can s ta te  stylistically:
hardw are : software =  propositional logic : predicate logic.
Since provability in predicate logic is undecidable, this also explains why we have 
to  use proof objects for the formal verification of software. On the  o ther hand 
provability in propositional logic is decidable and hence the verification of hardw are 
can be done by (reliable) theorem  provers. (A ctually th is is an over-simplification. 
Hardw are is in fact more complex th an  the propositional logic level since repeated  
hardw are p a tte rn s  and also tim e considerations ask for predicates.)
This m ethodology of verified design has been used for more th an  15 years (usu­
ally not in the style of de Bruijn, bu t w ith all kinds of proof generators). As a result, 
hardw are nowadays is very reliable. The bug m entioned above in the arithm etic 
un it of the first Pentium  chip was in fact not found in the  hardw are, bu t in the  
m icrocode (software provided by the m anufacturer).
Since im perative software is very complex and has insufficient m odular structure , 
there has not been developed a m ajor activ ity  producing corrections proofs of such 
program s. There is a notable exception. C om m unication protocols are small bu t 
highly im portan t program s, often used as em bedded software in telecom m unication 
system s, rem ote control consoles and the like. The correctness of these program s 
is of vital im portance for the proper functioning of these systems. Moreover it is 
expensive for the  m anufacturer to  call back system s for a repair. Therefore consid­
erable successful effort is being spent on proving the correctness of im plem entations 
of these com m unication protocols (Sellink 1996).
In the early 1990s functional program m ing s ta rted  to  come of age. For th is model 
of com putation each program  com ponent is built up  in an surveyable m odular wayi ,
i.e. is constructed  from a lim ited num ber of p a rts  such th a t the  proportion  of the 
whole is reflected in a clear way from those of the parts. Therefore it is justified to  
hope th a t for functional program m ing correctness proofs are feasible.
M a th e m a t ic s
In m athem atics there has developed a strong culture for the  right form ulation of 
sta tem ents to  be proved. Moreover, in m any cases already simple sta tem ents are a 
challenge to  be proved. For th is reason our case studies come from m athem atics. 
The goal of these case studies is not so much the construction of m echanically 
verified proofs, bu t ra th e r a study  of the  technique one needs in order to  com fortably 
formalize proofs.
Usually, proof-checking of existing m athem atics does not have the p roperty  th a t 
the specification of the  sta tem ent to  be proved is problem atic. On the o ther hand, 
the efficient form alization of proofs is a formidable challenge. One aims a t proof- 
objects th a t are not only com plete form alizations, bu t also should be ‘feasible’.
1 Functional programming languages have the very important property of referential trans­
parency. Referential transparency forms the basis of modularity.
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This m eans in the first place th a t it should be possible for a person th a t knows the 
intuitive proof to  produce in a ‘user-friendly w ay’ the corresponding proof-object 
(possibly w ith the help of an interactive proof developm ent system ). It also means 
th a t the resulting proof-objects should not be too large.
We believe th a t  producing case studies in the  form alization of m athem atics is 
of in terest for several reasons.
1. There probably  will be a positive spin-off for the  quest for correctness of IT- 
system s, notab ly  for software.
2. The highest possible degree of correctness of m athem atics will be w arranted. 
The role of refereeing by peers will change. The em phasis will shift from 
the correctness to  the relevance of a result, since correctness already can be 
verified mechanically.
3. Complex m athem atical notions can be represented exactly  on a com puter, 
even incom patible notions. In th is way, system s of so called ‘com puter m ath ­
em atics’ (CM) m ay result in heavy libraries of verified theories, certified al­
gorithm s and user friendly tools to  help the developm ent of new theories. In 
short, experienced m athem aticians m ay be helped by system s of CM in the 
same way as they  are being helped by system s of C om puter A lgebra (CA) for 
the developm ent of pure and applied m athem atics. Also for students there 
is a benefit. Systems for CM already have proven to  be instrum ental for the 
craftsm anship of producing m athem atical proofs. They help studen ts in de­
veloping awareness of logical steps applied. S tudents even seem to  like doing 
m athem atics on a com puter.
4. I t is a challenge for logic and the foundations of m athem atics to  make feasible 
form alization possible. This point will be explained below.
5. Some proofs consists of a large num ber of cases of sim ilar s tructu re . Systems 
for CM can take over the  e laborate p a rt of generating all cases. An example 
is the  proof of the  four color theorem  by (Appel and Haken 1976), which was 
carried out by m eans of a com puter system.
O b s ta c le s
A lthough m athem atics is regarded as an exact science, actually  in a sense it is 
not exact a t all. Namely, m ost proofs in m athem atical journals are in fact merely 
sketches which should convince the reader th a t some asserted theorem  does hold. 
All proof-steps which ought to  be obvious for the  reader are left out, leaving only 
those p a rts  of the proof which form the essence. We call th is in fo rm a l practice. 
Inform al practice makes proofs easier to  grasp and hence makes it easier to  see th a t 
these proofs are indeed correct. O n the o ther hand, we have com puters. In order 
to  let a com puter verify a proof, the program  needs to  obtain  all details, and every 
tiny  logical step  of which the proof consists needs to  be spelled out. A com puter 
based proof checker needs a fu lly  form alized  proof as input.
Suppose the au thor of a proof has left out on purpose some side conditions or 
some exceptions for the sake of clarity. Usually, the  reader will ‘see’ im m ediately 
th a t th is omission is provable indeed. A com puter system  on the o ther hand  still 
needs to  verify these omissions in full detail. Usually, th is is quite an involved job
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to  do. Even worse, in some cases such an exception m ay not be provable a t all 
w ithout some (trivial) m odifications in the original proof.
We also have to  realize th a t proof checkers have a few inherent weaknesses. 
F irstly  why should we believe th a t the  proof checker accepts only valid (true) proofs? 
How can we be sure th a t it does not accept some proof th a t  leads to  a contradiction? 
Since a proof checker is ju s t a piece of software th a t  runs on some equipm ent, they  
are also vulnerable to  the  weaknesses of IT  system s described in the beginning of 
th is chapter. Following the de Bruijn  criterion , we should keep the kernel of a proof 
checker as simple as possible. Then anyone could w rite his own proof checker fairly 
easily, and  use it as an independent judge. The tools we use to  generate proofs 
m ay be as complex as desirable, as long as the  resulting proofs can be checked by 
a simple system.
On the o ther hand, we do not wish to  work in a system  whose proof theoretical 
s treng th  is weak. A lthough we could encode the logic we wish to  use, and introduce 
m athem atical concepts axiomatically, th is approach is only suitable for small case 
studies. Unless a proof checker provides very powerful tacticals, formalizing large 
bodies of m athem atical tex t by m eans of a m inim al verification system  seems to  be 
an extrem ely tedious job  to  do.
Secondly, it is very hard  to  be com pletely sure th a t a form alization exactly m od­
els the phenom enon we wish to  describe. In order to  believe th a t  a given theorem  
T  we in tend to  prove is true  indeed, we have to  make sure th a t every formalized 
definition on which the form alization of the theorem  T  d irectly  or indirectly  de­
pends, exactly models our intention. This m ay seem easier th an  it is. We believe 
th a t this modeling problem  is one of the  m ost problem atic aspects of mechanical 
proof verification.
1.2 P roof A ssistants
Currently, a variety of com puter system s is used in m athem atics and the o ther exact 
sciences as an aid for research. Two of the m ost w idespread categories are system s 
for num erical analysis and for com puter algebra. A num erical analysis package is 
capable of m aking use of the  raw  processing power of a com puter to  quickly com pute 
a possibly extrem ely large num ber of real values by approxim ations. Exam ples of 
these packages are LINALG (Johnson 1992) and ScaLAPACK (Choi, D ongarra, 
Pozo and W alker 1992).
C om puter algebra system s are more sophisticated in the sense th a t they  use 
an exact representation  of symbols and formulas instead of approxim ated values. 
Exam ples of com puter algebra system s are M aple (Char, Geddes, G onnet, Leong, 
M onagan and W att 1992) and M athem atica (W olfram 1991). Because numerical 
analysis system s com pute by approxim ations, they  are vulnerable for rounding er­
rors. C om puter A lgebra system s use a knowledge base of algorithm s and rules to  
rew rite algebraic expressions into sim pler ones. A lthough com puter algebra system s 
do not use approxim ations, even these system s m ay deliver wrong solutions because 
m ost com puter algebra system s do not check all side conditions. For example, tak ­
ing the real valued square roo t of a negative num ber, or division by zero, is often 
undetected  and accepted.
Proof assistant system s form a th ird  category. Their em phasis is not on com­
puting  values, bu t on proving theorem s. They are especially suited  for checking
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results. P roof assistants m ight be divided into two flavors: proof checking and proof 
generation. In general, proof generation system s are lim ited because m ost logics 
are undecidable. W hen we use a proof generator to  find a proof of some lemma, in 
m ost cases the  checker will give up a t a certain  m om ent because it has no clue how 
to  find a proof. Exam ples of these system s are system s based on resolution logic 
like O tte r (M cCune 1990), and the Boyer-M oore theorem  prover N qthm  (Boyer and 
Moore 1988). The la tte r system  will ask the user for a hint when it fails to  generate 
a proof. So in an interactive way, the system  can be used to  formalize m athem atics. 
(Shankar 1986, Shankar 1994) has used N qthm  to  formalize Godels second incom­
pleteness theorem  and the Church-Rosser theorem . A nother very popular proof 
assistant system  today  is PVS (Owre, Rushby and Shankar 1992). PVS is a fairly 
user-friendly system, b u t less reliable.
As proof generation system s get more complex, they  will be m ore vulnerable for 
im plem entation errors. Reliability of proof assistants is crucial. W hat is otherwise 
the point of formalizing m athem atics in the first place? P roof verification system s 
have a far easier job  to  do. Namely instead of finding a valid proof, these system s 
only have to  verify th a t a given proof follows the  rules of logic. Consequently proof 
verification system s are easier to  build and more likely to  be correct. Exam ples 
of proof verification system s are HOL (G ordon 1991) and Isabelle (Nipkow and 
Paulson 1992).
As argued above, it is im portan t to  be able to  independently  check formalized 
proofs. P roof checkers which are based on type theory  have proofs as first class 
citizens. This makes it easy to  hand  over these objects to  o ther people using other 
proof checkers. Exam ples of proof checkers which actually  produce proofs are Coq 
(Dowek et al. 1993), LEGO (Pollack 1994) and Alf (M agnusson and N ordstrom  
1994). A nother advantage of using type theory  for formalizing proofs is th a t we 
are encouraged to  build constructive proofs only. A lthough th is is not compulsory, 
constructive proofs have the advantage th a t they  often contain a com putational 
content. So for example, suppose we have a constructive proof of a theorem
Vx3y[^(x,  y)] .
T hen a constructive proof for this theorem  will contain a function which assigns to  
every x  a y  such th a t 4>(x, y) holds. We will use th is fact to  get a prim e generator 
directly  from a proof of E uclid’s theorem  of the infinity of the set of prim e num bers.
1.3 T ype theory
The common view th a t  set theory  as form ulated in first order predicate logic w ith 
equality can serve as a foundation of m athem atics is an misconception. M athem at­
ics consists of defining, reasoning and com puting. In ordinary  logic, definitions are 
usually seen as abbreviations in an auxiliary language th a t denote their full expan­
sion in the  official language. For example in num ber theory  one has the definitions:
P rim e(x) :=  x  > 1 & Vy[(y < x) ^  (y | x) ^  (y =  1)] (1.1)
y I x  :=  3z[z  * y  =  x] (1.2)
If these definitions are seen as abbreviations, then  the sta tem ent expressing th a t 
there exists a prim e twin:
3x[Prim e(x) & Prim e(x +  2)]
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stands for:
3x[ (x > 1 & Vy[(y < x) ^  (3z[z * y  =  x]) ^  (y =  1)]) &
(x +  2 >  1 & Vy[(y < x  +  2) ^  (3z[z * y  =  x  +  2]) ^  (y =  1)]) ]
For more com plicated sta tem ents the  official transla tion  becomes infeasible. There­
fore a b e tte r view on definitions like (1.1) and (1.2) is th a t the defined expressions 
become p a rt of the official language and :=  stands for an axiom atic extension or a 
reduction discussed below.
The way reasoning is cap tu red  in first order predicate logic is not bad, except 
th a t n a tu ra l deduction for in tuitionistic logic or a sequent calculus for classical logic 
is superior to  a H ilbert style form ulation.
The m ain defect of the  trad itional foundational view is related  to  com putations. 
If these are to  be cap tured  by the equality in first order logic, then  a full proof of 
an algebraic equation like:
x3 -  y3 =  (x -  y )(x2 +  x y  +  y2)
becomes unreasonably long, in fact quadra tic  in the  size of the sta tem ent itself. 
This is caused by the  fact th a t in a chain of equations each tim e a heavy use is 
m ade of the congruence properties (+  and * preserve equality). S tatem ents like:
|y i l 0 0 j  =  33
Prime(1999)
are also extrem ely awkward to  be proved in arithm etic as formalized in predicate 
logic w ith equation.
1.3.1 Flavors
In th is section we will briefly present a few lam bda calculi. For the  reader who wants 
a full description of the system s and their properties, we will give some references.
L a m b d a  C a lc u lu s
Because of the em phasis we lay on proof checkers which actually  produce proof 
objects, the  class of proof checkers we will study  is based on the typed  lam bda 
calculus. The typed lam bda calculus stem s from the (untyped) lam bda calculus 
originally in troduced by (Church 1932,1933). The lam bda calculus is a general 
theory  of functions and logic, intended as a foundation of m athem atics. The reader 
is referred to  (B arendregt 1984) for an in-depth  trea tm en t of the  lam bda calculus.
T y p e d  L a m b d a  C a lc u lu s
The typed  lam bda calculus is in troduced by (C urry  1934, Church 1940). Essentially, 
every lam bda term  has a type associated. In fact, only term s are allowed which can 
be typed. Typed lam bda calculi are useful for several reasons. Firstly, types can be 
used to  specify an algorithm . T hen an inhab itan t of a type, th a t is, a te rm  which 
has the type, is an im plem entation of the  algorithm . In a sim ilar way, types can be 
seen as propositions. In th a t case inhab itan ts are proofs, and inhabited  types are 
tru e  propositions. Furtherm ore, types can be used to  make com pilations of term s 
more efficient.
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Exam ples of typed lam bda calculi are system  F  and the Calculus of C onstruc­
tions (CC). The la tte r calculus is invented by (C oquand and H uet 1985, C oquand 
and H uet 1988) and is a lam bda calculus w ith dependent types. In (C oquand 1985) 
it is shown th a t the system  CC is consistent. In (G irard, Lafont and Taylor 1989), 
the  reader finds a trea tm en t of system  F  and the connection w ith (constructive) 
logic.
In (B arendregt 1992), various system s of typed lam bda calculi are presented 
in a general framework of the  form of a cube, the  so-called X-cube. These eight 
system s differ in expressiveness and proof strength . O n one extrem e we have simply 
typed lam bda calculus X ^ , which can be viewed as a m inim al propositional logic 
w ith im plication alone. Then we have the polym orphic lam bda calculus X2 which is 
essentially system  F . A stronger system  is X P 2 in which we also have predicates. On 
the o ther end of the cube we have the system  called XC which has much in common 
w ith higher-order predicate logic. The X-cube is generalized into so-called Pure 
Type Systems (P T S ’s) independently  by (Berardi 1989) and by (Terlouw 1989).
S ig m a  ty p e s  a n d  ty p e  h ie ra rc h ie s
A weakness of CC is th a t it is not possible to  d irectly  form the  product type A  x  B ,  
given two types A  and B . In (Luo 1990) a system  called the Extended Calculus 
of C onstructions (ECC) is presented. Essentially, it in tegrates the (im predicative) 
Calculus of Constructions and M artin-L öf’s (predicative) type theory  w ith universes 
(M artin-Lof 1972, M artin-Löf 1984). In ECC, product types are in troduced by so- 
called S-types. Luo showed strong norm alization for ECC.
I n d u c t iv e  ty p e s
A nother extension of the  Calculus of C onstructions are inductive types. In CC it 
is possible to  define notions w ith a recursive n a tu re  like the n a tu ra l num bers. The 
trick  is to  encode such a type in term s of a higher order im predicative definition. 
Inductive types enable us to  formalize recursive definitions in a much more direct 
way. For example, to  define the n a tu ra l num bers, we w rite
j X  [X ,X  ^  X] ,
which stands for the  sm allest type consisting of one inhab itan t and a function 
which transform s an in hab itan t into another one. In fact, we use the following 
formalization:
N =  j X  : *.(0 : X , S +  : X  ^  X )
So in this way, the  n a tu ra l num bers are defined as the sm allest set N of type *, 
which consist of two constructors: a constan t nam ed 0 and unary  function nam ed 
S+ . Because N is defined as the smallest type, we ob tain  an induction principle eN:
eN : V $ :N ^ * .  ($0) ^  (Vn:N. ($ n )^ (4 > (S + n))) ^  (V n:N .$n) ,
together w ith two accom panying rew riting rules:
£n $ f g 0  f
£n $ f g ( S + n )   ^i g n  (eN $ f g n )
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where $  : N ^ * ,  f  : $ 0, g : Vn:N. ( $ n ) ^ ( $ ( S +  n )), and n  : N. Note th a t  we use the 
notion of ¿-reduction for rew riting inductive term s. We say th a t we have defined the 
n a tu ra l num bers inductively . Now it is possible to  define o ther term s by recursion . 
For example, we can define the  addition by recursion on i t ’s second argum ent:
add =  Ax:N.ew (Ay:N. N )0(A y:N  Ah:N.S+h)
Note th a t it is also possible to  use inductive types instead of sigma types to  
define the product A  x  B  of two given types A  and B.
p ro d  =  AA:* AB:* ¡j, X :*. ( tu p le  : A  ^  B  ^  X )
T e rm  re w r i t in g
Besides ¡3- and ¿-reduction, we also use in a few very specific cases p-reduction. 
p-reduction allows us to  add a rb itra ry  rew riting rules. So this is potentially  very 
dangerous, as we could add a rule which rew rites true  into falsum. B u t used w ith 
great care, in some circum stances it will be extrem ely useful. In C hap ter 5 we 
im plem ent an algorithm  to  autom atically  verify equations of a class of algebraic 
structures. This is done by carefully adding the rew rite-rules of the  K nuth-B endix 
com pletion of the  algebraic structure .
D e l ta  r e d u c t io n
As m entioned before, we wish to  have definitions as p a rt of our type theory. Then 
we are able to  a ttach  a nam e to  a term . Definitions are used bo th  for defining 
m athem atical objects, as for nam ing lemmas and theorem s. The m echanism  used 
to  unfold a definition is called ¿-reduction. The type checker we use is able to  
autom atically  unfold definitions when necessary.
S u m m a r iz in g
So we end up using a type system  w ith the following properties:
-  Calculus of constructions for higher order predicate logic.
-  Conversion (3-reduction) for com putations.
-  ¿-reduction for definitions.
-  Inductive types (via ¿-reduction) also for definitions and  com putations.
-  p-reduction which enables us to  add rew riting rules.
-  Cum ulative type hierarchies and sigm a types.
The type checker which im plem ents all these features is LEGO (Luo and Pollack 
1992). LEGO is designed and im plem ented by R andy Pollack. It is coded in New 
Jersey S tandard  ML. LEGO is freely available from the In ternet. I t is rem arkable 
th a t LEGO also im plem ents another concept, nam ely argum ent synthesis. Argu­
m ent synthesis is the ability of the  type checker to  fill in certain  types in a te rm  we 
left out.
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1.4 D escription
This thesis is divided into four parts. The first chapter is about logic. We will 
present different kinds of logic, and the connection w ith type theory.
Next we will develop a small library  of m athem atical concepts, like sets, func­
tions, s tructures and some analysis. The m ain em phasis is on constructive defini­
tions, although we define the real num ber system  w ith a decidable equality  relation.
The lib rary  is used in C hap ter 4 where we present four case studies. The first 
one is to  make clear how logical reasoning is done in an interactive way on a proof 
checker. A nother case study  is used to  show the  difficulties of equational reasoning. 
The last case study  is the  am bitious goal to  fully formalize the  Fundam ental Theo­
rem  of Algebra. Its purpose is to  get an understanding of the question w hether it is 
possible to  formalize large bodies of m athem atical tex ts into type theory. As we will 
see, it tu rned  out th a t the form alization could not be com pleted w ithin reasonable 
time.
We spend a separate  chapter to  study  equational reasoning. We propose a 
m ethod which enables us to  use the  type checker to  autom atically  verify equational 
reasoning.

Chapter 2
Representing Logic
Various logical system s m ay differ in their expressive power and in their proof- 
theoretic strength . The simplest logical system  is first order m inim al proposition 
logic. I t does not possess predicates, nor connectives besides the  im plication alone, 
nor any quantifications. At the o ther end of the  spectrum  we have higher order 
predicate logic. The system  th a t we will use in the following chapters is found in 
between. We will use second order logic w ith universal quantification and implica­
tion alone. The other logical connectives are defined impredicatively. Furtherm ore, 
in order to  be able to  express m athem atical notions, we will also perm it predicates . 
So we will work in second order predicate logic. Also we add inductive types. These 
are quite convenient for defining m athem atical objects w ith a recursive structure .
In th is chapter we will first give a brief overview of the  h istory  of logic. I t is by 
no m eans com plete and is only intended to  give a context to  the logical system  we 
use. The reader is referred to  (van Dalen 1978) for a more in-depth  trea tm en t of 
th is topic. Next, we show how we can formalize these system s into type theory.
2.1 R elevant view s on logic
The first works on logic are by A ristotle who w rote his O rganon  in the fourth 
cen tury  B.C. Only in 1854, G. Boole in troduced the first logical system  (Boole 1854). 
Then it was Frege who gave the first formal description of m athem atical logic. In 
his B egriffschrift (Frege 1879), he presented a formal system  for first order logic. 
H ilbert used w hat is called the axiom atic m ethod (H ilbert and Bernays 1934, 1939). 
Brouwer revised the idea of provability in his in tuitionistic logic. Following ideas 
a ttrib u ted  to  R. Pollack, we can view logic from different angles.
F o rm a lis t ic  a p p ro a c h
We call a system  formal if we can give a precise definition of its syntax  and the 
derivation rules. Exam ples of formal system s are Peano arithm etic and predicate 
logic. Also H ilb ert’s G rundlagen der G eom etrie  (1899) is a fine example of the 
formalistic approach. In th is work, he introduces geom etric objects like points as 
given, w ithout giving it any in terpretation . T hen he form ulates the  properties th a t 
these objects should obey. Form alists wish to  axiom atize all of m athem atics.
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L o g ic is tic  a p p ro a c h
The m ain idea of the  logicism is to  identify m athem atics and logic. Frege defined 
m athem atical concepts in term s of logic. To do so, he gave a very precise description 
of logic and enriched the power of expression. In (Frege 1879), propositional logic 
is based on a abstrac t notion of tru th  values.
M athem atical logic as founded by Frege was elaborated  by W hitehead and Rus­
sell. Their Principia Mathematica  (W hitehead and Russell 1910-1913) can be 
viewed as the culm ination of logicism.
In tu i t io n is t ic  a p p ro a c h
The D utch m athem atician  Brouwer approached logic from a com pletely new point 
of view (Brouwer 1907). He rejected the principle of boolean values which assigns 
to  every sentence a tru th  value. In B rouw er’s view, m athem atical objects are cre­
ated  by m ental constructions. In tu ition ists believe th a t logic rests on m athem atics. 
W here classical logic is descriptive by nature , constructive logic focuses a tten tion  on 
the dynam ic interaction of the individual w ith the m athem atical universe (Mines, 
Richm an and R uitenburg 1988, C hap ter 1, Section 1). To prove a theorem , we have 
to  give a construction of a proof.
In order to  reason, in tu itionists gave a new in terp re ta tion  to  the  logical connec­
tives. Let P  and Q be propositions, A  a set and  $(x) a predicate.
-  A proof of P  & Q consists of a proof of P  and a proof of Q, ju s t as in classical 
m athem atics.
-  To prove P  V Q, we m ust either prove P  or prove Q, whereas in classical logic 
it would be possible to  prove P  V Q w ithout proving P  or Q.
-  A proof of P  ^  Q consists of a construction which transform s any proof of P  
into a proof of Q .
-  The negation of P  is defined as P  ^  ± , where ±  is some contradiction. So 
to  prove —P , we have to  show how to  transform  a proof of P  into a proof of 
absurdum.
-  A proof of Vx:A. $ (x)  consists of a construction th a t assigns to  every a : A  a 
proof of $ (a).
-  A proof of 3x:A. $ (x)  consists of a construction which gives a a : A  and a 
proof of $ (a).
The inductively defined logical connectives presented in Definition 2.2.3 fit perfectly 
well in the  view-point of logic being p a rt of m athem atics.
2.2 Logic form alized
Let us switch focus and investigate how we can formalize the various logical paradigm s 
in type theory.
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A x io m a tic  fo rm a liz a t io n
Following the formalistic trad ition , we encode propositional logic axiomatically. 
Note th a t m ost logical connectives come w ith in troduction and elim ination rules.
2.2 .1 . D e f in it io n . (i) We introduce a type of propositions prop, and a type func­
tion  T assigning to  each proposition the type of its proofs.
p ro p  : *
T : p ro p  ^  *
(ii) We axiom atize the im plication connective together w ith proof constructors 
for in troduction and  elim ination as follows.
imp : p rop  ^  p ro p  ^  p rop
impe : n a ,  f3:prop. (T(imp a f l ) )  ^  (Ta) ^  (T^) 
imp4 : n a ,^ :p r o p .  ((Ta) ^  (T0 )) ^  T (im p a ^ )
(iii) In a sim ilar way we introduce falsum and the negation. 
f l s  : p rop
f l s e : (T f l s )  ^  n « :p ro p . Ta 
n o t : p rop  ^  p rop
=  A a:prop. imp a  f l s
notD N  : n a  : p rop .(T (no t (no t a ))  ^  Ta
In a sim ilar way, all the  o ther connectives can be in troduced axiomatically. The 
first A utom ath  T ranslation AUT-68 (van B enthem  Ju ttin g  1994) used a system  very 
sim ilar to  th is one to  encode classical m inim al predicate logic.
Suppose we work in the type system  A P 2 (one of the eight system s of the  A-cube, 
see Section 1.3.1). If we substitu te  the  type * for p rop, and the identity  for T , we 
have formalized second order predicate logic in a more straightforw ard way. Then 
we also should replace (imp A B )  by ( A ^ B ). This idea is called the propositions- 
as-types in terp re ta tion  of (de B ruijn  1970, Howard 1980). This in terp re ta tion  was 
used for the  AU TO -Q E system . See (B arendregt 1992) for more details on the 
propositions-as-types in terpreta tion .
I m p r e d ic a t iv e  fo rm a liz a t io n
In the logicistic sp irit we define in type theory  the logical connectives —, &, V and 
3 by second order definitions.
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2.2 .2 . D e f in it io n . Define the logical connectives impredicatively. 
_L
_ V _ 
3
O ther logical connectives can be defined in term s of the  previous ones. For example 
logical equivalence can be defined as follows.
i f f  :
=  Xa,p:*. ( a ^ p )  & ( p ^ a )
B y definition, we get the in troduction  rules for the  im predicatively defined con­
nectives for free. The elim ination rules are easily provable. R em ark th a t  if we use 
a type system  w ith type hierarchies, we m ay raise the type of T  in the  definition of 
3 from * to  □, or even higher.
P ro p o s i t io n s -a s -T y p e s
One of the advantages of the propositions-as-types paradigm  is th a t it follows closely 
the in tuitionistic trad ition . Suppose we can prove in a logic L  the claim th a t  A  
follows from the  assum ptions r .  Formally, we prove this by showing th a t
r  h L a  .
A form ula A  in L  corresponds w ith a te rm  [A] of type * in type theory. We call 
an in hab itan t p  of [A] a proof object. This proof object is a faithful encoding of a 
proof for A. So,
[r] K  p  : [A] .
W hen we extend our type theory  w ith inductive types we do not need the  second 
order logic anym ore to  define the logical connectives. Some logicians consider second 
order logic as non-constructive. There seems to  be less resistance against inductive 
types. This is because inductive types are constructed  from base elements. On the 
o ther hand, some stronger versions of the elim ination principle of inductive types 
are more or less disputed.
2.2 .3 . D e f in it io n . Define the logical connectives inductively in first order m inim al
*
n x  :* .X
* — *
Aa:*. a  —  ^
* --— * --— *
Aa:* Ap:* n X :*. (a — X ) — (p — X ) — X  
* --— * --— * 
Aa:* Ap:* n X :*. (a — p — X ) — X  
n T :*. ( T — *) —  *
A T :* Afr.T — * n X :*. (n t:T . ( $ t ) — X ) — X
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predicate logic w ith inductive types.
±  : *
=  n X :*. ()
— : * —— *
=  Aa:*. a  —  ^
_ V _ : —> * —
=  Aa:* Ap:* i X :*. ( i n l  : a — X ,  i n r  : f3— X )
^  ^  *
=  Aa:* A3:* i X :*. ( p a i r  : a — 3 — X )
3 : n T :*. ( T — *) — *
= A T :* A4>:T—* f i X :*. ( e x in t r o  : n t:T . (<frt)— X )
As opposed to  the im predicatively defined connectives, we get the elim ination rule 
for free. This rule is nam ely precisely the elim ination principle of the  corresponding 
inductive type. The in troduction  rules we get for free as well from the constructors.
In second order predicate logic w ith inductive types, the characterization  of the 
connectives defined in definitions 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 are provably equivalent. Rem ark 
th a t for reasons of consistency, the inductive definition of 3 does not perm it T  to  be 
quantified over types higher th an  *. In some cases th is can be ra th e r inconvenient. 
This restriction does not hold for the  im predicative version of 3 .
We sum m arize the different system s in the  following table.
1 A ut A ut LEGO * Coq
-N  V Propositions-as-types
“I, &
V Encoded Second O rder Inductive
3
The colum n ‘1 A u t’ stands for the first au tom ath  translation , which is purely 
an encoded logic. The o ther A utom ath  system s (the so called second A utom ath  
translations, labeled as ’A u t’) makes use of the  propositions-as-types isomorphism. 
The type checker LEGO uses an im predicatively defined logic (‘Second O rder’). 
O ur system , labeled ‘*’, is sim ilar except for the or-connective. As we will see in 
Section 3.3.4, we make use of bo th  the inductive as the  im predicative defined or- 
connective. The type checker Coq (Dowek et al. 1993) is purely based on inductively 
defined connectives.
C la s s ic a l logic
O f course, the  law of excluded middle does not hold in in tu itionistic  logic. If we 
really need th is law in type theory, we have to  extend the  context w ith a constant 
of one of the following types.
2.2 .4 . D e f in it io n . Define the laws of excluded middle and double negation.
E M  : *
=  n a :* . a  V ~<a
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2.2 .5 . LEMMA. The laws of double negation and excluded middle are equivalent in  
intuitionistic logic.
PROOF. Well-known.
2.2 .6 . D e f in it io n . We can encode classical propositional logic using inductive 
types as follows. For an explanation  of the no ta tion  £b00l • • • = ^ ,  see A ppendix A.1.3.
b o o l
i s t r u e
j X ( f a l s e  : X ,  t r u e  : X ) 
b o o l
neg
£booi f a l s e  
t r u e  
b o o l ^  b o o l 
£booi f a l s e  
t r u e  
b o o l ^  b o o l 
£booi f a l s e  
t r u e
_L
=>• t r u e  
=> f a l s e  
b o o l
=>• A x:bool.x  
=> Ax:bool. t r u e
Note th a t as expected,
n x :b o o l  ( i s t r u e  (neg (neg x))) ^  ( i s t r u e  x)
is provable by induction on x.
Using the  classical t ru th  values b o o l, it becomes straightforw ard to  define func­
tions and predicates by cases. For let T  be a type, h i , h 2 : T  ^  T  and $  : T  ^  boo l. 
If we wish to  define a function f  such th a t
ƒ (x) = hi (x) 
h-2 (x)
if ^(x) 
otherwise
we can do this as follows:
f  : T  ^  T  ^  T  
= Ax:T. (£booi t r u e  
f a l s e
(h i x)
(h-2 x)) (^ x )
This is not possible for the im predicatively defined or-connective. In th a t case 
we ob tain  an elim ination principle into propositions, not into types. However, in 
Section 3.3.4 we will show how we can strengthen  the or-connective in order to  
achieve case distinction.
o r
Chapter 3
Representing M athematical 
Notions
To be able to  develop m athem atical proofs in a proof developm ent system , we have 
to  define the stan d ard  notions in type theory. Some notions are of set-theoretic 
nature , like sets, subsets and functions. Some are algebraic, like monoids, or fields. 
O thers have to  do w ith analysis, of which the n a tu ra l num bers and reals are exam ­
ples.
3.0.1 V alidation  contra verification
In general we see a trade-off between the com plexity of definitions and the complex­
ity  of the  proofs of properties concerning these definitions. If we choose com pact 
and simple definitions, we often need to  spend m ore effort in proving the desired 
propositions. B ut on the o ther hand, we could try  to  enhance our definitions in 
order to  get sim pler and more straightforw ard proofs. B ut then  the definitions usu­
ally get more complex and less clear. For two reasons we have a strong preference 
for simple definitions as opposed to  short proofs.
F irst, if we formalize m athem atics, it is of great im portance th a t all definitions 
are as clear and transparen t as possible. We need to  be sure th a t all formal defi­
nitions correspond precisely to  the  concepts and notions we have in mind: i.e. we 
have to  validate  the  formal definitions. G aining th is insight is more delicate th an  
form ally verifying  correctness of proofs. The la tte r can even be done by a machine. 
So we believe th a t we should focus on short and simple definitions, and accept th a t 
in some cases proofs m ay get more complex.
Second, theorem  provers are prim ary  designed for building proofs interactively 
in a more or less convenient way. In order to  prove a proposition, the theorem  prover 
helps us in finding an appropriate  list of tactics. Using these tactics, the theorem  
prover produces the  proof object which represents a proof of the proposition. On 
the o ther hand, these tactics were not designed for constructing  defin itions  in an 
interactive way. Of course in type theory  one could regard a definition as a proof of 
a proposition. So we could use the theorem  prover to  ‘bu ild ’ a definition, bu t this 
approach seems a b it awkward.
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N o ta t io n
In th is chapter, we will develop a no ta tion  for m athem atics. This no ta tion  should 
be easily readable for hum ans. B u t it should be precise and formal in such a way 
th a t it can be canonically transform ed into the syntax  of the  proof checker. We will 
call th is no ta tion  Pseudo LEG O  (see A ppendix A.1.2).
T hroughout th is thesis, we will present form alizations of lemmas, definitions, 
and assum ptions in a uniform  m anner. We have to  be very careful to  separate two 
levels of formality. Namely, we should distinguish between informal mathematics  
and m athem atics formalized in type theory. The la tte r  will generally be typeset in 
type w riter font. Lemmas are in troduced as follows.
Lem m a. S tatem ent S  is true.
Name : S
=  P ro o f
Note th a t S will often be of type PROP. If we are not in terested  in the actual proof- 
te rm  P ro o f we leave it out and replace it by _• • j . In th a t case the full proof w ith 
all the  details can usually be found in the LEGO library  (see Appendix A.3).
In type theory  there is no essential distinction between lemmas and  definitions. 
B oth  consist of a term , a corresponding type and a nam e attached  to  the term .
D e f in i t io n .  Define definiendum  as definiens.
d efin ien d u m  : T
=  d e f in ie n s
O ften T will be of type SET.
In some occasions we need to  assume th a t a certain  sta tem ent S  holds. We 
formalize this by a variable declaration which extends the current context of the 
type checker.
A xiom . Assume S  is true.
x : S
As p a rt of our pseudo LEGO, we allow the definition of lam bda-term s as an 
infix operator. We indicate th is by w riting explicitly the place holders used. An 
example is to  define the b inary  operator equality as _ =
3.1 Sets
W hen we w ant to  represent m athem atics the first question we encounter is how 
to  deal w ith sets. As Bishop wrote, a set is defined by describing w hat m ust be 
done to  construct an element  of the  set, and w hat m ust be done to  show th a t two 
elem ents of the  set are eqqual (Bishop 1967, chapter 3 ,paragraph 1). This leads us 
to  the following approaches.
3.1.1 Sets as typ es
Terms live in types, and elem ents belong to  a set. So it seems to  be n a tu ra l to  
define sets as types. The phrase ‘is an element o f’ is formalized by ‘has ty p e ’. For
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equational reasoning we need an (polym orphic) equivalence relation over types. We 
will define Leibniz equality1 for this purpose.
3.1 .1 . D e f in it io n . (i) We need the type of propositions, the type of sets, and a 
universe of types.
PROP : SET
SET : TYPE
=  Dq
TYPE =  □ 1
(ii) Define w hat it is for a relation to  be an equivalence relation. Let T iSET be a 
type2, R : T ^ T ^PROP be a relation over T .
r e f l e x i v e  : PROP
=  n x :T .R x x
sym m etric  : PROP
=  nx ,y :T ^  ( R x y ) ^ ( R y x )
t r a n s i t i v e  : PROP
= n x i T n y : T n z iT  ( R x y ) ^ ( R y z ) ^ ( R x z )
e q u iv a le n c e  : PROP
=  r e f l e x i v e  & sym m etric & t r a n s i t i v e
(iii) Define Leibniz equality impredicatively.
- = L  - : IL4iSET.
=  AAiSET A x ,y :A  n$:A^PROP^ ( $ x ) ^ ( $ y )
(iv) Define the n a tu ra l num bers by induction.
n a t  : SET
= j X :SET (ze ro  : X , SN : X ^ X )
Note th a t in p a rt ii and iii we make use of argum ent synthesis. This mechanism 
allows us to  leave out the applicant in those cases when the type checker is able to  
reconstruct the term . So instead of w riting ‘= L A x y \  we m ay drop A  and w rite 
‘= l  x y  ’. In fact, pseudo LEGO even allows us to  w rite ‘x = L y ’.
3 .1 .2 . LEMMA. Obviously, Leibniz equality is an equivalence relation.
R e f lL : r e f l e x i v e  = l 
=
SymL : sym m etric = l
=
T ra n sL : t r a n s i t i v e  = l
1Called after the German philosopher G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716) who investigated mathematical 
logic.
2See appendix A.1.1 for an explanation of the principle of argument synthesis and the i notation.
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At first sight it m ay seem b e tte r to  define SET on the lowest type-level possible, 
nam ely as the  type of propositions *. In order to  enable the form ation of the  set of 
propositions and the  set of predicates, we raise the type SET to  □ q. Then we have 
th a t * lives in SET. In Section 3.3.2 we will see th a t this choice is convenient.
As long as we deal w ith atom ic constructions, Leibniz equality  is fine. So for 
example Leibniz equality is suitable for equality  over inductive types like the n a t­
ural num bers n a t. Also it is suitable when we have a set w ith no structu re , like 
the axiom atically in troduced real num bers (see Section 3.5.4). A nother example is 
the  form alization of process algebras. In general one uses only atom ic or induc­
tive types to  define the d a tastruc tu res when formalizing process algebra. For this 
reason (Sellink 1996) was able to  make use of an inductively defined equality. A 
com plication of an intensional  equality like inductively defined equality  or Leibniz 
equality  is th a t when we use the  sets as types approach, elements of sets m ay have 
structu re  because they  are constructed  from other building blocks. In m any such 
cases we need a specific extensional equality which identifies more elem ents th an  
Leibniz equality does. Leibniz equality  is in a sense m inimal, because it identifies 
those elements which have exactly the same behavior. This will become problem atic 
in some cases, for exam ple when we construct the set of functions as follows.
: SET^SET^SET
=  A A ,B  :SET • A ^ B
: n A , B iS e t  ( fu n A B )^ ( fu n A B )^ P R O P
=  AA, B iS e t Af,  g :fun  A B  n x A  ( f x )  = l  (gx)
The intended equality  is pointwise equality of function results. Then 
A  : S e t let A  be a set
f  : fu n  A A  let f  be a function over A
z  : n x A  ( f x )  = L x  assume f is the iden tity  function over A  
g : fu n  A A  define g as the  identify function over A
= Ax'.A^x •
Now z is also a proof of the  sta tem ent f  = fun g, bu t f  = L g is no t provable w ithout 
extending the context w ith the axiom  of extensionality:
E xt : n A ,B  iSET n f ,g : f u n  A B ^ ( f  = fun g ) ^ ( f  = l  g) •
The form ation of quotient sets is even more troublesom e. For example, there is no 
straightforw ard way to  define the set of integers as the quotient of N x N by the 
relation
(x i,x 2 ) ~  (yi,y2) =  x i +  y2 =L  x2 +  yi •
Because the type theory  we work in does not have quotient types, sets-as-types is 
not suitable to  formalize quotient sets.
3.1 .3 . R e m a r k . Polym orphic equality can also be defined inductively.
Eqind : n a :S E T  a ^ a ^ P R O P
=  Aa:SET Ax:a jP ia^P R O P ^ (R e fla K : P  x)
It is easy to  show th a t Eqind is equivalent to  Leibniz equality. Inductive equality has 
a stronger elim ination principle, which m ay be convenient in some rare occasions.
fu n
-  — fun  -
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3.1.2 Setoids
In order to  solve the problem  of a fixed equivalence relation, we could relativize all 
quantifications of sets A  by a b inary  relation R  over A  and by a proof th a t R  is 
an equivalence relation. So if we wish to  express ‘for every set A, $ (A )’, we can 
formalize th is roughly as
nA :SE T nR :A ^A ^PR O P^ (e q u iv a le n c e  R) ^  $ r ( A ) ’
where $ R results from $  by replacing the equality by R. It will be much more 
n a tu ra l (w ith respect to  B ishop’s definition of sets) to  package the  type A, the 
relation R  and a proof of e q u iv a le n c e  R  in to  one single type. For this, we need 
sigma types.
3 .1 .4 . D e f in i t io n .  Define the type of setoids, no ta tion  S e t, as a type T , together 
w ith a b inary  relation R  over T  and a proof th a t R  is an equivalence relation.
EqRel : SET^SET
=  A T :SET S R :T ^ T ^PROP^ e q u iv a le n c e  R  
S e t : TYPE
=  ST:SET EqRel T
Now we model a set A  by T / R  for some type T  : SET and equivalence relation R  
over T . The equivalence classes of T / R  represent the elem ents of A. This approach 
is called sets as setoids.
To ex trac t the various com ponents of a formal set, we define
S e t^ S E T  ‘the elements of A ’
A A :S et n 3(A)
n A iS e t  ( e l  A ) ^ ( e l  A)^PROP 
A A iSet n 3 (A)
r e f l e x i v e  (=iA) ‘the proof th a t A  is reflexive’
A A iSet o u t 3nf (A)
sym m etric  (=iA) ‘the proof th a t A  is sym m etric’
A A iSet o u t 3nf (A)
t r a n s i t i v e  (=iA) ‘the proof th a t A  is tran sitiv e’
A A iSet o u t In f  (A)
The term  for 1 <  i < n  G N is in troduced as pseudo LEGO in A ppendix A.1.2. 
Some examples:
A  : S e t ‘let A  be a se t’ 
x  : e l  A  ‘let x  be an elem ent of A ’
For the  sake of readability  we sometimes w rite ‘Vx:T ’ instead of ‘n x :T  ’. Again, 
argum ent synthesis appears to  be quite convenient for the definition =  of equality  of 
a setoid. We do not need to  explicitly specify the set to  which the equality belongs.
W hen we construct a setoid, we generally do this in two stages. F irs t we con­
struc t a type T  : SET. Next we define a relation over T , show th a t it is an equivalence 
relation, and combine them  into a setoid S e t.
3.1 .5 . D e f in it io n . 
e l  :
-sym
trans
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3.1 .6 . D e f in it io n . Define the em pty  set, a singleton set and the set of n a tu ra l 
num bers.
(i) F irst on the level of types.
EmptySET : SET
=  ¡j,X:SET. ()
UnitSET : SET
=  ¡j, X :SET. ( s t a r  : X )
(ii) By adding Leibniz equality3, we ob tain  setoids.
Em ptySet : S e t
=  <EmptySET, =^iEmptySET, i_..._ i>
U n itS e t : S e t
=  <UnitSET, =^iU nitSET, _ . . ._ >
N : S e t
=  < n a t ,  = £ in a t, _ . . ._ >
We define for any n a tu ra l num ber n
n  : e l  N
=  (SN )"(zero)
where (SN )" (z e ro )  stands for n  applications of z e ro  w ith SN .
3.1 .7 . D e f in it io n . Because we have PROP : SET we can also define the set of propo­
sitions as is done in Lindenbaum  algebra’s. Define i  as the  propositions m odulo 
the if-and-only-if equivalence relation.
i  : S e t
=  <PROP, i f f ,  i____ >
By definition we have th a t  e l  i  =pL PROP and for propositions P ,Q  : e l  i
(P  =  Q) ^  (P  ^  Q ) .
Rem ark th a t for propositions P, Q : PROP, the term  P  =  Q is not  typable. Namely, 
the  argum ent m echanism  of the type checker needs to  find a setoid to  which P  and 
Q belong in order to  find the underlying equality relation between P  and Q.
3.1 .3  P artia l equivalence relations
A th ird  approach to  model sets in type theory  is to  use partial equivalence relations. 
A relation is a p artia l equivalence relation (or a PE R ) if it is a sym m etric and 
transitive relation.
Let R  be a P E R  over the type T  : SET. The dom ain of R  is defined as precisely 
those x  : T  for which R x x  holds. T hen we have th a t R  is an equivalence relation 
on its domain.
3 Instead of Leibniz equality we could use the inductively defined equality which is provably 
equivalent to Leibniz equality.
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3.1 .8 . D e f in i t io n .  (i) Define the type PER of p artia l equivalence relations over a 
type T  : SET. Define PE R -sets as a type T  together w ith a P E R  over T .
PER : SET—SET
=  A T :SET S R :T —T —PROP. (sym m etric R) & ( t r a n s i t i v e  R)
S e tp : TYPE
=  S T  :SET. PER T
(ii) Define term s to  ex trac t the  various properties of a PER -set.
e l p : S e tp —SET
=  AA:Setp .n f (A)
_ = p _ : IL4iSetp. (elp v4)^(elp A)^PR0P 
=  AAiSetp .n f (A)
(iii) Define the dom ain of a PER -set.
domp : n A :S e tp . ( e lp A )—PROP 
=  AA:Setp A x:e lp A . x  =p x
This way we have formalized the  notion ‘element o f’ by a term . So for a set A  : S e tp, 
we can express sta tem ents like ‘x is an elem ent of A  or it is n o t’.
Vx  : e l p A .(dom pA  x)  V -i(dom pA  x)
3.1 .4  P rod u ct Sets and V ectors
One very basic m athem atical notion we w ant to  formalize is p roduct sets. This can 
be done conveniently by either sigma types or an inductive definition. We choose to  
use sigma types because in the type checker we use, they  provide a nicer denotation  
for pairing and projection and they  can be type checked more efficiently.
3.1 .9 . D e f in it io n . Define the b inary  product type prod, an equivalence relation 
over prod, and the b inary  product set.
p ro d : SET^SET^SET
=  AS, T  :SET. S  x T
Eqprod : n A , B :Set. (p ro d (e l A )(e l B ) ) ^ ( p r o d ( e l  A )(e l B ) ) — PROP
= AA, B :S et Ap, g :p ro d (e l A )(e l B ).  (p.1 =  q.1) & (p.2 = q.2)
P rod : S e t— S e t— S e t
=  AA, B :S e t. < p ro d (e l  A )(e l B),  Eqprod A B , ^ . . . j>
In the sequel, we will need to  work w ith n -tuples for a rb itra ry  n a tu ra l num bers 
n. Therefore we need to  define the  type of n-tuples. Let A i , . . . ,  A n and A  be sets. 
We distinguish two cases, nam ely m any-sorted A i x - - - x  A n and single-sorted A n 
(also known as heterogeneous and homogeneous). The former case we call n-ary  
products, the  la tte r vectors.
For the  m any-sorted case we need to  define the type of sorts. This is done by a 
(finite) list of SETs, which we call SETS. Because SET lives in TYPE we need a list 
constructor of type TYPE^TYPE, which itself lives in BIGTYPE. We could avoid the 
use of BIGTYPE by defining SETS directly  as an inductive type, bu t we prefer the 
current approach because it is more general.
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3.1 .10 . D e f in it io n .
LIST : TYPE— TYPE
=  A T :TYPE /X :TYPE. (NIL T : X , CONS T : T — X — X ) 
SETS : TYPE
LIST SET
For any type A  : SET and Bs  : SETS, we will make use of the following abbreviations:
NILSET =  0 
CONS SET A  Bs = A ' B s
Now th a t  we have the type of sorts, there are two equivalent ways to  define n-ary  
products. Firstly, we can transform  the list of sorts to  an ite ra ted  application of the 
binary  product. This is a definition by recursion on (the length of) the  list SETS. 
Secondly, we can define n -ary  products by an inductive type.
3.1 .11 . D e f in it io n . Define n -ary  product in two ways. F irstly  by ite ra tion  and 
secondly by an inductive type.
p ro d u c t : SETS—SET
=  eLiST SET 0 = ^  UnitSET
(T ' T s ) = ^  p ro d  T  (p ro d u c t T s )
productind  : SETS—SET
=  ¡j, X :SETS—SET. ( 
p n i l  : X  0,
pcons : nSiSET n iiSE T S .S—  ( X  l)— X  ( S ' )
)
An intuitive argum ent th a t p ro d u c t and productind  are equivalent is to  look at 
the shape of their canonical inhabitants:
< s i , . . . ,  sn , s t a r >  : S i x . . .  x S n x  UnitSET
= L p ro d u c t (Si' '-  ■ ■’^ Sn'^0) 
pcons s i ( . . .  (pcons sn p n i l ) ) )  : p ro d u c tind (S i '^ ^ ^ 'S n^0)
A lthough the la tte r definition (p ro d u c tind) seems to  be a b it more elegant, we 
choose to  use the former one (p ro d u c t) . This is because proofs and definitions in 
which n -ary  products occur are m ostly done by induction on the set of sorts used. 
O f course, vectors are ju s t a special instance of n -ary  products.
3 .1 .12 . D e f in i t io n .  (i) Define a term  which m aps A n to  A'■■■'A  for any A  : SET, 
n  : n a t.
s s o r t e d  : SET— n a t —SETS
=  A T :SET.enat z e ro  = ^  0
(SN n) = ^  T '( s s o r t e d T  n)
(ii) Define the type of vectors in two ways. F irstly  indirectly  by using n -ary
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products and secondly by recursion on n .
v e c to r prod : SET—n a t—SET
=  A T :SET A n:nat. p ro d u c t ( s s o r t e d T  n) 
v e c to r  : SET— n a t—SET
= A T :SET.e;2at z e ro  = ^  UnitSET
(SN z e ro )  = ^  T
(SN (SN n)) = ^  p ro d T  (v e c to r  T  (SN n))
A lthough the definition of vectors by m eans of n -a ry  products is a b it more abstract, 
we choose to  use the second definition. The only reason is th a t it is a more low- 
level definition which involves half the num ber of i reductions com pared to  the  first 
definition. Also it has the  very convenient p roperty  th a t v e c to r  T  1 = pu T .  In case 
we need to  consider vectors as products, apply the next triv ial lemma.
3 .1 .13 . LEMMA. V T :SET V n:nat. (v e c to r  T n )— (p ro d u c t ( s s o r t e d T n ) ) .
P r o o f . For a proof, see the LEGO library.
3.1 .14 . D e f in it io n . To com plete the  definitions for n-tuples, we extend them  from 
types to  setoids.
S e ts  : TYPE
=  LIST S e t 
P ro d u c t : S e ts —S e t
=  eLIsT S e t (NIL S e t) = ^  U n itS e t
(CONS S e t A  A s ) = ^  P rod  A  (P ro d u c t A s )
E quality  on n -ary  products is defined using ite ra ted  conjunction of the  equalities of 
the sorts.
3 .1 .15 . D e f in i t io n .  (i) Define a te rm  which m aps A n to  A ' ■ ■ ■'A  for any setoid 
A  : S e t and n a tu ra l num ber n  : n a t.
S S o rted  : S e t— n a t —S e ts
=  A A :S et.enat z e ro  = ^  NIL S e t
(SNn) = ^  CONS? A  (S S o rted  A n )
(ii) Define the type of vectors by recursion on n .
V e c to r ind : S e t—n a t—S et
=  AA:Set. enat z e ro  = ^  U n itS e t
(SN n) = ^  P rod  A  (V ec to rind A n )
(iii) Define the vector set.
Eqvector : n A :S e t n n :n a t .  (v e c to r  ( e l  A) n )— (v e c to r  ( e l  A) n )—PROP 
=  A A :Set.£2at z e ro  = ^  = iU n itS e t
(SN ze ro ) = ^  =iA  
(SN (SN n)) = ^
Av, w :v e c to r  ( e l  A) (SN (SN n)).
(v.1 =  w. 1) & (Eqvector ? ?  v.2 w .2)
V e c to r : S e t— n a t —S e t
=  AA:Set A n:nat. < v e c to r  ( e l  A) n, Eqvector A n , t - . . . j>
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A lthough the definition V e c to r ind is much more straightforw ard then  V e c to r , we 
still choose the  la tte r one. Again th is is ju s t because of efficiency of reduction. 
V ec to r gives us quick access to  its com ponents w ithout going into recursion. So 
for each n, e l  (V ec to r A n ) converts in a single step  to  v e c to r  ( e l  A) n, where 
e l  (V ec to rlnd A n )  needs order n  steps.
3.1.5 D isjo in t union
Disjoint sums and products are ju s t dual structures, so all our definitions for p rod­
ucts can triv ially  be converted to  sums.
3.1 .16 . D e f in it io n . (i) Define the (binary) disjoint sum  type inductively.
sum : SET— SET—SET
=  AS, T :SET j X :SET. (inL  S,T : S — X ,  in R S,T : T — X )
(ii) Define the setoid Sum by adding an appropriate equivalence relation to  sum.
Eqsum : n A ,  B :Set. (sum A .e l  B . e l )— (sum A .e l  B . e l )—PROP 
=  A A , B :Set.e;?umA .e l B .e l
(inL  A .e l  B .e l  x i ) ,  (inL  A .e l  B .e l  X2) = ^  x i =  X2 
(inL  A .e l  B .e l  x i) , (inR  A .e l  B .e l  yi)  = ^  f a l s e  
(inR  A .e l  B .e l  y i), (inL  A .e l  B .e l  X2) = ^  f a l s e  
(inR  A .e l  B .e l  y i), (inR  A .e l  B .e l  yi)  = ^  yi =  yi
Sum : S e t— S e t—S e t
= AA, B :Set. <sum A .e l  B . e l , Eqsum A B , ^ . . ._i>
3.1 .17 . D e f in it io n . Define the n -ary  disjoint type and  set by recursion on n.
sums : SETS—SET
=  eLIsT SET 0 = ^  EmptySET
( S ' S s ) = ^  sum S  (sums S s )
Sums : S e ts —S e t
=  eLIsT S e t (NIL S e t) = ^  Em ptySet
(CONSSet A  A s ) = ^  Sum S  (Sums S s)
3.1 .18 . D e f in it io n . In Definition 3.4.6 we need a set of exactly  two elements.
(i) Using the disjoint union it becomes straightforw ard to  define a canonical set 
of precisely two elements.
TwoSets„m : S e t
=  Sum U n itS e tU n itS e t
(ii) We can also define a canonical set of two elem ents by an inductive definition.
TwoSET : SET
=  j X :SET. (u n itf ,  u n i t |  : X )
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(iii) E xtend  the definition to  a setoid.
EqTwoSET : TwoSET
=  F2 — F TwoSET
TwoSET^PROP 
u n it? , u n it?  
u n i t i  
u n it?
2u n i t i
u n i t
u n i t
u n i t
t r u e
f a l s e
f a l s e
t r u e
TwoSet S e t
=  <TwoSET, EqTwoSET, l ..._ i>
The same scheme can be used to  define sets of three or more elements. In those 
cases it is more convenient to  define them  as inductive types w ith three, four or 
more constructors as opposed to  defining them  by itera tion  of Sum U n itS e t. This 
is because the elim ination principle en of the  set of n  elem ents gives us im m ediately 
all n  sub cases, whereas esum gives us only two sub cases.
3.2 Functions
The next notion we define is functions on sets. We model these as type theoretic 
functions th a t respect the equality relation. However, th is way some particu lar 
functions cannot be defined in our calculus. Therefore we present a second definition 
based on functions as graphs, and a th ird  approach using case distinction.
3.2.1 Function  space
Let the sets A  and B  be given. To construct a function from A  to  B , we construct 
a A-term f  of type ( e l  A) — (e l  B ). Also we have to  supply a proof th a t this term  
f  preserves the equality  from A  to  B .
3.2 .1 . D e f in it io n . (i) Define the type of unary  functions.
e x te n s io n a l  : n A , B iSet. ( ( e l  A )— (e l  B ))—PROP 
=  AA, B iSet A g:(el A )— (e l  B)
Vx, y :e l  A. (x  =  y )— (gx) =  (gy)
Fun : S e t— S e t—SET
= AA, B :S et £ f  :(e l A )— (e l  B ).  e x te n s io n a l  f
(ii) Let A,  B iS e t be setoids and f  :Fun A B  a function from A  to  B . Define a term  
ap which ex tracts the type theoretic function from f . Also define a te rm  e x te n  
which gives a proof th a t f  preserves the equality of A  to  B .
ap
e x te n
(e l  A ) ^ ( e l  B)
2
( f  )
e x te n s io n a l ( a p  f  )
2 (f )
(iii) E xtend  the type of unary  functions to  a setoid.
eqFun : (Fun A B )— (Fun A B )—PROP
=  Af,  g:Fun A B  V x:el A.  (ap f  x)  =
F u n c tio n  : S e t— S e t—S e t
=  AA, B :S e t.< F u n  A B ,  e q Fun 1A 1B,
(ap g x)
___ i>
1
2
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The term  ap is used for function application. So f  (x) is formalized as ap f x .  This 
m ay be w ritten  as f . ap x. Furtherm ore we extend pseudo-LEGO w ith the following 
abbreviation. Let A, B  be sets.
A ^ B  =  Fun A B
Besides unary  functions, we also need b inary  functions a lot. I t is triv ial to  
extend the definitions above to  the b inary  case.
3.2 .2 . D e f in it io n . We will only present the definition of b inary  functions. The 
definitions of ap2 and e x te n 2 are m erely the first and second projections.
Fun2 : S e t—S e t—S e t—SET
=  AA, B ,  C :S e t S f  :(e l A )— ( e l  B )— (e l  C ). e x te n s io n a l2 f
For a rb itra ry  structu res we even need functions of a rb itra ry  arity. We will define 
these in Section 3.4.2. We could have used a rb itra ry  arity  functions to  in stan tia te  
them  to  the unary  or b inary  case. Because functions are a ra th e r basic notion 
which is used a lot in a proof checker, and because this instan tia tion  would make 
type checking considerably slower, we choose to  tre a t the  unary  and b inary  case 
separately.
3.2.2 C hoice axiom s
Some m athem aticians have been reserved to  make use of (variants of) the axiom of 
choice. Because of the  contructive n a tu re  of the propositions-as-types paradigm a, 
the  choice principles are not derivable in our system.
3 .2 .3 . D e f in i t io n  (Axiom of Choice). Let A  and B  be sets, and S  a subset of 
A  x  B .  If for each a G A  there  exists an element b G B  such th a t (a, b) G S , then  
there is a function f  G A ^ B  such th a t for each a in A  we have (a, f  (a)) G S .
In constructive m athem atics, existence is much more restrictive then  the existence 
in classical m athem atics. As (Bishop 1967, chapter 1, paragraph  3) w rites “the only 
way to  show th a t an object exists is to  give a finite routine for finding i t” .
So suppose th a t, in order to  get a choice function, we have proven for any a the 
existence of b such th a t R(a, b) holds. Then we had  to  provide a finite routine i for 
which R (a ,i (a ))  holds for every a. This routine need not preserve equality, so in 
general we do not get a choice function. Furtherm ore, th is routine i only exists on 
the m eta theoretical level. So if we need the axiom of choice, we have to  introduce 
it axiomatically.
There are m any weaker forms for the axiom of choice. One of them , which 
we call the axiom of unique choice, is particu larly  useful if we need to  construct a 
function object from its graph. As opposed to  the axiom  of choice, the underlying 
finite routine of the  proof of 3!x.^(x) does preserve equality. So in constructive 
m athem atics, the axiom of unique choice seems to  be an acceptable principle to  
use.
3 .2 .4 . D e f in i t io n  (Axiom of Unique Choice). Let A  and B  be sets. Every subset
S  C A  x  B  for which
-  for each a G A  there  exists an element b G B  such th a t (a, b) G S
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-  if (a, bi) and (a, b2) are elem ents of S, then  bi =  b2
determ ines a function f  G A ^ B  such th a t for each a in A  we have (a, f  (a)) G S .
W hen we formalize these axioms, in particu lar the existence property  of a function 
f , we have to  decide w hether we take the strong or weak existential quantifier.
The next definition makes use of the  notion of a binary relation over sets. Given 
A, B  : S e t, inhab itan ts of R el A  B  are equality preserving b inary  relations over the 
elem ents of A  x  B .  See Section 3.2.4 for the  formal definition of R el.
3.2 .5 . D e f in it io n . (i) Define the axiom of choice over sets, b inary  relations and 
functions, and over types and operators.
AC : PROP
=  n A , B  iSet VR:Rel A B . (V x:el A  3y  :e l  B . R .ap x y ) —
3 f : A ^ B  V x:el A. R .ap  x  ( f .ap  x)
ac  : PROP
=  n T ,  U iSET V R :T — U —PROP. (Vx:T 3y:U. R x y ) —
3 f : T — U Vx:T. R x  ( f  x)
(ii) Define the  axiom of unique choice over sets and functions using weak and 
strong existential quantification.
AUC3 : PROP
=  n A , B  iSet VR:Rel A B .  (Vx:el A  3 !y :e l B . R .ap x y ) —
3 f : A ^ B  V x:el A. R .ap x  ( f .ap  x)
AUCs  : TYPE
=  n A , B  iSet VR:Rel A B .  (Vx:el A  3 !y :e l B . R .ap x y ) —
S f : A ^ B  V x:el A. R .ap x  ( f .ap  x)
The axiom  of unique choice sta tes th a t if we have a function as a graph, there exists 
a function in the type theoretic sense. The strong variant actually  gives us this 
function as an object.
I t is easy to  prove th a t from AC follows ac and th a t from ac follows AUC .^ Also 
AUCs —AUC^  is provable, bu t the reverse im plication is not. The following lemma 
shows th a t in our system  the axiom of choice over sets implies classical logic.
3 .2 .6 . LEMMA. The axiom of choice implies excluded middle.
AC — V P :PROP. P  V —¡P
PROOF. We present an informal sketch of the proof. Suppose we have AC. Let 
P  : PROP be a proposition. First we define two predicates ^  and 0  over Q:
4>(a) = a  V P  
-0(a) =  —a  V P  .
Next we construct a tvjo-element set A  and a relation R  over A  x  Q as follows.
A  = {$, 0 }  
R(X, a) = x (a )
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We show that R  is a graph. That is, we prove
V x:el A  3a:PROP. R (x ,  a)
by case distinction on x  and substituting t r u e  respectively f a l s e  for  a. Then we 
apply AC to obtain a predicate f  over A  for  which
V x:el A . x ( f (x)) .
In  particular, 0 ( f  (0)) and 0 ( f  (0 )) hold. We apply case distinction on f  (0) V P  
and —f  (0) V P . For the case that f  (0) and —f  (0 ) hold, we assume P  is true. B u t  
then we have that 0  =  0  and hence f  (0) =  f  (0) which is leads to a contradiction. 
So we give up the assumption and conclude —P . For the other three cases, we have 
P  immediately.
The proof is based on the  fact th a t the  propositions form a set and th a t we have 
the com prehension axiom (see Section 3.3.3). This enables us to  define the setoid 
A  as follows.
= P : (PROP—PROP)— (PROP—PROP)—PROP
=  A0, 0 : ( e l  Q)— (e l  Q) Va:PROP. (0 a ) =  (0 a )
A  : S e t
=  <Sx:PROP—PROP. x  = p  0 V x  = p  0 ,  l ..._ i, i_. .._i>
For details, see the LEG O  library.
3 .2 .7 . Lem m a. AUCs  is conservative over AUCg
P r o o f  (sketch). Suppose we have proved a sta tem ent T  by a proof z : T  which 
makes use of an application of ACs . So say for a relation R  and a proof h we used 
in the  proof z the  term
ACs  R h  : S f  : A ^ B V a:el A . R ( a , f  (s)) .
T hen we can prove V f  : A ^ B .  [(Va:el A. R(a, f  (s))) — T ] w ithout using (ACs  R  h) 
anymore. B y an application of AC  ^ we can get a new proof of T  w ithout the strong 
axiom  of choice.
The strong versions of the  choice axioms as we form ulated them  have the re­
m arkable properties th a t they  make weak existential quantification strong.
3 .2 .8 . Lem m a. Suppose  A iSet, 0 :P red  A.
(i) ACs— (3 x :e l A. 0(x)) —  (S x :e l A .0 (x ) )
(ii) AUCs — (3!x :el A. 0(x)) —  (S x :e l  A. 0 (x)  & u n iq u e(0 , x))
PR ooF. For a proof, see the LEG O  library.
So as soon as we assume ACs  or AUCs , the projection for the existential quantifiers
3 respectively 3 ! become provable inside the system.
None the proofs presented in the case studies of the next chapter employed 
any choice principle a t all. During the developm ent of formalized m athem atics, 
we encountered only two occasions where we felt the  need for a choice principle. 
F irstly  for a proof th a t the  defined equality  over categorical subsets is equivalent 
to  the equality  on predicates (see Section 3.3.1). Secondly, for the construction 
of an inverse function from a surjective injection. It is not hard  to  see th a t bo th  
sta tem ents are equivalent to  the  axiom  of unique choice.
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3.2 .3  G raphs
Set theory  uses graphs to  represent functions. A graph is b inary  relation th a t is 
to ta l and unique.
3 .2 .9 . D e f in i t io n .  (i) Define w hat it m eans for a relation to  be total or functional.
t o t a l  : n A , B iSet (Rel A B — PROP
=  AA, B iSet AR:Rel A  B  V x:el A  3 y :e l B . R (x ,  y)
f u n c t io n a l  : n A , B iSet (Rel A B ) —PROP 
=  A A ,B  iSet AR:Rel A B
V x:el A  Vy, y ' : e l  B. R (x ,  y )— R (x ,  y ')— y  =  y'
(ii) Define functions in a set-theoretic  way as to ta l functional b inary  relations.
FunGr : S e t—S e t—SET
=  AA, B :Set. S R :R el A B .  ( t o t a l  R) & ( f u n c t io n a lR )
Functions as graphs as have the advantage th a t the axiom  of unique choice as 
form ulated in the previous section becomes a tautology. So it will be no problem  
to  define a function by cases on a decidable predicate.
3 .2 .10 . LEMMA. Let A , B  : S e t be a setoids, let 0  : ( e l  A) — P rop be a decidable 
predicate. Let a,b  : e l  B  be elements of B .  Then there exists a function F  : 
FunGr A  B  such that
F  (x) =  a i f  0(x)  
b else
PROOF. Define f  as
f  =  Ax, y :e l  A. (a =  y  & (0x)) V (b =  y  & —(0x))
Then it is trivial to show that f  is a total functional relation fo r  which the desired 
property holds.
From a set-theoretic standpo in t of view graphs are nice, for type theory  these 
are highly inconvenient to  use. L am bda calculus invites us to  represent functions as 
by A-terms. For example, to  formalize ‘V x . f  (g(x)) =  2’ as graphs we have to  w rite 
som ething like
V x 3 y .R f  (y, 2) & R g (x ,y )
3.2 .4  P red icates and relations
In th is subsection we will define the notion of predicates. We will formalize them  
as functions into the set of propositions Q. Let us first present a definition of n-ary  
relations following (Mines et al. 1988, chapter 1, paragraph  2).
An n -ary  relation on a set S  is a p roperty  P  th a t is applicable to  n - 
tuples of elements of S, and is extensional in the  sense th a t if xi  =  y*, 
for i =  1 , . .  . , n ,  then  P  (x i , . . . , x n ) if and only if P  (yi , . . . ,  yn ).
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The naive way to  formalize predicates is by tuples of a type theoretic function 
f  in to  PROP, together w ith a proof th a t f  preserves equality. B ut since we have 
functions over sets and the setoid of propositions Q, it is easy to  define predicates 
and relations as functions into Q. This has the advantage th a t all constructions and 
lemmas which are valid for functions also can be in stan tia ted  by predicates. In the 
following definitions we only present the case for predicates, while relations are a 
triv ial extension.
3.2 .11 . D e f in it io n . (i) Define predicates as functions into the set of propositions.
P red  : S e t—SET
=  AA:Set. Fun A  Q
(ii) Let A  : S e t be a setoid. Transform  the type P red  A  : SET into a setoid.
P r e d ic a te  : S e t—S e t
=  A A :S e t.F u n c tio n A Q
Because P red  is defined in term s of functions, extensionality holds autom atically  
for predicates also. This m eans th a t given a predicate 0  : P red  A  for some setoid 
A, we have th a t for x , y  : e l  A,
(x =  y ) — (0(x) 0 (y )) .
This is ensured because the underlying equality  of the set of propositions Q is the  if- 
and-only-if relation. For the definition of P re d ic a te ,  pointwise equality of functions 
is used to  com pare subsets. This implies th a t  for any two predicates 0  and 0  of 
type P r e d ic a te  A  we have
0  =  0  =  V x:el A. 0(x) 0 ( x ) .
3 .2 .12 . D e f in i t io n .  (i) A predicate over a set A  is decidable if for every element 
of A  we know th a t x  is in the  predicate or not. We distinguish predicates on the 
level of type theoretic m aps into PROP and on the level of functions into Q.
d e c id a b le _ p re d  : IITiSET. (T->PROP) -► PROP
=  A T iSET A P :T —PROPVx:T. (P  x) V —( P x )
d e c id a b le j r e l  : IITiSET. (T ^ T ^ P R O P ) -► PROP
=  A T iSET A R :T — T — PROPVx,y:T . ( R x y )  V —( R x y )
(ii) Define decidability of predicates P red  and relations R e l .
D e c id a b le P re d  : n A iS e t. (P red  A) — PROP
=  AAiSet A P:Pred A  d e c id a b le _ p re d  (apP )
D ec id a b le R e l : n A iS e t. (Rel A A ) — PROP
=  AAiSet Ai?:Rel A  A  d e c id a b le j r e l  (ap2i?)
(iii) We also can define w hat it is for a setoid to  be discrete. A setoid is discrete 
if the underlying equality  relation  is decidable. Let A  : S e t be a setoid.
D is c r e te  : PROP
=  d e c id a b le j r e l  (=  iA)
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3.3 Subsets
In th is section we elaborate on subsets. Now th a t we have predicates, it seems 
n a tu ra l to  define subsets as predicates. We will look briefly to  another approach, 
nam ely categorical subsets. Next we will show how to  construct the  power set, and 
show how we can transform  subsets into sets. For decidable predicates, we will 
define a way to  obtain  the characteristic  function by way of case distinction.
3.3.1 Su bsets as pred icates
Bishop defines subsets w ith use of an injection m ap. We quote (Bishop 1967, chapter
3, definition 1):
A subset (A, i) of a set B  consists of a set A  and  a function i : A  —  B,  
called the inclusion map , such th a t
a i =  a2 if and only if i ( a i ) =  i(a 2)
for all a i and  a2 in A.
This function i injects every element of A  in to  the set B . So actually, A  is a subset 
of B  if A ’s cardinality  is smaller then  the cardinality  of B .
However, in type theory  it seems to  be more n a tu ra l to  formalize subsets as 
predicates. So given a set A , a subset B  is formed by indicating which elements 
of A  belong to  B . The set-inclusion relation then  is valid only for subsets over a 
common set.
3.3 .1 . D e f in it io n . (i) Define subsets as predicates and the power set by forming 
subsets into setoids.
S u b se t : S e t—SET 
=  P red
(ii) For readability, we define the ‘is an elem ent’ relation for subsets. Let A  : S e t 
be a setoid.
elem  : ( e l  A )— (S u b se t A )—PROP 
=  A x:el A A P :S u b se t A.  a p P x
3.3 .2 . D e f in i t io n .  A subset S  of a set A  is detachable if every element of A  belongs 
to  S  or not.
d e ta c h a b le  : (S u b se t A) — PROP 
=  D e c id a b le P re d  iA
In a classical setting, all subsets are detachable.
3.3.2 Pow er sets
Power set form ation is considered as a very powerful operation. The way we have 
formalized predicates gives us the power sets immediately.
3.3 .3 . D e f in it io n .
P o w erse t : S e t—S e t
A A :S e t . P r e d ic a te  A
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The crucial point is th a t in Definition 3.1.7, we allowed ourselves to  form the set of 
propositions Q by quotienting them  by the  if-and-only-if relation.
3 .3 .4 . D e f in i t io n .  Let A, B iS e t be a setoids. We define operators over subsets 
and the  notions of image and pre-im age of a subset.
(i) Let S , T  : e l  (P ow erse t A) be subsets of A. Define the em pty  subset, subset 
complement, union and intersection.
v o id  : e l (P o w e rs e t  A)
=  < A x:el A.  f a l s e ,  _ . . ._ >
compl : e l (P o w e rs e t  A)
=  < A x:el A. — (elem x S ) , _ . . ._ >
u n io n  : e l  (P ow erse t A)
=  < A x:el A.  (elem  x  S)  V (elem  x T ) ,  _. . ._>
i n t e r  : e l  (P ow erse t A)
=  < A x:el A.  (e lem x S )  & (e lem x T ) ,  _.. ._>
(ii) Let f  : Fun A B  be a function. Define the pre-im age and image of f . 
P reIm age
Image
(e l  (P ow erse t B)) ^  ( e l  (P ow erse t A))
X C :e l  (P ow erse t B ).  < A a:e l A.  elem  f  (a) C, _. . ._i> 
( e l  (P ow erse t A)) ^  ( e l  (P ow erse t B))
A C :e l  (P ow erse t A).
<A b:el B  3 a :e l  A.  (elem a C )  & ( f  (a) =  b), _..  ._>
3 .3 .5 . LEMMA. Given S , T  : e l  (P ow erse t A) be subsets of a setoid A  : S e t. We 
have the following De Morgan laws.
(i)
( i n t e r  (compl S )(com pl T )) =  compl (u n io n S T )
(ii) I f  d e ta c h a b le  S  and  d e ta c h a b le  T  hold, then
(un ion  (compl S )(com pl T )) =  compl ( i n t e r  S T ) .
PROOF. See the LEG O  library.
3.3 .3  Su bsets into sets
The com prehension axiom  plays an im portan t role in set theory. The axiom sta tes 
th a t
for any p roperty  0  and set A  we can form the  set {x  G A \0 (a )} of all 
elem ents of A  which satisfy p roperty  0  .
Let A  be a set and S  be a subset over A. We use sigm a-types to  define the type of 
all elem ents of A  th a t are m em ber of S . This type is formed into a set by adding 
the equality relation of A .
toSET : nTiSET. (T —PROP)—SET
=  AT  iSET A0:T— PROP. S x : T . 0 x  
to S e t  : n A iS e t. (S u b se t A )—S e t
=  AAiSet A S :S ubset A. <T, Ax, y:T. x i  =  y i, _.. ._> 
where T  : SET =  toSET (ap S )
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The com prehension axiom has the danger th a t it m ay lead to  a paradox. Namely, 
define z =  {y\y G y}, then  we have z G z 2 G z  which is a contradiction.
However, the Russell paradox will not arise because we dem and th a t elem ents of z 
belong to  a set of which z itself can not be a member. Also elem  z z  is no t typable.
3.3 .4  C ase d istin ction
Unless we have functions as graphs, it is not possible to  define a function by cases 
in pure type system s like A C . The reason for this is th a t we defined the logical 
or-connective by an im predicative definition. The or-elim ination principle allows us 
only to  elim inate into propositions. In general however, a function has a type as 
codomain. O f course, we could assume the  strong variant of the axiom of unique 
choice to  define a function by cases. B u t this extension of the  context is not w anted 
nor necessary in m ost cases.
The inductively defined or-connective has a stronger elim ination principle, nam ely 
elim ination into types. Then we are able to  define a function by case distinction. 
If we need case distinction we could substitu te  the  im predicative definition of the 
or-connective by the inductive definition. This would m ean redoing all our proofs 
and rebuilding all our libraries. B ut fortunately, there  is a more elegant solution. As 
we will see, ju s t the  definition of the  inductively defined or makes the im predicative 
defined or strong.
3.3 .6 . D e f in it io n . Recall the definition of the logical or-connective bo th  im pred­
icative and inductively from Section 2.1.
V : PROP—PROP—PROP
=  AP,Q :PRO PnX iPROP. (P — X ) — (Q— X ) — X  
i n l  : n P , QiPROP. A — (A V B)
=  L. . .J
i n r  : n P , QiPROP. B — (A V B )
=  L ...J
Or : PROP— PROP—PROP
=  AP, Q:PROP ¡j, X :PROP. ( I n l P,Q : P — X ,  I n r P,Q : Q — X )
Then we have
e0r f g ( I n l p,Q p ) =  f p
£0r f g  ( I n r  p,Q q) =  gq
where P ,Q  : PROP, p  : P , q : Q, 0  : (Or P Q — SET, f  : Vp:P.0  ( I n l p ,q p), and 
g : Vq:Q. 0  ( I n r p ,q q) .
Using Or we can define a te rm  s e l e c t  for case d istinction  based on P  V Q :
3 .3 .7 . D e f in i t io n .  Let P ,Q  : PROP be propositions.
s e l e c t  : (P  V Q) — n T iSET.T— T — T  
= Az:P V Q AT:SET Aa,b:T.
£or (Ap:P. a) (Aq:Q. b) (z In lp ,Q  I n r p Q
3.3 .8 . LEMMA. Let P ,Q  : PROP be propositions. Let T  : SET be a type and a,b  : 
T .
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(i) The or-connectives are equivalent.
(P  V Q) ^  (Or P Q )
(ii) Suppose p  : P , and q : Q. Then
s e l e c t  ( in lp ,q p )  ab =pu a 
s e l e c t  ( in rp ,q  q) ab =pu b .
(iii) I f  z  : P  V Q, then
s e l e c t  z ab = pu a i f  for  some h:P we have z  = pu in lp ,q  h 
s e l e c t  z ab = pu b i f  for  some h:Q we have z  = pu i n r  p ,q h .
(iv) I f  z  : P  V (—P ), then
P  —  ( s e l e c t  z a b ) = L  a 
- P  —  ( s e l e c t  z  ab) = l  b .
P r o o f . The proof of (i) is trivial (see the LEGO library  for details). To see th a t 
(ii) holds we have to  realize th a t
i n l p ,q p  In lp ,q  In rp ,q  =  In lp ,q  p  
i n r p ,q q In lp ,q  I n r p ,q =  I n r p ,q q .
Lemma (iii) follows directly  from (ii). We only present a proof of the first p a rt 
of (iv). Assume th a t P  holds. E xpand the definition of s e l e c t  and apply the 
O r-elim ination principle on
z  In lp ,- ,p  In lp ,- ,p  : Or P  (—P ) .
Then we are left to  prove P — (a = L a) and (—P )— (b = L a), which are b o th  obvious 
because P  holds.
If the  proof z in Lem m a 3.3.8 (iv) is constructive, z will generally have a shape as 
s ta ted  in (iii). As a consequence we then  get the stronger result th a t
P  —  ( s e l e c t  z a b ) = p l a 
—P  —  ( s e l e c t  z  ab) = pu b .
Case distinction via s e l e c t  is no t always convenient. Sometimes we w ant to  
test w hether two elem ents in a discrete set are equal or not.
3 .3 .9 . D e f in i t io n .  Let A iSet be a discrete setoid such th a t Adiscr is a prove for 
D is c r e te  A . Let x, y  : e l  A  be elem ents of A . Define
i f  : nTiSET. T — T — T  
=  s e l e c t  (Adiscr x y )  .
Now we can w rite ‘i f  Adiscr x y a b  which m eans ‘if x  =  y  then  a otherwise b’.
The following extension of pseudo LEGO allows us to  w rite case d istinction for 
decidable predicates in a more readable way. Let 0  : T —PROP be a decidable predi­
cate over a type T  : SET and hi,  be of type T  —>■ T .  Let </>dec : d e c id a b le _ p re d  4> 
be a proof of the decidability of 0. Then
f  =  s e l e c t  (0decx)(h1 x )(h 2 x)
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m ay be w ritten  as
f  =  Ax:T. hi x  if 0 x
h2 x  otherwise
in pseudo LEGO.
3 .3 .10 . D e f in i t io n .  Using case distinction it is easy to  get the  characteristic func­
tion  of a decidable predicate.
(i) Let TiSET be a type, </>iT^PR0P and </>dec : d e c id a b le _ p re d  4> a proof th a t 4> 
is decidable. Define the m ap
c h a r  : T  —  n a t
=  Ax'.T. 0 if <j)x
1 otherwise
(ii) Because the m ap c h a r  preserves equality we can extend it to  a function. Let 
A iSet be a setoid, 0 iP red  A  and 0 dec : D e c id a b le P re d  0  a proof th a t 0  is decidable. 
Define
Char : Fun A  N
=  < c h a r  0 dec, l . . . j >
3 .3 .11 . LEMMA. Let T  : SET be a type, 0  : T —PROP be a decidable predicate over 
T .
yx '.T . (<j) x)  -<=> (c h a r </>dec x) =  0
PROOF. B y  Lemma 3.3.8 (iv) and some equational reasoning.
For an application of s e l e c t  and c h a r , the  reader is referred to  Section 4.2. 
There we define a prim e generator using bounded m inim alization.
3.4 M athem atical Structures
In th is section we present a form alization of a general framework of syntactical 
descriptions and their realizations. For two reasons it is im portan t to  formalize 
m athem atical structu res as prim itive notions. F irst, it makes it possible to  define 
notions like hom om orphism  and substructures for a rb itra ry  structu res in a general 
way. So to  ob tain  the type of hom om orphism s over monoids, we ju s t have to  in­
s tan tia te  hom om orphism s w ith the s tructu re  of monoids. O f course, all results for 
hom om orphism s will im m ediately carry  over to  hom om orphism s over monoids. Fur­
therm ore, we wish to  be able to  reason about struc tu res in general. This will allow 
us to  develop m eta-theory  inside our system. An example is equational reasoning 
which we present using a two-level approach in C hap ter 5.
We will consider single-sorted structu res only. The reason for th is is threefold.
1. All our case studies do not need m any-sorted structures. We don’t  work w ith 
m etric spaces for example.
2. Most structu res like ‘function’, ‘te rm s’, or ‘hom om orphism ’ are quite easier 
to  define single-sorted. Also the ir application in formal proofs is simpler.
3. The construction  of the single-sorted case as an instan tia tion  of the  many- 
sorted case is quite involved. It would make type-checking considerably less 
efficient.
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M athem atical struc tu res are constructed  in two stages. F irs t we define the 
syntactical notion of a signature. For the case of single-sorted algebras, the signature 
determ ines a countable set of function and predicate symbols. Also, every symbol 
is assigned an arity. Next the syntax is in terpreted . This leads to  the sem antical 
notion of a structu re . The in terp re ta tion  consists of a carrier set and a function 
and predicate for each symbol of the  signature.
We distinguish structu res and models. C om pared to  structures, models satisfy 
additional axioms. We define the notion of axioms over structures instead of over 
signatures. This makes much more general form ulations of axioms possible. A 
draw back m ight be th a t axioms do not have structu re  anym ore about which we can 
reason. However, we feel th a t th is is not out weighted by the advantage of freely 
s truc tu red  axioms.
R ecapitulating, s tructures are in troduced by
1. a signature defining the alphabet,
2. a carrier set for the  dom ain of the structure,
3. two valuation maps which in terp re t every symbol of the signature to  a func­
tion  or predicate over the  carrier set.
Based upon structu res we construct the notion of models by adding
4. a proposition over the in terpreted  symbols of the  signature to  form ulate the 
axioms of a structure,
5. a proof  of the axioms.
3.4.1 S yn tax
Single-sorted signatures consist of two types representing the num ber of function and 
predicate symbols, together w ith two m aps which assign an arity  to  each symbol. 
C onstan ts are trea ted  as functions w ith arity  zero.
3.4 .1 . D e f in it io n . (i) We define the type of signatures inductively as follows.
S ig n a tu re  : TYPE
=  ij,X  :TYPE. (
Sigintro : n F :SET. ( F ^ n a t )  ^
n P :SET. ( P ^ n a t )  ^  X
)
(ii) Define projection functions to  ex trac t various properties of a signature.
sym bolF : S ig n a tu re  ^  SET
=  Esó-gna-tui-e (XF:SET X A rp :F ^ n a t  X P :SET X A rp :P ^ n a t .  F )
symbolp : S ig n a tu re  ^  SET
=  £signature (X F :SET X A rp :F ^ n a t  X P :SET X A rp :P ^ n a t . P )
a r i t y F : n s iS ig n a tu re . (sym bolF s) ^  n a t
=  £signature (XF:SET X A rp :F ^ n a t  X P :SET X A r p : P ^ n a t .A r p )
a r i t y P : n s iS ig n a tu re . (sym bolP s) ^  n a t
=  £signature (XF:SETX A rp :F ^ n a t X P :SETX A r p : P ^ n a t .A r p )
3 .4 .2 . D e f in i t io n .  Let s : S ig n a tu re  be a signature. Define term s and formu­
las.
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(i) F irst we define n-tuples of term s and term s. 
te rm s n a t  ^  SET 
¡j, X :n a t ^  SET. (
TFV
TFC
t n i l
tc o n s
n a t  —>■ (X I ),
n / :s y m b o lF s. ( X ( a r i t y F ƒ)) -► (X I), 
X O ,
I ln in a t. (X I) —>■ (X n) —>■ (X (SNn))
term SET
te rm s  1
Here TFV stands for term formation variables and TFC stands for term formation  
constants and functions. Variables are encoded by n a tu ra l num bers.
(ii) Define (atom ic) formulas inductively.
a fo rm u la
fo rm u la
SET
Ij,X  :SET. (
AFPred 
AFEq
)
SET
Ij,X  :SET. (
FFAtom
FFE x,FFA ll,FFnot 
FFim p,FFor, FFand
)
np :sym bolP s. (te rm s ( a r i t y Pp)) ^  X  
(te rm s 2) —>■ X
3.4.2 Sem antics
We will define a s truc tu re  over a signature s as a set A  together w ith valuation 
functions for the function and predicate symbols of s. Given some axioms ax over 
s, we define a model as a s truc tu re  satisfying the  axioms ax.
3.4 .3 . D e f in it io n . (i) Define n -ary  functions and predicates.
FunN : S e t N SET
P red N S e t N SET
(ii) Define structu res and models.
S t r u c tu r e  : S ig n a tu re  ^  TYPE
=  X s:S ig n a tu re  S A :S e t. (nc:sym bolF s. FunN A  ( a r i t y F c ))x
(np :sym bolP s. P red N A  ( a r i t y Pp))
Axioms : S ig n a tu re  ^  TYPE
=  X s:S ig n a tu re . ( S t r u c tu r e  s) ^  PROP
Model : n s iS ig n a tu re . (Axioms s) ^  TYPE
=  X s:S ig n a tu re  X ax :Axioms s S s t r :S t r u c tu r e  s. ax str
)
Rem ark th a t  in the definition of Model the  lam bda term  ax str  is a proposition.
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The reader is referred to  the  LEGO library  for the actual definition of FunN and 
P red N . By definition we ob tain  the convenient properties th a t for any setoid A  : S e t
ap (FunN AO) e l  A
Fun" A l Fun A A
FunNA 2 Fun2 A A A
P re d NA l P red  A
P re d NA 2 R e lA A  .
3.4 .4 . D e f in it io n . Define lam bda term s to  ex trac t various properties of models 
and structures. Let s iS ig n a tu re  be a signature.
(i) Let the  proposition a x i(Axioms s) form ulate the  axioms for a s truc tu re  of the 
signature s. Let M  : (Model ax ) be a model satisfying the axioms.
s t r u c t u r e S t r u c tu r e  s
(M )
ax s t r u c t u r e
=  ^ 2(M  )
(ii) Let a x i(Axioms s) be some axioms for a s truc tu re  of the signature. Let M  
(Model ax ) be a model satisfying the axioms.
c a r  : S e t
=  ( s t r u c tu r e  M  )
obj : SET
=  e l  c a r
i n t F : nc:sym bolFs . FunN c a r  ( a r i t y F c)
=  n 3 ( s t r u c tu r e  M  )
i n t P : np :sym bolP s. P red N c a r  ( a r i t y Pp)
=  n f  ( s t r u c tu r e  M  )
1
(iii) Define the type 0  as
0 =  n A iS e t.
(nc:sym bolF s. FunN A  ( a r i t y F c)) ^
(np :sym bolP s. P re d N A  ( a r i t y Pp)) ^  PROP .
For convenience, we define a lam bda term  to  introduce the axioms of a s truc tu re  as 
follows.
Axioms intro : 0 ^  Axioms s
= Xz:0 Xstr  :S t r u c tu r e  s. z  n 3 (s tr)  nff(str)
We need an in terp re ta tion  function which, given some assignm ent, m aps each term  
of the signature to  an elem ent of the carrier of a model.
3 .4 .5 . D e f in i t io n .  Let s iS ig n a tu re  be a signature, a x i(Axioms s) some axioms 
for a s truc tu re  of the  signature. Let M  : (Model a x ) be a model satisfying the 
axioms.
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(i) An assignm ent is a valuation of the variables into the carrier of M . We 
im plem ent assignm ents by non-em pty4 lists. See the LEGO library  for a definition 
of non-em pty lists n e L is t .
A ssignm ent : S e t
=  n e L is t  M .c a r
(ii) Define the in terp re ta tion  of a te rm  w ith respect to  an assignm ent. F irs t we 
deal w ith the case of n-tuples of term s. Let p : e l  A ssignm ent be an assignm ent.
i nt ° n n in a t .  (te rm s s n )  ^  (p ro d u c t M .ob j n)
— ^terms s (TFV n) —
(TFC f t )  — 
t n i l  — 
tc o n s t l  — 
i n t p : (term  s) ^  (obj M )
— A t:term  s. n 2( in tp  t)
<p(n), s t a r >
< ( i n t Ff  ) ( in tp  t), s t a r >  
s t a r
< n 2(in tp  t), in tp  l>
M o n o id s
Defining a struc tu re  like the monoids falls into two parts. F irst, we define the 
signature. Second, we define axioms over the signature which should be satisfied to  
form a monoid.
3.4 .6 . D e f in it io n . We define the signature for monoids as two function symbols 
and no predicate symbols. One function symbol is used for a constant, another 
symbol for a b inary  function.
FnSymMN : SET
— i j,X :SET. (identMN, opMN : X ) 
sigMN : S ig n a tu re
=  S ig in-tro (^ FnSymMN ideiltMN ' 0
opMN 2 )
(£EmptySET)
3.4 .7 . D e f in it io n . (i) We need to  define the  notion of associativity  and identity.
Let AiSET be a setoid, f  : (Fun2 A A A ) a b inary  function over A  and e : e l  A  an 
element of A .
A s s o c ia t iv e  : PROP
=  n x , y , z :el A f  (x , f  (y , z )) =  f  ( f  (x , y ) , z )
I d e n t i t y  : PROP
=  ( n x :e l  A. f  (e, x) =  x) & ( n x :e l  A. f  (x ,e )  =  x)
4An assignment over M  is implemented by a non-empty list because we always need at least 
one element of the carrier of M . This element enables us to valuate variables outside the set of 
free variables of a term.
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(ii) Now we are able to  specify the axioms for a monoid.
axiom s hn : Axioms sigMN
=  Axioms intro (AA:Set
X F : ( n f  :sym bolF sigMN. FunN A  ( a r i t y F f ))
A P :(np:sym bolP sigMN. P red N A  ( a r i t y Pp)). 
( A s s o c ia t iv e ( F  opMN))
&
( I d e n t i t y  (F  opMN)(F identMN)))
A lthough the definition of the  axioms of monoid m ay look complex, the type checker 
will help us to  build it. So for exam ple using the I n t r o s  tactic, it will generate for 
us the  types of the  variables F  and P  autom atically.
3.4 .8 . D e f in it io n . (i) Now we have specified the signature for a m onoid s tructu re  
and the  axioms which should hold, the definition of a m onoid is a simple task.
Monoid : TYPE
— Model ax io m sHn
(ii) Also we are able to  retrieve the m ultiplication and un it elem ent of a monoid.
Let M  : Monoid be a monoid.
1mn : obj M
=  a p ( i n t F M identMN)
x hn : Fun2 M .c a r  M .c a r  M .c a r
=  i n t F M  opMN
a s s o c HN : A s s o c ia t iv e  x hn
=  f s t  M .axiom s
id e n tHN : I d e n t i t y  x hn 1hn 
snd M .axiom s
In our lib rary  we developed theory  for monoids, groups, rings, up to  fields. We 
in troduced ordered field as follows.
3 .4 .9 . D e f in i t io n  (O rdered field). Let A  be a set, 0 and 1 be two elem ents of 
A, in v  and r e c ip  be unary  functions over A  (for additive inverse and recip­
rocal), +  and x be b inary  functions over A, and pos be a predicate over A. 
F  =  <A, 0, in v , + , 1, r e c ip ,  x , 1, p o s>  is an ordered field if it satisfies the field 
axioms, and moreover for every x , y  in A :
p o s(in v (x )) V pos(x) 
pos(x) ^  p o s(in v (x )) ^  x  =  0 
pos(x) ^  pos(y) ^  pos(x  +  y) 
pos(x) ^  pos(y) ^  pos(x  x y)
Also we defined the notion of hom om orphism s and subgroups over struc tu res and 
showed some basic properties concerning them . The reader is referred to  the LEGO 
library  (A ppendix A.3) for more details.
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3.5 Towards A nalysis
In th is section we formalize a few num ber system s up  to  the field of complex num ­
bers. We s ta r t w ith the n a tu ra l num bers. T hey are defined by a construction. Next 
we build the  integers from the  naturals. Then using the integers, we construct the 
rationals. The real num ber system  is formalized by an axiom atization. And finally 
the complex num bers are constructed  ou t of the reals. Schematically:
n a t
N
Z
R
C R [ X  ]
C [X  ]
Q
where n a t  stands for the  inductively defined n a tu ra l num bers. Polynom ial rings 
will be in troduced in Section 4.4.1.
3.5.1 N atural num bers
Let us first form ulate a list of postu lates which should be satisfied by any represen­
ta tio n  of the n a tu ra l num bers.
3.5 .1 . D e fin it io n  (The Peano postulates). Given a signature
<N, 0, S, + , x >  .
The Peano postulates consist of the following list of sentences.
PPi
PP2
PP3
PP4
PP5
PP6
PP7
Vx e  N.(S x) =  0,
V x ,y  e  N.((Sx) =  (S y ) ) ^ ( x  =  y),
Vx e  N.(x +  0) =  x,
V x ,y  e  N.(x +  (S y )) =  (S (x +  y)),
Vx e  N.(x x 0) =  0,
Vx, y e  N.(x x (S y)) =  (x + ( x  x  y)),
V0 e  N ^PRO P.(^0 ) ^
(Vx e  N .(0 x )^ (p  (Sx))- 
(Vx e  N.0x)
The form alization of na tu ra l num bers does not pose any real difficulties. Depending 
on the type system  used, several approaches are possible. We will review these 
briefly. For all approaches we only define n a tu ra l num bers as a type. We could 
transform  them  into a setoid by adding an appropriate  equivalence relation like 
Leibniz equality.
A x io m a tic
W hen we work in a second-order predicate logic, the following context m ay be used 
also as an axiom atization of the Peano postulates.
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3.5 .2 . D e f in it io n . Define the context of Peano axioms.
natA SET
0 natA ,
S n a tA ^ n a tA ,
PAi n x ina tA - “ ((S x) =  0 ),
PA2 n x ,  y :n a ta . ((S x ) =  (S y  ) H ( x  =  y),
PA7 n^:natA ^P R O P . (fi 0 ) ^
( n  x :n a t^ . ( f i x ) ^ f i  ( S i ) ) ^
( n  x :n a t^ . f ix )
where =  stands for Leibniz equality.
By definition, Leibniz equality is com patible w ith S. Because we work in second- 
order predicative logic, we are able to  define prim itive recursive functions like pre­
decessor, addition or m ultiplication by some relation  R. After we have shown th a t 
th is R  is a graph, we feel safe to  extend the context PAax w ith a fresh variable f #  
together w ith a defining formula of f #  for R.
3.5 .3 . D e f in it io n . We introduce the addition as follows.
(i) Define the relation p lu s rei and  prove it is a graph.
p lu s rei : n a t^ ^ n a t^ ^ n a t^ ^ P R O P
=  X x ,y ,x :n a tA
VP  :n a tA ^ n a tA ^ n a tA ^ P R O P .
(V x:nat^. P  x  0 x ) ^
(Vx, y, z :natA . (P  x y  z ) ^ P  x  (S y)(S z ) ) ^
(P  x y  z)
p lu s graph : V x ,y :n a tA  3!z:natA . p lu s re lx y z
(ii) E xtend  the context PAax w ith
r plus =  p lu s  : n a tA ^ n a tA ^ n a tA ,
PA3 4  : Vx, y, z :natA . (p lu s rel x y z )  ^  ( (p lu s  x y )  =  z ) .
It is easy to  show th a t the addition thus defined is a com m utative associative func­
tion for which x  +  0 =  x  and x  +  (S y) =  S (x +  y) holds for any x, y  : natA . In a 
sim ilar way m ultiplication can be introduced.
If we assume the strong axiom of unique choice AUC  ^ (see Section 3.2.2), there 
is no need to  extend the context PAax. This is because w ith AUC  ^ we can define 
p lu s  such th a t PA3 4 holds.
E n c o d in g s
Besides an axiom atization we can also realize the Peano postu lates by an con­
struction . Often it is desirable to  keep the  context of auxiliary axioms as small as 
possible. This is especially im portan t when we wish to  develop m eta-theory  like 
consistency. In A-calculus, the Church-num eral encoding can be used to  construct 
the n a tu ra l num bers. The Peano postu lates w ith respect to  the Church num erals 
tu rn  out to  be derivable from a small auxiliary context.
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3.5 .4 . D e f in it io n . (i) Define the polym orphic type of Church numerals.
n a te  : SET
=  na:PROP. a ^ ( a ^ a ) ^ a
0 : n a te
=  Aa:PROP A x : a A f : a ^ a . x
S : n a te  ^ n a t e
=  A n :n a te  A x : a A f : a ^ a . f  ( n a x f )
(ii) Define a context PACh from which the Peano postu lates are derivable.
in d  : n a te  ^ PROP
=  A n :n a te  n fi:n a te^P R O P . (fi 0 ) ^
(n  n : n a t e . ( f i n ) ^ f i ( S n ) ) ^
(f i n )
PAch =  PAo : - ( (S 0 )  =  0),
PA7 : n n : n a t e . in d  n
The system  needed in th is case is second-order predicate logic. Also in th is system  
we take Leibniz equality for equality over n a t e .
3 .5 .5 . Lem m a. From the context PAch; the Peano postulates for  the Church nu­
merals are derivablee.
P r o o f .  The postu la te  PP7 is satisfied by PA7. Define pairing < , >  and the first and 
second projection. Next we define the predecessor following Kleene as
P~ : n a te  ^ n a t e
=  A n :n a te . (n ( n a t e x n a t e ) ( A z :n a t e x n a t e .< Z 2 , S z i> )  < 0 , 0 > )i .
Then we show using the induction scheme PA7 th a t  P~ (S x) =  x  for all x  : n a t e . 
For technical reasons, we also need to  show th a t P~ 0 =  0 .
(i) Suppose (S x) =  (S y ) f or  some x , y  : n a t e . T hen we have P~ (S x) =  P~ (S y ), 
and hence x  =  y. So we have PP2.
(ii) To prove PP1, we apply the induction axiom  PA3. The base case is proven 
im m ediately by PA0. For the  induction step, suppose S (S x) =  0 for some x  : n a t e . 
Then P~ (S (Sx)) =  P~ 0. So S x  =  0, and by the induction hypothesis we are done.
(iii) Define addition as follows.
p lu s  : n a te  ^  n a te  ^  n a te
=  An, m :n a te  AaiPROP Ax:a A f ' . a ^ a .  m  ( n x f  ) f
Using PA2 and PA7 it is easy to  prove PA3. PA4 holds d irectly  by reflexivity of 
equality.
(iv) Define m ultiplication as follows.
tim e s  : n a te  ^  n a te  ^  n a te
=  An, m :n a te  AaiPROP Ax:a A f ' . a ^ a .  m  x(Ax:a. n x f  )
PA5 and PA6 hold d irectly  by reflexivity of equality.
Also o ther functions like exponentiation can be defined directly  because Church 
num erals support iteration.
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We could strip  the context PAch to  only PAo if we relativize every quantifica­
tion  over n a tu ra l num bers w ith the in d  predicate. So for each form ula fi(x) the  
transla tion  of the  expression Vx:N. fi(x) will be
Using this mechanism, the assum ption th a t the  Church num eral 0 differs from the 
Church num eral SO suffices to  prove the Peano postulates. See (Ruys 1991) for 
details.
3.5 .6 . R e m a r k . In m ost textbooks, Church num erals are defined as
n a tC  =  n«:PROP. ( a ^ a ) ^ a ^ a  .
Obviously, every closed inhab itan t of n a t C has a corresponding term  in n a t'C. How­
ever, the  term  Aa:PROP A f  : a ^ a .  f , an ^-reduct of the Church num eral 1, lives in 
na tC  bu t has no coun terpart in n a t C. Because n a t C has fewer closed inhabitan ts, 
we prefer the  definition n a t C over n a t'C.
In d u c t iv e ly
If we have inductive types, we can get rid  of the context r nat completely. Induc­
tively defined n a tu ra l num bers have the advantage th a t by definition they  form the 
sm allest type in which 0 lives and  which is closed under S.
3.5 .7 . D e f in it io n . We recall n a t  from Definition 3.1.1 and use Leibniz equality 
to  obtain  the set of n a tu ra l num bers.
The system  needed is second-order logic w ith inductive types. The reader is referred 
to  Section 4.2 for more form alizations concerning n a tu ra l num bers.
3.5 .8 . E x a m p l e . As an example, we present the  definition of addition and multi-
Form alizations of the  n a tu ra l num bers based on Peano arithm etic are inadequate 
for real world applications. For example, in our case study  4.2 it is impossible 
to  com pute the seventh prim e num ber using inductively defined natu ra ls  w ithin 
reasonable time. The essence of the problem  of Peano num bers is th a t it is a 
unary  representation. Suppose th a t f  is a function which is defined by itera tion  
on its argum ent. In m ost cases, the  type checker needs order n  reduction steps to  
com pute the value of f  (S "(0 )). A possible solution is to  use a b inary  representation. 
In (Huism an 1997) an efficient form alization of b inary  n a tu ra l num bers is given.
r Vx:N .0 (x )n =  n x : n a t c • ( i n d x ) ^ r ^ (x )n .
N
n a t SET
y«a:SET. (ze ro  : a, SN : a ^ a )  
S e t
< n a t ,  = £ in a t, _ .. ._i>
plication.
-  + n a t  n a t  n a t
_ x n a t  n a t  n a t
B in a ry
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3.5.2 Integers
From  the n a tu ra l num bers, integers can be defined as a quotient set over N x N.
3 .5 .9 . D e f in i t io n .  (i) An integer is a tuple of n a tu ra l num bers. Two integers 
x  =  < x i, X2 > and y  =  <yi, y 2 > are equal if and only if x i — x 2 =  yi — y 2 .
i n t  : SET
=  p r o d n a tn a t
Eqint : i n t^ in t ^ P R O P
=  A x ,y  : i n t .x i  +  y2 =  x 2 +  yi
Z  : S e t
=  < i n t ,  Eqint, i------- >
(ii) We define zero, the identity, negation, addition and m ultiplication as follows.
0Z : e l Z
=  < o , o >
1Z : e l  Z
= <1,Q>
negZ : Z ^ Z
=  <Ax  : e l Z .< x 2 ,x i> ,  l . . ._ i>
addZ : (Z x Z ) ^ Z
=  < A x ,y  : e l  Z .< x i +  y i ,x 2 +  y 2 >, i------- _>
m u ltZ : (Z x Z ) ^ Z
=  < A x ,y  : e l  Z .< x i x yi +  x 2 x y2 ,x i  x y2 +  x 2 x y i> ,  i------- 1>
3.5 .10 . Lem m a. The set Z  forms a commutative ring with respect to the operators 
defined in Definition 3.5.9.
P r o o f . Trivial.
3.5 .11 . R e m a r k . We did not need the integers nor the rationals in our case studies. 
So we have no t formalized the lemmas in th is section and the next.
3.5 .3  R ation al num bers
Following a similar scheme, we can define the rationals.
3 .5 .12 . D e f in i t io n .  A rational is a tuple of an integer and a n a tu ra l num ber. Two 
rationals x  =  < x i ,x 2>  and y  =  < y i , y 2> are equal if and only if x i x (y2 +  1) =
yi x (x2 +  1).
r a t  : SET
=  p ro d  i n t  n a t  
SNZ : n a t  ^  i n t
=  Ax:nat. < SN x, 0>
Eqrat : r a t ^ r a t ^ P R O P
=  Ax, y : r a t .x i  x (SNZ y2) =  yi x (SNZ x 2)
Q : S e t
=  < r a t ,  Eqrat, i------ >
50 CHAPTER 3. REPRESENTING MATHEMATICAL NOTIONS
After defining the constants zero and one in Q, and the negation, the inverse func­
tion, and the addition  and m ultiplication functions over Q in a proper way, we can 
show th a t Q forms a field.
3.5 .4  R eal num bers
One approach to  introduce the real num ber system  is by a construction, for example 
by Cauchy sequences. This is worked out by (Jones 1991, E lbers 1993). A nother 
approach is to  introduce the reals axiomatically. Obviously this is much less work 
th an  a full construction. Because we will assume decidability of equality  of real 
num bers anyway, the  wish to  be constructive is not so strong anymore.
One possible axiom atization of the real num bers is as an A rchim edean ordered 
field which is Cauchy complete. See (Dieudonne 1960) for more details.
3.5 .13 . D e f in it io n . The real num ber system  R  is a set for which the following 
conditions hold.
(i) R  is an ordered field.
(ii) R  satisfies the axiom of Archimedes: for any pair x, y  of real num bers such 
th a t 0 < x, 0 <  y, there is an integer n  such th a t y < n  x  x.
(iii) R  satisfies the axiom of nested intervals: Given a sequence ([a", b " )  of closed 
intervals such th a t  a" < a " + i and b"+ i <  b" for every n  G N, the intersection of 
th a t sequence is not empty.
A nother equivalent axiom atization of the real num ber system  is by using Dedekind 
cuts. See (H untington 1955) for more details on the Dedekind postulates.
3.5 .14 . D e f in it io n . The real num ber system  R  is set such th a t the  following con­
ditions hold.
(i) R  is an ordered field.
(ii) R  satisfies the Dedekind postulate: every non-em pty bounded subset of R 
has a suprem um .
We have chosen to  use a weaker axiom atization, nam ely th a t of a real closed 
field. The reason for th is decision was pragm atic. F irst, in our case studies, the 
axiom atization by a real closed field was strong enough to  develop all theories. 
Furtherm ore, it would take quite some effort to  prove the axioms of a real closed 
field from one of the  two stronger axiom atizations. As a positive spin-off, all results 
for R  in our work also hold for algebraic complex num bers.
On the o ther hand  we strengthen  our axiom atization by adding the assum ption 
th a t the  set of real num bers is discrete. In o ther words, we assume th a t the equality 
over reals is decidable. So we work in a classical setting. In fact, th is is the  only 
classical assum ption we will make in our LEGO library.
3.5 .15 . D e f in it io n . The real num ber system  R  is defined as a real closed field. So
R  is
(i) a discrete ordered field,
(ii) such th a t every polynom ial in R  of odd degree has a root,
(iii) and  which has a square roo t function over R.
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3.5 .16 . E x a m p le . Define the unary  function absolute value over real num bers. 
We could do this using a definition by case d istinction  on the  sign of the  argum ent. 
Instead, we choose to  use the square roo t because it more closely resembles the 
definition of the absolute value function in C. Furtherm ore, we define a sign function 
over the reals.
AbsR : R ^ R
=  < A x:el R. S q r tR ( tim e sR (x, x) ) ,  l .. ._>
S ig n R : R ^ R
=  < A x:el R. s e l e c t  ( l . . ._  : x  < 0 V x  >  0) (— 1) 1, l . . . _ >
3.5.5 C om plex  num bers
From  the reals we can construct the field of complex num bers. The approach using 
polar coordinates involves trigonom etry. Because it would be quite a lot of effort to  
formalize trigonom etry, we choose to  define the complex num bers by ordered pairs 
of real num bers (H am ilton 1837).
3.5 .17 . D e f in it io n . (i) The complex num bers are defined as C artesian  coordi­
nates of real num bers. A complex num ber consist of a real and an im aginary part. 
Two complex num bers are equal if their real and im aginary p arts  are equal as real 
num bers.
C : S e t
0C : e l  C
=  < ^  0R>
1C : e l  C
=  < ^ , 0R>
i : e l  C
= <0R, 1R>
(ii) We define negation, addition and m ultiplication over complex num bers as 
follows.
NegC : C ^ C
=  < A x:el C.<NegR (x i), NegR (x2)> , i------ i>
P lu s C : (C x C ) ^ C
=  <Ax, y :e l  C. < P 1usr (x i ,y i) ,  P Iu s r  (x2,y2)>,  i------ >
M inusC : (C x C ) ^ C
=  <Ax, y :e l  C. P Iusc (x, NegC (y)), i------ >
M ultC : (C x C ) ^ C
=  <Ax, y :e l  C. <MinusR (MultR ( x i ,x 2 ),MultR (y i,y 2)),
P Iu s r  (MultR (x i ,y 2 ), MultR (yi, x 2 ))>, i------ i>
R ec ip C : C ^ C
=  < A x:el C. <D ivR (x, AddR (S quareR (x i), S q u areR (x2))),
DivR (NegR (y),
AddR (SquareR (x i) , SquareR (x2)))> ,
i____ i>
3.5 .18. Lem m a. The set C forms a commutative field of complex numbers with  
respect to the terms defined in  Definition 3.5.17.
P r o o f . For a proof, see the LEGO library.
3.5 .19 . E x a m p l e . We can define for exam ple the scalar p roduct and absolute value 
for complex num bers.
ScProdC : (C x C ) ^ R
=  <Ax, y :e l  C. P Iu sr  ((TimesR (x.1, y.1)), (TimesR (x.2, y.2))),
i____ i>
AbsC : C ^ R
=  < A z:e l C. S q r tR (ScProdC (z, z)), l .. ._>
The reader is referred to  the  LEGO lib rary  for a developm ent of the  theory  of 
complex num bers.
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Chapter 4
Case Studies
Formalizing m athem atics m ay be separated  into three distinguished actions. Sup­
pose we wish to  prove a certain  theorem . F irst we need logic: we need a framework in 
which we can reason. We need to  know which rules we accept and which we do not. 
Next we need to  define the  m athem atical objects we wish to  reason about. P roba­
bly one already has a library  of basic concepts like the ones defined in C hap ter 3. 
B ut alm ost always one needs to  extend it. And a th ird  p a rt of doing m athem atics 
is to  make computations.
In th is chapter we present several case studies to  make clear how these actions 
are perform ed in a proof-checker based on type theory. Note th a t here we study  the 
methodology used in proofs. Hence none of the proofs presented here are m athem at­
ically original work. The first case study  shows how one can use a type checker to  
reason. We will formalize a proof of a purely logical sta tem ent called the ‘Drinkers 
Principle’. The next case study  is a form alization of E uclid’s theorem  of the ex­
istence of infinitely m any primes. Here we will show how one could autom atically  
com pute prim e num bers from a constructive proof. The next form alization deals 
w ith a proof where a lot of equational reasoning is involved. The last case study  
is the  m ost comprehensive one. I t describes our a ttem p t to  give a fully formalized 
proof of the  fundam ental theorem  of algebra. Here every aspect of form alization 
comes in, the biggest effort being the developm ent of all notions and lemmas the 
theorem  is bu ilt on.
4.1 Drinkers Principle
Sm ullyan’s Drinkers Principle sta tes th a t in every bar you can always point out 
someone w ith the following property: everyone is drunk whenever he is. This 
theorem  is interesting because it is a purely logical sentence. Also the proof of 
th is classically true  sta tem ent is non-trivial. We will com pare a proof in ‘my best 
m athem atical s ty le’ (B arendregt 1996) to  a formal proof in n a tu ra l deduction style, 
and to  a proof in type theory.
4 .1 .1 . T h e o re m . Let Cafe be a non-empty set, D runk a predicate over Cafe.
3x[D runk(x) ^  Vy[Drunk(y)j] .
P r o o f  (Inform al). By case distinction. If everyone is drunk, then  the theorem  is
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triv ially  true. O therw ise there will be som ebody who is not drunk. This person 
makes the im plication true.
We could not avoid to  make use of an application of excluded middle. Excluded 
m iddle is logically equivalent to  double negation, which is a rule only accepted in 
classical logic. W hen we formalize the proof, we will see th a t we actually  need two 
applications of excluded middle. This appears in the next formal proof in n a tu ra l 
deduction style.
P r o o f  (natural deduction). Suppose we have a signature consisting of a set C , a 
predicate D  and a constant a. The constan t formalizes th a t C  is a non-em pty se t1. 
Define the predicate 4>(x ) as D( x)  ^  Vy[D(y)].  Now we have to  prove 3x[^>(x)j. 
Recall th a t —A  is defined as A  ^  ± , and th a t from ±  follows anything we wish 
(^-elim ination).
—D (z )8 D ( z ) 11
_L
13
Vy[D(y) \  
<t>(z ) 
3x[^(x)j
12
11
10
_L
->3x[^(x)]2 
------------9
D (a )5
- - D ( z )
D(z)
Vy[D(y))
fi(a)
3x[^(x)j
_L
-3x[^>(x)j
3x  [^(x)j
The em phasized steps 1 and 7 indicate an application of double negation.
5
In an interactive proof developm ent tool like LEGO, a sim ilar proof would be gen­
erated  by use of tactics called Refine  and Intros. The tactic  Refine corresponds 
to  m odus ponens, and the tactic  Intros to  ^  in troduction  or to  generalization. In 
contrary  to  m athem atical practice, proofs are built by backward reasoning. T h a t is 
why we num bered the  natural-deduction  proof sta rtin g  from the  last line and up.
P r o o f  (type checker). Let Dn : y P :PROP. P  ^  P  be the  axiom of double nega­
tion. Let C  : SET, assume we have an a : C  which makes C  non-empty, and let D  : 
C  ^  PROP be a predicate over C . Define a predicate fi as Ax:C. (D x) ^  n y .C .  D  y. 
S tarting  from our initial goal Ex fi, we execute the following LEGO tactics.
1 Also we could formalize ‘the set A is non-empty’ by assuming 3a G A[0] for some arbitrary
provable proposition 0. This way, we do not have to extend the signature with a constant. In type
theory both approaches are provably equivalent.
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# Goal Tactics Rule
1. E  x f i Refine Dn ; double negation
2 . -i-iEx fi In tros H 2; ^  introduction
3. ± Refine H 2; m odus ponens
4. Ex fi Refine ExIntro; Refine a; 3 introduction
5. fi a In tros H 5; ^  introduction
6 . a y Intros z; V generalization
7. D y Refine Dn ; double negation
8 . - - { Dy) Intros H 8; ^  introduction
9. ± Refine H 2; m odus ponens
1 0 . Ex fi Refine ExIntro; Refine z; 3 introduction
1 1 . f i y In tros H n ; ^  introduction
1 2 . n  y . D y Refine ExFalso; ex falso sequitur quodlibet
13. ± Refine H 8; Refine H n ; m odus ponens
See Section A.3.3 for an exact screen dum p of the  LEGO session above.
Of course, th is is only a proof if we believe th a t the  type checker only accepts 
tactics which leads to  a proof of a tru e  sta tem ent. The type checker generates a 
typed lam bda-term  as proof object. The type corresponds to  the  theorem , and the 
term  corresponds to  a proof. For a ‘second opinion’, any type checker could be used 
to  verify th a t the  term  has indeed the indicated type.
P r o o f  (Type theory).
Dn (Ex fi)
( XH2 : - (E x  fi).
H 2
(E xIntro fi 
(XH5:D a.
Xz:C.
Dn (D z )
(XHg : - ( Dz ) .
H 2
(E xIntro fi 
(X H n :Dz .
E xF also  ( n y C .  D  y)
H s H n )))))))
: Ex fi
The lam bda term  above is unreadable for hum an eyes. A type checker should type 
it by 3x[fi(x)]. So if we believe the correctness of the  type checker, we will regard 
the term  as a proof of the  Drinkers Principle. Also the list of tactics for the  type 
checker we presented is hard  to  grasp. The way an interactive type checker works 
is th a t for every step  it will present us a list of assum ptions and a subgoal to  prove. 
This way, it is clear w hat to  prove and which tactics to  use. Also the  type checker 
will do book-keeping like discharging local variables for us. Furtherm ore during a 
proof session, it will help us to  focus on which subgoals still need to  be proven.
If we look a t the  way an interactive type checker works, and how proofs are con­
structed  in m athem atical practice, one im portan t difference comes up. The former
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forces us to  reason backwards, the  la tte r also allows forward reasoning. Backward 
reasoning needs a shift of a ttitu d e  and m ay be counter intuitive for m athem ati­
cians. However, our experience showed th a t one gets used to  backwards reasoning 
very easily.
4.2 There are infinitely m any prim es
A lready Euclid showed th a t there exist infinitely m any primes. We will form ulate 
the theorem  as ‘for every n a tu ra l num ber x , there exists a prim e y  which is bigger 
th an  x '.  We will give a constructive proof. By the natu re  of constructive proofs, 
our proof will consist of an algorithm  which assigns to  every n a tu ra l num ber x  a y 
together w ith a proof th a t y  is a prim e bigger th an  x . We will be able to  ex trac t 
this algorithm  and get a lam bda term  which really com putes a bigger prim e from 
an a rb itra ry  sta rting  point. By use of this function, we construct a prim e generator 
which com putes for every n a tu ra l num ber n  the  n -th  prim e num ber.
The aim  of th is case study  is to  see how computation  is possible type theory. 
Also we will show how we can use proofs to  construct functions.
F irs t we define a predicate is_p rim e as
is_p rim e (x) =  (x >  1) & (Vy:nat. (1 <  y  <  x) —>■ (y \  x))
and give a constructive proof th a t  th is predicate is decidable. Applying the mech­
anism  introduced in Section 3.3.4, we form the characteristic  function Kprlme for 
which
b V x:nat. (Kprime x) =  0 is_p rim e x , 
and such th a t  for n a tu ra l num ber n
(KPrime«i) = /3t Q iff n  is a prim e num ber .
Next we give a constructive proof th a t there are infinitely m any primes, which we 
formalize by proving th a t for every n a tu ra l num ber x  we can find a prim e num ber 
y  which is bigger th a n  x . Also we give an upper bound for this y , so we can apply 
bounded m inim alization to  define a function prim e such th a t
prime 0 =@L 2,
prime 1 =@L 3,
prime 2 =@L 5,
We will prove th a t p rim e generates, s tric tly  increasing, all prim e num bers.
4 .2 .1 . R e m a r k . If we had  used classical logic, we would lose these com putational 
equalities. So then  the convertibility relations above would not hold. However, the 
‘logical' equations
prim e 0 =L 2,
p rim e 1 =L 3,
prim e 2 =L 5,
would still be provable.
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4.2 .1  Form alization o f E uclid ’s th eorem
We will give a form alization of the theorem  in more detail. We skip some basic 
definitions like the operations < , \, factorial. For a fully formalized proof w ith all 
the  details, the  reader is referred to  the LEGO library.
4 .2 .2 . D e f in it io n . Define a predicate ‘is prim e num ber’, ‘is not a prim e num ber’, 
and ‘is a prim e factor'.
is_prime : nat^PROP
=  Ax:nat. (1 <  x) &
(Vy:nat. (1 <  y)->(y < x)->(y \  x))  
is_dividable : nat^PROP
=  Ax:nat. (1 <  x)^(3y:nat. (1 < y) (y < x) (y \ x))
is_prime_f actor
n a t^ n a t^ P R O P  
A a, 6:nat. (a | b) & (is_prime a)
Because we wish to  be constructive, we need to  be careful w ith the negation of 
propositions. So we formalized ‘not is p rim e’ as ‘there exists a true  divisor’. We 
can prove for example th a t 3 is a prime.
ThreelsPrime : is_prime3
For n a tu ra l num ber n, the  size of a proof of is_primen is linear in n . We will see 
how we can reduce it to  a size independent of n .
4 .2 .3 . LEMMA. The predicate is_prime is decidable, that is fo r  any natural number 
x  we have (is_primex) V -i(is_primex). Formally,
is_prime_dec : decidable_pred is_prime
=  L . . .  _l .
P r o o f .  First we prove that
Vx, a:nat. (Vy:nat. (1 <  y H ( y  <  a ) ^ ( y  t  x)) V 
(3y:nat. (1 < y)  & (y <  a) & (y \ x))  .
Then trivially
Vx:nat. (is_primex) V (is_dividablex)
holds too. Now let x  be a natural number. We distinguish two cases. Suppose 
is_primex holds, then we are done. Suppose is_dividablex holds. We first prove 
that
Vxinat. (is_primex)^(is_dividablex)^_L .
Then we know  -i(is_primex) and we are done.
Note th a t from a classical point of view Lem m a 4.2.3 is trivial. B u t if we would 
have used classical logic, the next definition would lose its nice properties.
4 .2 .4 . D e f in it io n . Define the characteristic function Kprime using the  decidability 
of prim e.
Kprime : n a t ^ n a t
=  char is_prime_dec
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See Section 3.3.4 for the definition of c h a r . Because the proof is_prime_dec is 
constructive, we have th a t for all natural numbers n
(Kprime El) =/3i, Q iff n  is a prime .
4.2.5. E x a m ple . Now it becomes very easy to check whether a natural number is 
a prime or not.
K_prime_intro : Vxinat. (is_ p rim ex )^ ((K primex ) = L  Q)
=  L ..._
K_prime_elim : Vxinat. ((Kprimex ) = L  0 )^ (is_ p rim e x )
=  L. . .  _
F iv e lsP rim e : is_prim e5
=  K_prime_elim (Ref 1 ¿(Kprime 5))
N otS ixIsPrim e : -i(is_prim e 6)
=  A ii:is_prim e6. Succ_not_zeroO (K_prime_intro if)
where Succ_not_zero is a proof of
V x:nat.-i((SN x) =  0) .
If we look at the definition of F ive lsP rim e, we could be tem pted to write the 
simpler term
K_prime_elim(Ref1 lQ) .
However, this lambda term  is not typable by the LEGO system because we make use 
of the argument synthesis mechanism in the definition of the term  K_prime_elim. 
So the type checker has to be able to find an x  such tha t the next argument has 
type ((Kprime x )  = l  Q)• But obviously, (R efl ¿0) has type (0 =  0).
4.2.6. Lemma. Every natural number bigger then one has a prime factor. 
has_prim e_factor : Vx:nat. (1 < x )^ 3 y :n a t. is_p rim e_facto r y x
= L ..._
P r o o f .  By course of values induction.
4.2.7. T h eo rem . Given a natural number x  there exists a natural number y such 
that
-  y is a prime,
-  y is bigger than x, and
-  for y we have an upper bound depending only on x.
Formally:
in f  in ite ly_bounded_prim es_exist
: Vx:nat 3y:nat. (x < y) & (y < (SN (facx ))) & (is_prim ey)
PROOF. Set z = x! +  L By Lemma J^.2.6, z has a prime factor y. Suppose y < x. 
Then y \ x! holds. Because y \ z, we must conclude y = 1, which by definition 
cannot be the case. So x  < y.
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4.2.8. C o r o l l a r y  (Euclid). Given a natural number x. We can always find a 
prime y which is bigger than x.
in f  in ite ly _ p r im e s_ e x is t : Vx:nat 3y:nat. (x < y) & (is_prim e y)
= L . . .  _
P r o o f .  Immediate from Theorem 4.2.7.
4.2.2 Bounded minimalization
For decidable predicates fi(x) over the natural numbers, we wish to define bounded 
minimalization
exists no such x, it should return z. Indeed, using case distinction we are able to 
define bounded minimalization.
4.2.9. D e f in it io n . Let ^  be a predicate for which </>dec : decidable_pred</> is a 
proof tha t fi is decidable. We define bounded minimalization as follows.
fix < z. fi(x)
such th a t it computes the smallest x  smaller than z for which fi(x) holds. If there
n a t  ^ n a t  ^ n a t
£nat ze ro  = ^  A z:nat.z
(SN x) = ^  Az :nat. (mu  ^x x ) if fix
(mu^ x  z) otherwise
n a t n a t
Xz :nat. mu  ^z z
Next we prove some basic properties of mu.
4.2.10. LEMMA. Let fi be a decidable predicate.
(i) Bounded minimalization is sound.
mu_phi : Ilzinat. ((mu</>dec z) ^  z) —>■ fi (mu</>dec z)
(ii) Bounded minimalization is bounded.
mu_UB : Ilz ina t. (mu</>dec z) < z
(iii) Bounded minimalization returns the smallest value, i f  it exists.
mu_0K : Ilx inat. (fix)  —>■ Ilz ina t. (mu^dec z) < x
P r o o f . The reader is referred to the LEGO library.
4.2.3 Prime generator
Now we can use bounded minimalization to define a prime generator.
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4.2.11. D e f in it io n . Define a relation is_new_prime which states tha t y is a prime 
bigger than  x .
is_new_prime : n a t^ n a t^ P R O P
=  Ax,p:nat. (is_prim ep) & (x < p)
4.2.12. LEMMA. Let x  be a natural number. The predicate is_new_primex is de- 
cidable,
is_new_prime_dec : dec idab le_pred  (is_new_prime x)
4.2.13. D e fin it io n . (i) Using bounded minimalization, define a function over N 
which returns a prime number bigger than its argument, called a new prime.
new_prime : n a t ^ n a t
=  Ax:nat. mu (is_new_prime_dec x)(SN (x!))
(ii) The prime generator is just an iteration of new_prime, starting from 2.
prim e : n a t ^ n a t
=  £nat ze ro  ==> 2
(SNx) =>• new_prime (prime x)
4.2.14. Lemma. (i) The function  prim e only generates primes.
prim e_is_prim e : V*:nat. is_prim e (prime i)
= L ..._
(ii) The function  prime is strictly increasing.
prime_grows : V*:nat. (prime i) < (prime (SN *))
=  L..._
(iii) The function  prime generates all primes.
prim e_surj : Vx:nat. ( is_ p rim ex )^ 3 * :n a t. x = ¿  (prime i)
= L. . .  _l
Because the definition of the prime generator prime was a constructive defini­
tion, the type checker can compute prime numbers by normalizing. So the following 
convertibility relations hold.
prim e 0 =ßl 2,
p r im e i =ßl 3,
prim e 2 =ßl á
we can use this fact to quickly get a proof that
primei : (prime!) = ¿ 3  
=  Refl¿(primei)
Unfortunately, if the prime number we wish to compute grows, the verification time 
quickly gets out of hand2.
2 On our hardware, the normalization of prime 2 needed a heap space of more than 300 
megabytes. It took a whole day to check. Not to mention how much resources it would take 
to compute prime 1999. This suggests that either the algorithm we used is not really efficient, or 
the type checker used is not implemented efficiently. Or both.
4.3. BINOMIAL THEOREM 61
4.3 B inom ial theorem
In this section will show how equational reasoning can be done in type theory. 
We take Newton’s Binomial Theorem as a case study. Let us first formulate the 
theorem.
4.3.1. THEOREM. Let R  be a commutative ring, x  and y elements of R. Then for 
all n  in  N
It seems to be mathematical practice to define the binomial function in terms of 
factorials.
However proofs of properties of binomials get much more simple if we use a lower 
level definition3. So instead we present an equivalent definition of the binomial by 
nested recursion. This way we we avoid the need of factorials and division.
4.3.2. D efin it io n . We define the binomial coefficients directly by double recursion 
on its arguments.
Next we need a notion for summation. We always start from zero.
4.3.3. D e f in it io n . Let R  be a ring. We define summation from zero by recursion.
4.3.4. LEMMA. Let q be a natural number. Set p = SN q and n  = SNp. Then
i=0
n a t ^ n a t ^ n a t
S i2 o (-) : (n a t^ (o b j  R))^>n a t^ ( o b j  R)
i=0
(4.1)
i=0
(4.2)
i=0
(4.3)
i=0
(4.4)
(x +  y)p x (4.5)
3Here we offend the principle formulated in Section 3.0.1. But every rule should have exceptions.
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PROOF. By a lot of equational reasoning (see for details the LEGO library in Ap­
pendix A. 3.)
4.3.5. THEOREM. Let R  be a commutative ring, x  and y elements of R. Then for 
all n  in  N
n /
(x +  y)n =  ] T  xn^ y M  n
i=0
PROOF. By nested induction on n. The proof is straightforward, but involves a lot of 
rewriting of parentheses and applications of the ring axioms. For a fully formalized 
proof, the reader is referred to the LEGO library (Appendix A.3).
4.4 Fundam ental theorem  of algebra
The formalization of a proof of the fundamental theorem of algebra forms the main 
part of our case studies. The reason we chose this particular theorem to formalize 
is twofold. First, although the theorem is easy to formulate and formalize, proofs of 
the theorem are highly non-trivial and often quite large. We need a huge database 
of definitions and supporting lemmas in order to  be able to reach the level of m ath­
ematics at which we can prove the theorem. Although the name of the theorem 
suggests it belongs to algebra, there is also a great deal of analysis involved. Second, 
the theorem is interesting because during the last centuries many different proofs 
have been given by many great mathematicians. Some proofs are intuitionistic, 
some classical. Some proofs are highly abstract, using for example Galois Theory4, 
and others are very syntactical of nature. Also some proofs make use of a lot of 
analysis, others are more based on algebra. Most proofs of the theorem, if not all, 
involve polynomials in the real and complex field. So we first develop the concept 
of polynomial rings.
4.4.1 Polynomial rings
In order to formalize polynomials and construct polynomial rings, let us cite (van der 
Waerden 1931).
4.4.1. D e f in it io n . Let R  be a ring and let G be an infinite cyclic group generated 
by an indeterminate X . Polynomials in X  over R  are elements of the set R [X ]
n
f  = J 2  a X  ,
i=0
where ai G R. We call ai the coefficients of the polynomial f . The degree of a 
non-zero polynomial f  is n .
When we wish to formalize polynomials, we have to make a few implementation 
decisions. Let R  be a ring. Following the definition above, the most straightforward 
way to define a polynomial f  G R [X ] is as a list over R, such th a t the head of the 
list ƒ is non-zero. Then for example f [X] = X s + 4 X  G N[X] would be denoted by
ƒ = r r r o  .
4For a large scale formalization of Galois Theory, see (Bailey 1998).
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Two polynomials f  and g are equal if and only if the lists f  and g are element-wise 
equal. For reasons explained below, this implementation is not comfortable for more 
complex situations. Hence this definition is not suitable as a general representation 
of polynomials.
C o n s tru c tiv e  d e fin itio n
Suppose the carrier of the ring R  is not discrete. Then we cannot decide whether 
x  =  y for arbitrary x , y  G R. So if we add two polynomials f  and g of the same 
degree, we do not know in general if the resulting polynomial f  +  g has the same 
degree, or a lower degree. To be constructive we have to admit trailing zeros in our 
representation of polynomials.
ƒ = giriir^ Pir®
could be used to denote f [X] = X s + 4 X  too. Also we have to extend the equality 
relation over polynomials in order to quotient f  and f ' .  Unless the carrier of R  is 
a discrete set, a polynomial does not need to have a degree. We only have a notion 
of a maximum degree.
S p a rse  p o ly n o m ia ls
In some cases, the sequence of coefficients of a polynomial is sparse. For example, 
consider the polynomial g\X] = 1 +  X 183. Because most coefficients are zero, it 
would be rather inefficient to represent g by a list of length 184, almost completely 
filled with zeros. So we prefer to represent polynomials by lists of tuples of type 
R  x  N. Every tuple <a, i>  stands for the monomial a X % and a list of tuples is used 
to represent a polynomial. That way we obtain a much more concise representation 
in the case of sparse polynomials. So
<1,183>~<1,O>~0
may be used to denote the polynomial g. Another advantage is that this represen­
tation allows us to define polynomials with non-constant indices. For example,
g = An:N. <1, n > " '< l, O>"'0 
represents gn \X\ =  I  +  X n .
M u ltiv a r ia te  p o ly n o m ia ls
In standard literature, multivariate polynomials, or polynomials in more indetermi- 
nates are usually defined by iteration of ring adjunction R  ^  R [X ]:
R [ X i , . . . ,X n] =  R [ X i , . . . ,X n_i][X ] .
Although it is a clear and simple definition, in practice it has two drawbacks. First, 
representatives for polynomials will quickly grow in complexity if the number of 
indeterminates increases. For example, to denote h[X, Y ] =  3X Y 2 +  X 3 we need 
an expression like
h =  <<1, O>~0, 3>^<<3, 2>^0,1>^0
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which is quite unreadable. Another drawback of multivariate polynomials defined 
by iteration is tha t all theory concerning polynomial rings has to be developed 
twice: once for the case of the ring R[X ], another time for the case of the ring 
R [X i , . . . ,  X n]. So we define the multivariate polynomials as a primitive notion, 
and consider the polynomials in one indeterminate as a special case by instantiation. 
For this we introduce the notion of index monoids. Index monoids will form the 
type of indices.
4.4.2. D e fin it io n . An index monoid is an abelian monoid such that
1. the cancellation law holds,
2. it is ordered, and
3. the carrier is a discrete set.
Examples of index monoids are N and Nn . So our polynomial h will be constructed 
by
h = <3, <1, 2 » ~ < 1 ,  < 3 ,0 » ~ 0  .
R e lax e d  p o ly n o m ia ls
Finally, we add one more degree of freedom to our representation of polynomials. 
We allow multiple coefficients of the same index. Also we remove the condition that 
the indices have to be ordered. An im portant advantage of such a liberal approach 
is th a t in most cases the definition of operators on polynomials is greatly simplified. 
For example, the addition operator merely becomes list concatenation. To be able 
to define equality over polynomials, we first define the coefficient operator. Let f  
be a polynomial and i an index. The coefficient f i is defined by traversing the list f  
while adding all first projections of the pairs whenever the second projection equals
i. Equality over two polynomials f  and g is defined by
f  =  g = Vi[fi =  gi] .
As pointed out in Section 3.0.1, there is a price to pay for our relaxed definition. 
Although now it is easy to define certain operators over polynomials, it is sometimes 
difficult to prove tha t these operators preserve equality over polynomials. The 
reason is tha t for operators over polynomials, we have lost reasoning by induction on 
the degree. We do have reasoning by induction on the length of the list representing 
the polynomial, but this induction principle is a bit weaker. But again, as pointed 
out in Section 3.0.1, we prefer relaxed polynomials in formalizing mathematics.
P o ly n o m ia l r in g s
We summarize this section by giving the final formal definition of the set of polyno­
mials we have chosen to work with. Note th a t because index monoids are discrete, 
we may define objects by case distinction on the equality of elements of an index 
monoid.
4.4.3. D e f in it io n . Let I  be an index monoid and let R  be a ring. Recall that
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‘i f  x y  a b  should be read as ‘if x  =  y then a otherwise b’.
Monomial : Set
=  Prod (car R )(car I ) 
po ly  : SET
=  l i s t ( e l  Monomial) 
coef : p o ly ^ (o b j  I )^ ( o b j  R)
=  £iist 0 = ^  Ai:obj I.  Or
( t f )  = ^  Ai:obj I.  i f  ^^(t) i
n 2(t) + r  (coef f i )
(coef f i )
=poiy : po ly^po ly^P R O P
=  A f  :poly A f  :poly Vi :obj I.  (coef f  i) =  (coef g i)
Poly : Set
= <poly , =poly, I------>
4.4.4. D e f in it io n . Let I  be an index monoid and let R  be a ring. Set P  = 
P o ly IR .
0Poly : e l  P
= 0
1Poly : e l  P
= < 1 r,  0/  > 0
plu s Poly : (e l P H (e l P H (e l P )
=  A f :e l P . Elist 0 = ^  f
^ g ) = ^  t^'(plu s Polyf  g )
Allthough slightly more complicated, we can define the multiplication and inverse 
over polynomials in a similar fashion. Also we can show tha t Poly forms a ring. 
This is done in the LEGO library.
4.4.5. D e f in it io n  (polynomial application). Let I  be an index monoid, and R  be 
a commutative ring. Let n  be a natural number, set Rn : S et =  V ector (car R) n 
and let
Power : Fun2 Rn (car I ) (car R)
be an exponentiation function such tha t we have proofs for
Vx:elRn. (ap2 Powerx 0/) =  1 r
Vx:el RnVa, b:obj I.  (ap2 Power x  (a + /  b)) =
((ap2 Powerx a)  X / (ap2 Powerxb))
Set P  = Poly I R .  We define polynomial application as follows.
apP : (e l P ) ^  (elR n) ^  (obj R)
=  A f  :e l P A x:(elR n). l . . . j
ApP : Fun2P R n(car R)
=  <apP, l . . ._>
66 CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES
As we might expect, the l .  . .j  in the definition of apP is easy to fill in. To compute 
the application of a polynomial f  and a value x, we essentially just sum c X x 1 for all 
elements <c, i> in the list f . The gap in the definition of ApP stands for a proof of 
the proposition tha t apP respects polynomial equality. This is not trivial to prove. 
The reader is referred to the LEGO library for the details.
Let R  be a ring. We introduce the pseudo LEGO notation ‘R[X]’ which stands 
for ‘e l  (P o ly N R )’. Furthermore for f  : e l  (R[X]) and x  : obj R, we abbreviate 
‘apPN R 1  (Power R)  ƒ x ’ as lf [x \ \
4.4.2 k-th roots in C
Before we start to work on k-th roots in C for arbitrary positive numbers k, we first 
need the cubic case (k =  2). The way we formalized the real number system gives 
us immediately the following result.
4.4.6. LEMMA. Every positive real number has a square root. That is, there exists 
a function \J~- over the real numbers, such that
(i)
2
SqrtR_axioml : VxielR . (x > 0#) —>■ ( a/ x _  =  x )
(ii)
SqrtR_axiom2 : VxielR. (x > Oft) —> ( a / x  > 0^)
P r o o f . Immediately by Definition 3.5.15.
We can construct the square root for complex numbers in terms of the square root 
for the real numbers.
4.4.7. D e fin it io n .
sqrtC : (elC)— >(elC)
=  A x:elC . \J (W  +  a)/2  +  * (s ig n &)\J(W — a ) /2
where a, = re  x, b = im x, W  = Va? +  b2
SqrtC : C ^ C
=  < sqrtC , l . . .j >
We extend pseudo LEGO such tha t we may replace ‘ap SqrtC x ’ by the more read­
able i^ /x \  Let x : e l C  be a complex number. The equation y2 = x  actually has 
two solutions, namely y/x and — a/ x . So we have the following key lemma.
4.4.8. Lem m a .
Vx:el C. a/ x 2 =  ( — a/ x ) 2 =  x
P r o o f .  For a proof in full detail, the reader is referred to the LEGO library (Ap­
pendix A. 3).
For the definition of functions like cp : ( e lR ) ^ ( e l  C), re  : (e l C ) ^ ( e lR ) ,  and 
im : (e l C ) ^ ( e lR ) ,  the reader is referred to the LEGO library. Also for the more 
complex definition of the degree (S) of a polynomial in a discrete ring, we refer to 
the same library.
In order to be able to prove the existence of the k-th  roots in C we need the 
following continuity result.
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4.4.9. LEMMA. Every polynomial over the real numbers of odd degree has a root.
V P :e l R [X ]. (odd (S P )) ^  By :e l R. P[y] =  Or 
P r o o f .  Immediatly by Definition 3.5.15.
4.4.10. C orollary .
Vx:el R V n:el N. (oddn) ^  By:e l R .y n =  x  
P r o o f .  Given x  and odd n, apply Lemma 4.4.9 with P  = X n — x.
4.4.11. T h eo rem .
Vn:el N Vx:el C. ( n ^  0) —> 3y:el C. (yn = x)
P r o o f . Apply course of values induction on n. We distinguish two cases.
Suppose n  is even. Say n = 2m. Because n ^ O  we have th a t m ^ O  and m  < n. 
By the induction hypothesis for to and a/x, we obtain a y : e l  C such tha t ym = a/x. 
So yn = (a/x)2 =  x, and we are done.
For the second case, suppose n  is odd. Then we have a z : e l  C such th a t \z\ =  1R 
and (cp \x\)z =  x. By Corollary 4.4.10 we have y0 : e lR  such th a t yn =  \x\. Again 
we distinguish two cases.
Suppose x  e  R. By Corollary 4.4.10 we have a yi : e l  R such tha t yn =  re  z. 
Set y = cp yi, then yn =  cp yn =  cp (re  z) =  z , and we are done.
Suppose x £ R . Set d = ^fz.  Then d £  R. Define
P  : e lC [X ] =  i(d (X  + i)n -  d (X  -  i)n)
Q : e l  R [X ] =  re  P  .
We know tha t P  = P,  so P  = cp ( r e P) = cp Q. Because S P  = n  we have that 
odd (SQ). Apply Lemma 4.4.9 to obtain a y1 : e l  R such th a t Q[y1] =  Or. Set 
y2 : e l  C =  cp y1, then y2 =  i, and then
P [y2] =  (cp Q)[cp yi] =  cp (Q[yi]) =  cp Or =  0c  .
Take ys : e l  C =  (y2 +  *)/(3/2 — *) • Then we know tha t y3 =  d/d,  so we have y3 =  z. 
Take y : e lC  =  (cpyo)y3. Then yn =  (cpyn)yn =  (cp \x\)z =  x, and again, we are 
done.
The proof is based on the proof found in (Ebbinghaus, Hermes, Hirzebruch et al.
1990, Chapter 3, Section 3). The fully formalized proof contains a lot of equational 
reasoning5.
4.4.12. R em a rk . Usually one makes use of the complex exponential function to 
prove the preceding theorem. This leads to a considerable simpler proof. However, 
the conversion of the representation of complex numbers from ordered pairs to 
polar coordinates is rather nontrivial to establish. We did not wish to develop the 
necessary theories like trigonometry from scratch.
5The proof found in our LEGO libraray consists of more than 400 lines of LEGO code.
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4.4.3 Fundamental theorem of algebra
So far, all our effort in formalizing mathematics was done with as ultimate goal the 
formalization of the fundamental theorem of algebra. Proofs for this theorem caught 
the attention of mathematicians for several centuries. Only in 1799, Gauss gave a 
full proof. To prove the theorem, one needs a large base of analysis concerning the 
real and complex number systems. Also a lot of algebraic concepts are involved. So 
it is a good measure for the usefulness of current proof-development tools, and type 
checkers in particular. Let us first formulate the theorem.
4.4.13. T h eo rem  (The fundamental theorem of algebra). Every non-constant com­
plex polynomial has one or more zero’s in the field C.
A field K  is said to be algebraically closed if every polynomial f  e  K [ X ] \K  has a 
zero in K . So the theorem is equivalent to the statem ent th a t the field C of complex 
numbers is algebraically closed.
H is to rica l n o te s
To place the fundamental theorem in a context, we make a few historical remarks 
taken from (Ebbinghaus et al. 1990, Chapter 4, Section 1).
The Flemisch m athematician Albert Girard was the first to assert tha t there are 
always n  solutions. He did not give a proof, only a few examples of polynomials for 
which his thesis holds.
4.4.14. T h esis  (Girard, 1692). For every polynomial f  e  R [X ] of degree n  there 
exists a field K , an extension of R, such that f  has exactly n  zeros (not necessarily 
distinct) in K . The field K  may perhaps be a proper overfield of C.
In a letter to Goldbach, Euler asserted in 1742 the following thesis.
4.4.15. T h esis  (Fundamental theorem of algebra for real polynomials). Every poly­
nomial f  e  R[X ] of the n-th  degree has precisely n  zeros in the extension field C.
In 1749 Euler gave a sketch of a proof of this thesis. The first serious attem pt to 
prove the fundamental theorem of algebra was done three years earlier by Jean le 
Rond d'Alembert in 1746. His idea was to try  to minimize the absolute value of 
the polynomial f  by an appropiate choice of its argument. But it was not until 
1799 th a t Gauss gave a rigorous proof of the theorem. So far questions were raised 
like what form the roots would have. Gauss’s proof did not calculate a root, but it 
proved its existence. Later, Gauss gave three other proofs of the theorem, the last 
one in 1849.
In (Huntington 1955, Chapter IV, Appendix II) a very syntactical proof is given 
based on geometry tha t does not make use of trigonometry, nor of the method of 
separating a complex quantity into its real and pure imaginary parts.
O u r re su lts
To formalize the Fundamental Theorem, we choose the proof found in (Ebbinghaus 
et al. 1990, Chapter 3, Section 4). This proof is attractive for our purposes for 
two reasons. First, it makes a clear distinction between the analytical part and 
the algebraic part. Second, the proof does not make use of large theories which
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should be proven first. In fact the proof is rather syntactical and seemed to be 
straightforward to formalize.
We spend considerable effort formalizing all kinds of concepts and proofs which 
can be found in the LEGO library (Appendix A.3), and in the other chapters in 
this thesis. Eventually, reached as far as a complete formal proof of the existence 
of fc-th complex roots (Theorem 4.4.11). So we did not formalize the Fundamental 
Theorem in type theory. The reason for this is basicly th a t with current technology 
it is not possible to formalize non-trivial mathematical bodies within reasonable 
time. In the conclusion (Chapter 6), we will elaborate on the limitations of type 
checkers. In the next chapter, we will trea t one limitation in particular, namely 
equation reasoning.

Chapter 5
A Two-Level Approach
This chapter is based on the paper (Barthe, Ruys and Barendregt 1996).
We present a simple and effective methodology for equational reasoning in proof 
checkers. The method is based on a two-level approach distinguishing between 
syntax and semantics of mathematical theories. The method is very general and 
can be carried out in any type system with inductive and congruence types. The 
potential of our two-level approach is illustrated by some examples developed in 
LEGO.
5.1 Introduction
The main actions in writing mathematics consist of defining, reasoning and com­
puting (symbolically; this is also called ‘equational reasoning’). Whereas defining 
and reasoning are reasonably well captured by an interactive proof-developer, the 
formalization of computations has caused problems. This chapter studies the possi­
bilities of a partial automation of equational reasoning, which is from the authors’ 
experience, one of the most recurrent source of problems in formalizing m athe­
matics using a proof-developer (Barthe 1995a). We describe several methods using 
elementary techniques from universal algebra which provide an efficient tool to solve 
problems of an equational nature in any type theory with inductive types and term 
rewriting (inductive types are required for a formalization of universal algebra, in 
particular for the formalization of the type of terms of a signature).
Our main goal is to solve equational problems of the form a =a  b, where A  
is a model of a given equational theory S  =  (£, E), a and b are (expressions for) 
elements of A, and = a  is the equality relation of the carrier of A. To do so, we use 
two naming principles:
for satisfiability: we recast the problem a = a  b in a syntactic form [r a n]A =a  
[r bn]A where a  is an assignment and r a n and r bn are two S-term s such that
f  a 1 A =  a and f b !  A =  b
where denotes the «-interpretation of S-term s into the model A.  (Note 
th a t such terms always exist and one can even find optimal terms). By the 
soundness theorem, the latter problem follows from S  h r a n =  r bn (we use this 
informal notation to state tha t (r a n, r bn) is a theorem of S ). If S  is equivalent 
to a canonical term  rewriting system R, then the last problem can be solved
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automatically by taking the R-normal forms of r a n and r bn and check whether 
they are equal. We internalize the whole informal process using congruence 
types (Barthe and Geuvers 1996); the rewrite system is grafted to the type 
theory in such a way th a t the conversion rule itself is changed and checking 
whether [r a n] =  [r bn] (the equality here is Leibniz equality) boils down to a 
reflexivity test, which can be done by the proof checker. 
for extensionality: often we need a proof object for statem ents of the form
s =A t ^  0 ( s ) = A  0(t) (5.1)
where s, t  and 0(x) be (expressions for) elements of A. If this is done in the 
way taught in books on logic (applying several times the axioms of equational 
logic) a proof object for this fact becomes rather large: quadratic in the size 
of the expression ‘0 ’. However, using the naming principle one can solve (5.1) 
by proving the meta-result
S =A t ^  I"0 " 1A(x: = S) = a T 0 A(x: = t) 
for all r 0 n. This result has a proof of fixed size.
In this chapter, we shall give a detailed presentation of these methods (and some 
minor variants) and demonstrate with non-trivial examples tha t they provide a 
suitable tool for a partial autom ation of equational reasoning in proof-checking. 
The distinctive features of our approach are:
-  it applies to type systems where equality is treated axiomatically (intensional 
frameworks) and with proof-objects; the only requirement is the presence of 
(first-order) inductive types and so-called congruence types;
-  the size of the implementation of the proof-checker is kept fairly small; the 
whole process can be carried out within the proof-checker;
-  the proof-checker is built upon formal systems whose meta-theory is easy to 
understand.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.2, we introduce the relevant m ath­
ematical background for the subsequent parts of the chapter. In Section 5.3, we 
specify the nature of equational reasoning and delimit the range of equational prob­
lems whose resolution can be automated. In Section 5.4, we discuss the possible 
approaches to the automation of equational reasoning and present our own solution 
in terms of congruence types. In Section 5.5, we present a preliminary implementa­
tion of the two-level approach in LEGO. Large parts of the chapter are of expository 
nature; they have been included because (i) the material we present has never been 
presented elsewhere with a view to use it for our specific purpose (ii) the main 
contribution of this chapter is to specify the problem and devise a methodology to 
solve it (but the methodology does not use any new technique).
The work presented in this chapter bears some similarities with the work of the 
NuPrl team  on reflection (Constable 1993, Howe 1988), although the specific use of 
naming principles to autom ate equational reasoning seems to be new.
5.2 M athem atical Background
In this section, we review some standard material on equational logic and term 
rewriting. During the last few years, there has been an explosion in the number
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of variants of equational logic: many-sorted, order-sorted, conditional. . . We shall 
only be concerned with the simplest formalism, unsorted equational logic. For 
convenience, we separate the presentation in two parts; the first part is concerned 
with syntax, equational deduction and term  rewriting. The second part is devoted 
to semantics. See (Cohn 1981, Klop 1992) for a longer introduction to the notions 
involved.
5.2.1 Equational Logic and Term Rewriting
The basic notions of universal algebra are those of signature and equational theory. 
As the notions are standard, we give them  without any further comment.
5.2.1. D e f in it io n . (i) A signature is a pair S  =  (Fs , Ar) where Fs  is a set of 
function symbols and Ar : Fs  ^  N is the arity map.
(ii) Let S be a signature. Let V  be a fixed, countably infinite set of variables. The 
set Ts  of S-term s is defined as follows:
-  if x  e  V , then x e  Ts ,
-  if f  e  F s  and t i , .. . , t Arf  e  Ts,  then f  ( t i , .. . , t Arf ) e  Ts.
(iii) A map 0 : Ts  ^  Ts  is a S-substitution  if for every f  e  Fs  and S-terms 
t i , .. . , t Arf we have 0( f  ( t i , . .  . , t Arf )) =  f  (0t i , . . . ,  0t Arf ).
(iv) The relation < is defined by t, t ' e  Ts , t  < t ' if there exists 0 such tha t 0t =  t ' . 
The pre-order induced by < is denoted by T ^ .
(v) The set var(s) of variables of a term  s is defined inductively as follows:
-  if x  e  V , then var(x) =  {x},
-  var(f ( ti , . . ^  tArf )) =  U i<i<n var(ti ) .
(vi) if s and t  are S-term s and u is an occurrence of s, s[u ^  t] is the term  obtained 
by replacing the sub term  of s at u by t.
Note tha t every (partial) map 0 : V  ^  Ts  yields a S-substitution  in an obvious 
way. We shall sometimes refer to such maps as partial substitutions. The standard 
terminology can be carried over to partial substitutions, so we will also talk about 
partial renamings.
E q u a tio n a l Logic. A S-equation is a pair of S-terms (s ,t), usually written as
s =. t .
5.2.2. D e f in it io n . An equational theory is a pair S  =  (S ,E ) where S is a signa­
ture and E  is a set of S-equations.
The rules for equational deduction are given in the following table:
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R u les  for eq u a tio n a l d ed u c tio n
t  =  s 
s =  t  t  =  u
s =  s
s =  t
Reflexivity
Symmetry
Transitivity
s =  u
s 1 =  t 1 • • •sn =  t n Compatibility
/ ( s1, . . . , sn) ƒ (t 1, . . . t n )
s =  t
Instantiation0s =  9t
where 6 is a substitution.
5.2.3. D e f in it io n . Let S  =  (S ,E ) be an equational theory. A S-equation s =  t 
is a theorem of S  (written S  h s =  t) if it is deducible from E  using the rules for 
equational deduction.
T erm  R e w ritin g . Let S be a signature.
5.2.4. D e f in it io n . A S-rewrite rule is a pair of S-terms (s ,t), usually written 
s ^  t, such tha t s is a non-variable term  and var(t) C var(s). A S-rewrite system  
is a set of rewrite rules.
As usual, we talk about rewrite rules and rewrite systems when there is no risk 
of confusion. Note tha t every S-rewrite system R  induces an equational theory 
(S, R ), simply by seeing rewrite rules as equations. By abus de notation, we shall 
denote this equational theory by R.
Let R  be a rewrite system and s and t  be two S-terms. We say tha t s one step 
R-rewrites to t  (notation s ^ r  t) if there exist an occurrence u of s, a rewrite rule 
(l, r) in R  and a S-substitution 6 satisfying s /u  =  6l and t  =  s[u ^  6r].
We let ^ r  and be respectively the reflexive transitive and the reflexive, 
symmetric and transitive closure of ^ r . Finally, s [r  t  if there exists u such that 
s ^ r  u and t  ^ r  u. Note th a t [r  C ^ r .
5.2.5. D e f in it io n . A rewrite system R  is confluent if [ r  =  ^ r  and terminating 
if there is no infinite reduction sequence t ^ r  t \  ^ r  t 2 ^ r  • • •. A rewrite system 
is canonical if it is both confluent and terminating.
5.2.6. PROPOSITION. Let R  be a confluent rewrite system.
5.2.7. R em a rk . Algebraic structures are usually described equationally rather than 
as term  rewriting systems. However, some of them  can be turned into term  rewriting 
systems using the Knuth-Bendix completion procedures (Klop 1992).
(s [r  t) ^  (s ^ r  t) ^  R \~  s =  t .
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5.2.2 The Semantics of Equational Logic and the Complete­
ness Theorem
Equational theories are syntactical descriptions of mathematical objects. The ob­
jects satisfying these descriptions are the mathematical structures themselves. In 
this section, we define a semantics for equational theories. As we are interested in 
using universal algebra to solve the problem of equational reasoning in type theory, 
our semantics is ultra-loose, i.e. the equality relation between terms is interpreted 
as an arbitrary equivalence relation rather than as the underlying equality of the 
model.
5.2.8. D e f in it io n . An S-algebra A  for a signature S consists of a set A, an equiv­
alence relation = a  on A  and for each function symbol f  of arity n, a function 
fA  : A n ^  A  such tha t for every (a i , . . . ,  an), (a'i , . . . ,  a'n ) e  A n ,
a i =A a1 , . . . , an =A an ^  f  (a1, . . . , an ) =A f  (al , . . .  an ) .
For implementation purposes, we use a slightly modified definition of assignment 
and satisfiability. Of course, the resulting semantics is equivalent to the standard 
one.
5.2.9. D e f in it io n . An A-assignment is a partial map a  : V  ^  A  with a non­
empty, finite domain.
Any ^4-assignment can be extended inductively to a partial function [_]A on the set 
of S-terms:
[x]A ^  a x  if x  e  dom a
[ f ( t i  , . . . , tn ) ]A  ^  f A( [ ti lA ,.. .,I tn lA )  •
5.2.10. D e f in it io n . Let A  be a S-algebra. Two A-assignments a  and 3  are com­
patible if dom a  =  dom 3  and a x  = a  3 x  for all x e  dom a.
The following lemma shows tha t compatible assignments model the same equations.
5.2.11. Lemma (Compatibility lemma). Let A  be a S -algebra. Let a  and 3  be two 
compatible A-assignments. Let t be a S -term such that var(t) C dom a. Then
m  A =  a  itj A ­
We write A  =  s =  t  if for all A-assignments a  such tha t var(s) U var(t) C dom a,
isi A =  a  it] A •
5.2.12. D e f in it io n . Let S  =  (S, E) be an equational theory. A S-algebra A  is a 
S -model if A  =  s =  t  for all the equations s =  t  in E.
We say tha t S  =  (S, E) semantically entails a S-equation s =  t  (notation S  =  s =  t) 
if A  =  s =  t for every S -model A. The fundamental theorem of equational logic 
establishes the compatibility between syntax and semantics.
5.2.13. T h eo rem  (Soundness/Completeness). For every S-equation s =  t,
S  h s =  t  ^  S  =  s =  t .
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The completeness result is proved by constructing the term  model Ts  as the quotient 
of Ts by the provability relation ~ S . The crucial fact tha t we shall exploit later is 
tha t for every term  s and t,
5  h s =  t  [s] =  [t]
where [_] \ T^ —> T s  is the canonical map assigning to  every term  its equivalence 
class under the provability relation.
5.3 T he N am ing Principles
In this section, we define a methodology to solve equational problems in type theory. 
Our methodology is very flexible and can be carried out in any type system with 
inductive types. In particular, it can be carried out in the underlying type systems 
of LEGO (Luo and Pollack 1992), Coq (Dowek et al. 1993), Alf (Magnusson and 
Nordstrom 1994) and NuPrl (Constable et al. 1986).
5.3.1 Specifying the Problem to be Solved
Our first task is to fix the boundaries of the problem to be solved. In its most general 
form, equational reasoning is concerned with determining whether two elements s 
and t  of a set V  of values are related by an equality relation R. Naturally, the prob­
lem is far too general to have an autom ated solution. Yet there is a well-understood 
branch of mathematical logic, namely equational logic, which is concerned with 
equational theories, i.e. first-order languages with a single (binary) predicate sym­
bol = . Equational logic provides the right level of generality to tackle the problem 
of equational reasoning for several reasons:
1. the problem is general enough: a wide collection of mathematical theories can 
be presented equationally, for example the theories of monoids, groups and 
rings;
2. one might expect a useful and autom ated solution to the problem: in some 
cases, it is possible to provide an algorithm to test whether an equation of a 
given theory S  is a theorem of this theory;
3. this work can provide a theoretical foundation to integrate computer algebra 
systems and proof checkers: computer algebra systems, with their impressive 
power, are mostly concerned with equational theories.
This justifies the following choice for the form of an equational problem.
T h e  PROBLEM. Let S  be an equational theory. Let A  be a model of S . Let a rand b 
be expressions for elements of A . Does a =a  b ?
Note tha t the problem makes sense within a type system with inductive types as 
one can formalize all basic notions of universal algebra in such a system. Here are 
a few examples of equational problems.
5.3.1. E x am p les . -  Let Zn be the ring of integers modulo n, where n > 3. 
Does 2(n — 1) =  0?
-  Let D 8 be the dihedral group with eight elements. Let a,T  G D 8. Does 
ra  =  <t3t ?  Here the problem is quantified over all elements of D 8.
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-  Let (M, = m , °M, eM) be a monoid. Let x ,y  G M . Does (x oM e) oM y = M 
x  °m  y? Here the problem is quantified over all x ,y  G M  and monoids M .
To solve the problem, we will first relate it to equational logic and then use equa­
tional logic to solve the problem automatically.
For the remainder of this section, we work with the formalization of universal 
algebra in the type system. In particular, an equational theory is an inhabitant of 
the type of equational theories, and a model of a theory is an inhabitant of the type 
of models of this theory. To alleviate the presentation, we will still use the ordinary 
language of universal algebra.
In the sequel, we let S  =  (£, E) be a fixed equational theory and A  be a model 
of S .
5.3.2 Equational Logic, Local Equational Logic and Equa­
tional Reasoning
Equational logic is global in the sense tha t it is used to determine whether a S- 
equation s =  t  is true in all models of S , i.e. whether S  =  s =  t. In contrast, 
equational reasoning is local, in the sense th a t one is also interested whether a given 
equality holds in a specific model, i.e. a = a  b for some specific a and b in a specific 
model A  of S . An intermediate formal system is local equational logic, a variant of 
equational logic whose deductive system allows to infer whether A  =  s =  t for a 
specific model A  of S . One could even go one step further and develop a formal 
system to infer whether [s]£  =  a  [t]A in a specific model A  and for a specific 
assignment a. This last problem, which we call the local satisfiability problem is in 
fact a special instance of equational reasoning. If we analyze the logical formulations 
of local satisfiability and semantical entailment, we see tha t the latter represents a 
uniform notion of the former1. One concludes tha t the goal of equational logic is to 
know whether a uniform collection of equational problems is satisfied.
Local satisfiability is a very common form of equational problem. However, not 
all equational problems arising in the formalization of mathematics are concerned 
with local satisfiability. An equally im portant instance of equational problem is the 
extensionality problem: given a S-term  t, a model A  of S  and two interpretations
a, ß  in A, does [t]£  =  a  [t]A? In fact, those two problems (local satisfiability and 
extensionality) form the core of equational reasoning.
5.3.3 The Naming Principles
As outlined in the previous subsection, there is a divergence between equational 
logic as a formal system and equational reasoning as it occurs in mathematics. We 
have
a goal: an equational problem, i.e. an equality a = a  b;
some tools: equational logic, which can be used to solve a local satisfiability prob­
lem, and the compatibility lemma, which can be used to solve an extensionality 
problem.
1By the soundness/completeness theorem, S = s = t is equivalent to the collection of local 
satisfiability problems ([s]£  = a  [i]A)(AeM ,aeV(A) where M  is the collection of S-models and 
for A £ M, V(A) is the set of A-assignments.
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The difficulty in applying the tools to solve the goal is that equational problems 
are essentially of a semantical nature while equational logic is designed to solve 
syntactical problems. In order to apply equational logic to equational reasoning, 
one must perform a preliminary manipulation on equational problems, so th a t they 
present themselves in a form which is amenable to be solved by equational logic. 
W hat is needed here is a naming principle which transforms a semantical equational 
problem into a local satisfiability problem or an extensionality problem. For the 
clarity of the discussion, we will therefore distinguish between the naming principle 
for satisfiability (for short NPS) and the naming principle for extensionality (for 
short NPE). One fundamental feature of these naming principles is tha t they do 
not require any extension of the type system; indeed, the naming principles are a 
special instance of conversion rules. We introduce these principles below.
T h e  N am in g  P rin c ip le  for S a tisfiab ility .
The aim of the naming principle for satisfiability is to recast a local equation a = a  b 
into an equation of the form [s]A =  a  [t]A , where
-  s and t are terms of the theory T ,
-  a  is an assignment,
-  [sl A — a>
-  t  A -  b.
Of course, the equation to be solved has not changed; what has changed is the way 
to look at it. The equation in its second form makes it clear tha t the problem to 
be solved is an instance of a uniform collection of equational problems, as defined 
in the previous section. The advantage of this switch of perspective is tha t the 
equation in its second form is more amenable to be solved by standard syntactic 
tools. Indeed, [s]A =  a  [t]A is an immediate consequence of S  h s =  t. This yields 
a semi-complete2 method to  prove a = a  b:
1. apply the NPS; this reduces the equational problem to one of the form [s]A =  a
111A;
2. apply any method available to prove S  h s =  t.
Of course, the efficiency of the method depends on the choice of s and t3. Fortu­
nately, there is always an optimal application of the NPS.
5.3.2. D e f in it io n . Let A  be a model of S. Let a be an element of A. The pre­
order of codes of a is the sub-pre-order of Tj? whose elements are the terms t  for 
which there exists an assignment a  such tha t [t]A — a.
For every element a of A, the pre-order of codes of a has a top element (unique 
up to  renaming), called the optimal code of a. We write r a n for the optimal code 
of a .
Similarly, we can define a code for an equational problem a =A b to  be an 
equation s =  t such th a t for some assignment a, [s]A — a and [t] A — b. Every
2 The method can fail even if the equational problem is true.
3Indeed, some uses of the NPS can be less than judicious. Every equational problem a =a  b 
can be reduced by the NPS to [s]A = a  [i]A where s and t are distinct variables and a is any 
assignment satisfying as = a and at = b. In order to solve the problem according to the proposed 
method, we must now solve S h s = t. This only holds if the theory is inconsistent!
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equational problem a = a  b has an optimal code r a n =  r bn (one can verify th a t r a n 
and r bn are optimal codes for a and b respectively) with the two properties:
-  r a n =  r bn is a code for a = a  b;
-  S  h r a n =  r bn if and only if S  h s =  t  for some code s = t  of a = a  b.
The conclusion is tha t one can define an algorithm which performs the optimal 
choice for the NPS. In the sequel, it is understood tha t the NPS is always applied 
for such an optimal choice.
T h e  N a m in g  P r in c ip le  for E x ten s io n a lity .
The aim of the naming principle for extensionality is to recast a local equation 
a = a  b into an equation [t]A =  a  [t] A , where
-  t  is a term  of the theory T ,
-  a  and 3  are assignments,
-  [tlA — a,
-  [tJA — b­
In the second form, the equation can be immediately deduced from a x  = a  3 x  for 
all x  e  var(t) . As for the NPS, the method is only semi-complete . Yet it is a very 
im portant tool for formal proof development. Indeed, the standard representation 
of sets in most type systems uses the so-called setoids; consequently all the reasoning 
takes place with book equalities and extensionality m atters do come up very often. 
As for the NPS, the NPE can be applied optimally. Indeed, one can find for every 
equational problem a = a  b a term  t  (the optimal code for NPE) such that
-  there exist two assignments a  and 3  such tha t [t]A — a and [t] A — b;
-  for every term  t ' and assignments S and 7  such tha t [t'JA — a and [t'JA — b, 
there exists a substitution 0 such tha t 0t ' — t.
Note th a t it is possible to  extend the naming principle for extensionality to formulae. 
C o m b in in g  B o th  P rin c ip le s .
In the previous subsections, we have considered two different naming principles 
which can be used to solve equational problems. However, the method th a t we have 
described disregards the possibility of using assumptions present in the context. In 
fact, the NPS is too weak to be useful in this more general case. For example, if 
one has to prove in a monoid M  that
(a o b) o c = a  a' o (b o c) (5.2)
for some elements a, a', b and c of M  such tha t a =a  a', the NPS reduces the 
problem to
[(x • y ) • * 1A =  a  [x' • (y ■ z )]A (5.3)
for a suitable assignment 7 . Moreover, one cannot invoke the NPE principle to 
reduce equation (5.3) further. However, one can combine the NPS and the NPE to 
obtain a powerful naming principle (NPSE) which can be used to solve equational 
problems in a context. This new principle takes as input an equational problem 
a = a  b and returns as output an equation [s]A =  [t]A where s and t  are two terms 
s and t and a  and 3 are two assignments such that
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-  [sl A — a ,
-  [t]lA — b,
-  dom a  =  dom 3  and a x  =  3 x  for every x  e  dom a.
As for the NPS, the equation follows from S  h s =  t. W ith this new principle, 
equation (5.2) can be reduced to [(x • y) • z]A =  a  [x • (y ■ z )]A and a x  =  3 x  for 
suitable a  and 3 . This shows tha t the NPSE is stronger than the combination of 
the NPS and the NPE. However, it is difficult to find an optimal use of the NPSE for 
obvious reasons. Fortunately, one can recover the power of the NPSE from the NPS 
by grafting a simple procedure on top of the NPE. The procedure, called collapsing 
procedure (or CP for short),
-  takes as input a problem of the form [s]A =  [t]|A and two variables x  and y in 
the domain of a ,
-  returns as output the problems [s[y/x |]A =  [t[y /x |]A and a x  =  ay.
The benefits of the CP are similar to those of the NPSE. For example, the CP can 
be called to reduce equation (5.3) into the two problems
Kx • y ) • z1A =  a  Ix • (y • *)]IA 
Yx = a  y x ' .
The CP provides an easy means to make use of the optimal naming of an equa- 
tional problem via the NPS. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be any obvious 
counterpart for making use of the optimal naming of an equational problem via the 
NPE4.
5.4 Congruence T ypes
5.4.1 How to Automate Equational Reasoning?
As mentioned earlier, the naming principles do not solve equational problems. A 
naming principle is a special kind of conversion rule which recasts an equational 
problem into a specific form. Here these specific forms are local satisfiability and 
extensionality problems. The point is the naming principles make apparent terms 
of an equational theory. In the special case where we look at a local satisfiabil­
ity problem, the equational problem will become of the form [s||A = a  [t]A . By 
the soundness/completeness theorem, the equality is a consequence of S  h s =  t. 
Reducing an equational problem to a problem of the form S  h s =  t  is useful be­
cause we dispose of techniques to determine whether an equation is in the deductive 
closure of an equational theory:
using computer algebra systems. Current computer algebra systems are excellent at 
equational reasoning. They have various clever algorithms to compute all kinds 
of equations at a symbolic (syntactical) level. We could use such a system to 
compute s =. t and, if this succeeds, we let our proof checker assume the 
statem ent as an axiom. This is what we call the external believing way.
4 Consider a monoid H and three elements a, b,c of H such that a o b =h a' o b'. The optimal 
use of the NPE on
(a o b) o c =h (a' o b') o c 
will yield the two subproblems a =h a' and b =h b'. Indeed, the NPE will be applied with
(x o y) o z as code whereas it would have been better to take x o y as code.
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using term rewriting. Another technique to check 5  h s =  t  is of course term  rewrit­
ing: if S  can be completed into a confluent and term inating term  rewriting 
system R , we can look at the normal form of s and t with respect to the comple­
tion of S. For such theories, equational reasoning can be partially autom ated 
by using the naming principle and importing in some way term  rewriting into 
the type theory as done for example in (Breazu-Tannen 1988). We call this 
method the internal believing way, because the problem is solved without any 
outside help. This is the method proposed in this chapter.
the autarkic way. We might want to define a map nf which assigns to every term  its 
normal form in R  and to show tha t for every term  t and assignment a, we have 
It JA I nf t]A. In order to check s =  t, we just have to verify (nf s) =  (nf t), 
where =  denotes Leibniz equality. This comes down to a reflexivity test. This 
method is called the autarkic way because it does not involve any change to 
the type theory or the proof-checker. It must be said tha t this method seems 
currently too inefficient to be used in practice.
Most proposals in the literature opt for the external believing approach (Ballarins, 
Homann and Calmet 1995, Harrison and Thery 1993, Jackson 1994). Indeed, the 
external believing way has an obvious advantage: hybrid systems offer a shortcut 
to integrate term  rewriting in proof checking. However, the approach has two 
disadvantages:
-  proof checkers are based on well-understood languages whose logical and com­
putational status are well understood. It is not always the case for computer 
algebra systems.
-  proof checkers generate from scripts proof-objects; if the computer algebra sys­
tem is used as an congruence, then all calculations performed by the computer 
algebra system have to be taken as axioms by the proof checker. Such a process 
threatens the reliability of the hybrid system5.
One can remedy to these two problems by using the computer algebra system not 
as an congruence but as a guide, as done in (Harrison and Thery 1993). In this case, 
the answer of the computer algebra system is used to solve an equation. We call 
this method the skeptic way because the proof-checker does not trust the computer 
algebra system. This technique is superior over the external believing one in that 
it eliminates the holes in the proof-terms. Moreover, the problem of the reliability 
of the computer algebra system is circumvented. However the skeptic way seems 
infeasible in a proof-checker such as LEGO because of the absence of tactics.
5.4.2 The Internal Believing Approach via Congruence Types
In this section, we introduce congruence types. The formalism, which is based 
on algebraic, inductive and quotient types, is well-suited for the introduction of 
canonical term  rewriting systems. We refer the reader to (Barthe and Geuvers
1996) for a general scheme for congruence types and focus on a specific example of 
congruence type used to  solve equational problems for groups. It consists of two 
types:
5 Sometimes the user has to make sure that the necessary side conditions are satisfied. For 
example, several computer algebra systems will state that (\/x)2 equals x, without bothering 
about the condition that x > 0.
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-  an inductive type G corresponding to the set of terms of the signature of 
groups,
-  the quotient G of G by the deductive closure of the theory of groups; G is 
defined as an algebraic type, i.e. equality between inhabitants of G is forced 
by the rewrite rules.
Both types are related by a map [_] : G —>■ G which assigns to every term  its equiva­
lence class under the provability relation. There is an axiom to reflect the universal 
property of quotients as it is used in the completeness theorem: an equation s =  t 
holds in every group if [s] =  [t|. If we work in ECC (Luo 1994), the rules are:
K G : Do I-  e :G \- i : G —> G b o - . G ^ G ^ G
h G  :□  o
h a : N ^ G
b e  : G
b a  :N ->  G
b o : G ^  G ^  G
r b p : [ « ]  = [6]
r  b noconf p : a =g_ b
T b fe:C Tb fi : G^ C ^  C
r b C : D 0 r b / a : N ^ C  r  b ƒ„ : G ^  G ^  C ^  C
eC [fa,fe,fi,fo]:G^ C
T b a: A  T b B : s 
r  b a : B
if A ■ B  or B A
where =g_ is the (impredicatively defined) deductive closure of the theory of 
groups, [_] is a new constructor and N are the inductively defined natural numbers. 
The computational content of the system is given by 3 -reduction and the following 
reduction relations:
-  ¿-reduction; let f  =  ( fa , fe, fi,  fo). The rules are 
[ƒ] (a i) fa i
[ƒ] e
eC [ƒ] (i x) 
eC [f] (o x  y)
fe
fi  x  (eC [ƒ] x)
fo x y  (eC [ƒ] x) (eC [ƒ] y )
p-reduction; the rules correspond to the Knuth-Bendix completion of the ax­
ioms of groups:
o e x
o x  e 
o x  (o y z) 
o (i x) x  
o x  (i x)
x
x
o (o x  y) z
e
e
i e
o ( o x  (i y )) y 
o (o x y )  (i y)
i (i x) 
i (o x y)
e
x
x
x
o (i y) (i x)
X-reduction; for every x , y  : G,
[o x  y] 0 [x] [y]
1 [x] 
e
P
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5.5 Form alization in LEGO
Type theory based proof checkers such as Alf, Coq and LEGO are expressive enough 
for the two-level approach described above to be developed within the system itself. 
We present an implementation of the two-level approach in LEGO. The reason to 
choose LEGO is th a t it allows for the user to input its own rewrite rules, thus 
offering the possibility to implement congruence types.
5.5.1 Formalization of Equational Logic
Formalizing equational logic in LEGO is relatively easy. There are no m ajor diffi­
culties in developing the whole theory along the lines of Section 5.2.
Equations are defined as pairs of terms and equational theories as signatures 
together with a predicate over the type of equations. One can even formalize the 
deductive closure of a set of equations by formalizing first the notion of simulta­
neous substitution. It is equally easy to define the semantics of equational logic. 
The definitions of algebra, assignment, satisfaction and model are immediate adap­
tations of the definitions introduced in Section 5.2. See Section 3.4 for a detailed 
presentation of our implementation of universal algebra in LEGO.
5.5.2 Formalization of the Naming Principles
LEGO does not offer support for the naming and extensionality principles6. Yet 
they are special instances of conversion rules, so they can be performed manually 
using the Equiv command. We present three examples, one using the NPE, a second 
using the CP and the third one using the NPS. These examples are meant to give 
an idea of the method used. To understand them  fully, the reader should read first 
Section 5.6. In each case, the proofs turn  out to be remarkably short. Note th a t in 
our implementation we did not use (nor need) specifications of equational theories.
First, we give an example where the NPE is used to solve an equational problem. 
Here G is an algebra for the signature of groups, obj G is an element of its carrier, 
tim es is the multiplication on G and inv  is the inverse on G. TIMES and INV are 
function symbols of the signature of groups. i n t  is the interpretation function 
which, given an assignment rho, assigns a symbol of the signature to an element 
of G whose set of variables is contained in the domain of rho. Note th a t [x:A]b 
stands for \x:A .b, {x:A}B for n x A .B ,  <x:A>B for Xx:A.B, S et stands for the type 
of setoids, Eq for the equality of a Set, e l  for the elements of a Set, obj for the 
elements of a model and Q is Leibniz equality.
Lego> Goal {x,y,z:obj G} (Eq x y) ->
(Eq (times (inv x) z) (times (inv y) z));
Goal
?0 : {x,y,z:obj G}(Eq x y)->Eq (times (inv x) z) (times (inv y) z)
Lego> intros; 
intros (4) 
x : obj G 
y : obj G 
z : obj G 
H : Eq x y
6An extension of the LEGO system is proposed in (Barthe and Elbers 1996) to solve this 
problem.
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?1 : Eq (times (inv x) z) (times (inv y) z)
Lego> rho == necons x (necons y (base z)); 
defn rho = necons x (necons y (base z)) 
rho : nelist (obj G)
Lego> t == TIMES (INV (VAR ZeroN)) (VAR TwoN); 
defn t = TIMES (INV (VAR ZeroN)) (VAR TwoN) 
t : termGr
Lego> u == TIMES (INV (VAR OneN)) (VAR TwoN); 
defn u = TIMES (INV (VAR OneN)) (VAR TwoN) 
u : termGr
Lego> Equiv Eq (int G rho t) (int G rho u);
Equiv
?2 : Eq (int G rho t) (int G rho u)
Lego> Refine SubstitutionLemma G ZeroN;
Refine by SubstitutionLemma G ZeroN
?9 : Eq (int G rho (TFV sig ZeroN)) (int G rho (VAR OneN))
Lego> Refine H;
Refine by H 
Discharge.. rho H z y x 
*** QED ***
Note tha t the NPE yields the goal ?2. The SubstitutionLem m a is used to obtain 
?9 is a specific instance of the compatibility lemma. The next example uses the 
CP procedure. Here we are working in a context in which tim es_assoc states that 
tim es is associative. The CP procedure is called by the term  CP.
Lego> Goal {a,b,b’,c:obj G} (Eq b b ’) ->
Eq (times a (times b c)) (times (times a b ’) c);
Goal
?0 : {a,b,b’,c:obj G} (Eq b b ’) ->
(Eq (times a (times b c)) (times (times a b ’) c)
Lego> intros; 
intros (5) 
a : obj G 
b : obj G 
b ’ : obj G 
c : obj G 
H : Eq b b ’
?1 :Eq (times a (times b c)) (times (times a b ’) c)
Lego> rho == necons a (necons b (necons b ’ (base c))); 
defn rho = necons a (necons b (necons b ’ (base c))) 
rho : nelist (obj G)
Lego> t == TIMES (VAR ZeroN) (TIMES (VAR OneN) (VAR ThreeN)); 
defn t = TIMES (VAR ZeroN) (TIMES (VAR OneN) (VAR ThreeN)) 
t : termGr
Lego> u == TIMES (TIMES (VAR ZeroN) (VAR TwoN)) (VAR ThreeN); 
defn u = TIMES (TIMES (VAR ZeroN) (VAR TwoN)) (VAR ThreeN) 
u : termGr
Lego> Equiv Eq (int G rho t) (int G rho u);
Equiv
?1 : Eq (int G rho u) (int G rho u)
Lego> Refine CP G OneN (VAR TwoN);
Refine by CP G OneN (VAR TwoN)
?9 : Eq (int G rho (TFV sig OneN)) (int G rho (VAR TwoN))
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?10 : Eq (int G rho (Subst t OneN (VAR TwoN))) 
(int G rho (Subst u OneN (VAR TwoN))) 
Lego> Refine H;
Refine by H 
?10 : ...
Lego> Refine times_assoc;
Refine by times_assoc 
Discharge.. rho H c b ’ b a 
*** QED ***
The final example uses the NPS. Congruence types are used to give a short proof 
of an equality on groups. In the sequel, Q j r e f  1 is a proof of the reflexivity of Leibniz 
equality, comm and conj respectively denote the commutator and the conjugate of 
two elements. For comparison, we have included a traditional proof of this fact in 
Section 5.6.
Goal {x,y,z:obj G} Eq (conj (comm x y) z) (comm (conj x z) (conj y z)); 
intros;
rho == necons x (necons y (base z)); 
t == CONJ (COMM (VAR ZeroN) (VAR OneN)) (VAR TwoN);
u == COMM (CONJ (VAR ZeroN) (VAR TwoN)) (CONJ (VAR OneN) (VAR TwoN)); 
Equiv Eq (int G rho t) (int G rho u);
Refine Soundness;
Refine Q_refl;
Save comm_conj;
5.6 Exam ples
This section contains examples of equational problems solved using our approach. 
To keep the presentation simple, we introduce the group axioms without using an 
equational theory. Note th a t because of the two-level approach, the number of 
LEGO commands of the proof comm.conj is very small (in essence only four). This 
in contrast to the traditional proof comm.conj Jiand. Because of a lot of applications 
of the transitivity of equality and the group axioms, the proof explodes up to a few 
pages of LEGO commands.
Module Examples Import syntax semantics;
(* Define the signature and the terms of a Group. *)
[sigGr : Signature = ...]
[termGr : SET = term sigGr]
[VAR : nat -> termGr = TFV sigGr]
[ONE : termGr = ...]
[INV termGr -> termGr = ...]
[TIMES termGr-> termGr -> termGr = ...] ;
[DIV termGr-> termGr -> termGr = ...] ;
(* Let G be a group, satisfying the group axioms. *)
[G : Algebra sigGr];
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[One el (car G) = ...]
[Inv Fun (car G) (car G) = ...]
[Times Fun2 (car G) (car G) (car G) = ...]
[one obj G = ...]
[inv (obj G) -> (obj G) = ...]
[times (obj G) -> (obj G) -> (obj G) = ...]
[One_ident : Identity Times One ]
[Inv_invers : Inverse Times One Inv]
[Times_assoc : Associative Times ];
(* Show y = z -> z ((x/y) y) = z ((x/z) z) *)
Goal {x,y,z:obj G} (Eq y z) -> Eq (times (times y (times x (inv y))) z)
(times (times z (times x (inv z))) z);
intros;
rho == necons x (necons y (base z));
t == TIMES (TIMES (VAR OneN) (DIV (VAR ZeroN) (VAR OneN))) (VAR TwoN); 
u == TIMES (TIMES (VAR TwoN) (DIV (VAR ZeroN) (VAR TwoN))) (VAR TwoN); 
Equiv Eq (int G rho t) (int G rho u);
Refine SubstitutionLemma G OneN;
Refine H;
Save Example_1;
(* Show b = b ’ -> a (b c) = (a b ’) c *)
Goal {a,b,c,d:obj G} (Eq b d) -> Eq (times a (times b c))
(times (times a d) c);
intros;
rho == necons a (necons b (necons c (base d))); 
t == TIMES (VAR ZeroN) (TIMES (VAR OneN) (VAR TwoN)); 
u == TIMES (TIMES (VAR ZeroN) (VAR ThreeN)) (VAR TwoN);
Equiv Eq (int G rho t) (int G rho u);
Refine CP G OneN (VAR TwoN);
Refine H;
Refine Times_assoc;
Save Example_2;
(* =====================================================================
Use Oracle Types to implement term rewriting. *)
[FreeGroup : SET];
[varFg : nat -> FreeGroup];
[oneFg : FreeGroup];
[invFg : FreeGroup -> FreeGroup];
[timesFg : FreeGroup -> FreeGroup -> FreeGroup];
(* Define the Knuth-Bendix completion of the group equations. *)
[ [x,y,z : FreeGroup]
timesFg oneFg x ==> x
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timesFg x oneFg 
timesFg (invFg x) x 
timesFg x (invFg x) 
invFg oneFg
timesFg (timesFg x (invFg z)) z 
timesFg (timesFg x y) (invFg y) 
timesFg x (timesFg y z) 
invFg (invFg z) 
invFg (timesFg z y)
==> x 
==> oneFg 
==> oneFg 
==> oneFg 
==> x 
==> x
==> timesFg (timesFg x y) z 
==> z
==> timesFg (invFg y) (invFg z)
[class : termGr -> FreeGroup = ...];
[Soundness : {s,t:termGr} {rho:el (Assignment G)}
(Q (class s) (class t)) -> Eq (int G rho s) (int G rho t)];
(* The conjugate of a commutator equals the commutator of the conjugate. 
Define the commutator [x,y] == (x y)/(y x)
and the conjugate x*y == y (x/y) *)
[comm [x,y : obj G] : obj G = times (times x y) (inv (times y x))]
[COMM [x,y : termGr] : termGr = DIV (TIMES x y) (TIMES y x)]
[conj [x,y : obj G] : obj G = times y (times x (inv y))]
[CONJ [x,y : termGr] : termGr = TIMES y (TIMES x (INV y))];
(* Show [x,y]*z = [x*z,y*z] using the two-level approach. *)
Goal {x,y,z:obj G} Eq (conj (comm x y) z) (comm (conj x z) (conj y z)); 
intros;
rho == necons x (necons y (base z)); 
t == CONJ (COMM (VAR OneN) (VAR OneN)) (VAR TwoN);
u == COMM (CONJ (VAR OneN) (VAR TwoN)) (CONJ (VAR OneN) (VAR TwoN)); 
Equiv Eq (int G rho t) (int G rho u);
Refine Soundness;
Refine Q_refl;
Save comm_conj;
(* Proof the last lemma again on the traditional way.
First show x~{-1}~{-1} = x. *)
Goal Involutive Inv;
Intros x;
Refine Eq_trans (times one (inv (inv x)));
Refine Eq_sym; Refine fst One_ident;
Refine Eq_trans (times (times x (inv x)) (inv (inv x)));
Refine exten2 Times ??.Eq_refl;Refine Eq_sym; Refine snd Inv_invers; 
Refine Eq_trans (times x (times (inv x) (inv (inv x))));
Refine Eq_sym; Refine Times_assoc;
Refine Eq_trans (times x one);
Refine exten2 Times ?.Eq_refl; Refine snd Inv_invers;
Refine snd One_ident;
Save Inv_invol;
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(* Show (x y)*{-1} = y~{-1} x~{-1} *)
Goal {x,y:obj G} Eq (inv (times x y)) (times (inv y) (inv x)); 
intros;
Refine Eq_sym;
Refine Eq_trans (times (times (inv y) (inv x)) one);
Refine Eq_sym; Refine snd One_ident;
Refine Eq_trans (times (times (inv y) (inv x))
(times (times x y) (inv (times x y))));
Refine exten2 Times ?.Eq_refl; Refine Eq_sym; Refine snd Inv_invers; 
Refine Eq_trans (times (times (times (inv y) (inv x)) (times x y))
(inv (times x y)));
Refine Times_assoc;
Refine Eq_trans (times one (inv (times x y)));
Refine +1 fst One_ident;
Refine exten2 ? ? ?.Eq_refl;
Refine Eq_trans (times (inv y) (times (inv x) (times x y)));
Refine Eq_sym; Refine Times_assoc;
Refine Eq_trans (times (inv y) y);
Refine +1 fst Inv_invers;
Refine exten2 Times ?.Eq_refl;
Refine Eq_trans (times (times (inv x) x) y);
Refine Times_assoc;
Refine Eq_trans (times one y);
Refine exten2 Times ? ?.Eq_refl; Refine fst Inv_invers;
Refine fst One_ident;
Save Times_Inv;
(* Show (x*z)(y*z) = (x y)*z *)
Goal {x,y,z:obj G}Eq (times (conj x z) (conj y z)) (conj (times x y) z); 
intros;
Refine Eq_trans (times z (times (times x (inv z)) (conj y z)));
Refine Eq_sym; Refine Times_assoc;
Refine exten2 Times ?.Eq_refl;
Refine Eq_trans (times x (times (inv z) (conj y z)));
Refine Eq_sym; Refine Times_assoc;
Refine Eq_trans (times x (times y (inv z)));
Refine +1 Times_assoc;
Refine exten2 Times ?.Eq_refl;
Refine Eq_trans (times (times (inv z) z) (times y (inv z)));
Refine Times_assoc;
Refine Eq_trans (times one (times y (inv z)));
Refine +1 fst One_ident;
Refine exten2 Times ? ?.Eq_refl;
Refine fst Inv_invers;
Save Times_Conj;
(* Show (x*y)~{-1} = x~{-1}*y *)
Goal {x,y:obj G} Eq (inv (conj x y)) (conj (inv x) y); 
intros;
Refine Eq_trans (times (inv (times x (inv y))) (inv y));
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Refine Times_Inv;
Refine Eq_trans (times (times y (inv x)) (inv y));
Refine +1 Eq_sym; Refine +1 Times_assoc;
Refine exten2 Times ? ?.Eq_refl;
Refine Eq_trans (times (inv (inv y)) (inv x));
Refine Times_Inv;
Refine exten2 Times ? ?.Eq_refl;
Refine Inv_invol;
Save Inv_conj;
(* And finally, show [x,y]*z = [x*z,y*z] *)
Goal {x,y,z:obj G} Eq (conj (comm x y) z) (comm (conj x z) (conj y z)); 
intros;
Refine Eq_sym;
Refine Eq_trans (times (conj (times x y)z) (conj (inv(times x y)) z));
Refine +1 Times_Conj;
Refine exten2 Times; Refine Times_Conj;
Refine Eq_trans (inv (conj (times x y) z));
Refine exten Inv; Refine Times_Conj;
Refine Inv_conj;
Save comm_conj_hand;

Chapter 6
Conclusions
We spent quite some effort in formalizing all kinds of mathematical definitions 
and lemma’s in type theory. W hat did we learn from the exercise? Perhaps most 
surprising is tha t it took a lot more time to formalize proofs than we initially thought 
it would take. In the beginning of the project, most effort was spent in building 
from scratch a library full of very trivial lemma’s. When we arrived at a higher level 
where we tried to prove more involved lemma’s, formalizing was still hard. Namely, 
compared to the original mathematical texts, we had to add a lot of details and 
side conditions not mentioned in the original proof. For example, half a page of 
mathematical text was blown up to ten pages of LEGO code. We feel tha t the 
current state of technology of proof checkers is not suitable to fully formalize non­
trivial parts of mathematics. Currently, proof development systems are little used 
by mathematicians. This is not because of unwillingness to use computer systems, 
nor because of lack of persistence on their side. The reason is tha t the effort to fully 
formalize a proof is out of proportion to the insight we gain.
On the other hand we do feel tha t when proof checkers get smarter, and when 
good libraries of formalized mathematics are built, in time these systems are promis­
ing and can be extremely useful.
6.1 R ecom m endations
Before we present some recommendations to be implemented in proof development 
systems, let us first point out two fundamental obstacles one has to overcome when 
starting a large formalization.
S ta r t  from  sc ra tc h
Every library of formalized mathematics is based on certain choices which are not 
always the most optimal in all circumstances. Especially the decision which logical 
system is used, is often an area of ongoing discussion. As a consequence, often one 
finds it necessary to develop from scratch all theory needed to prove or to formalize 
a particular theorem. As the author has experienced, this is a highly elaborate 
process. So we have no alternative then to reuse existing libraries of formalized 
mathematics, and to extend them  to the level needed.
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Level o f d e ta il
Although at first sight it may seem surprising, proofs found in mathematical texts 
are almost never integral proofs. Proofs are merely a list of arguments which should 
convince the reader tha t the formulated lemma is true indeed. The author gives a 
sketch of how to prove the theorem. All steps in the proof which are trivial for the 
intended reader, are left out. So often, all side conditions are discarded and it is 
for the diligent reader to verify them. For this reason, the level of detail of proofs 
is never the same level needed by proof development systems. When a proof is fed 
into such a system we have to add the low-level proofs ourselves. However, proof 
checkers should be able to generate proofs automatically to fill in all the gaps as 
much as feasible. Especially in the area of equational reasoning, we think a lot is 
to be gained. See Section 6.2 for more on this topic.
6.1.1 Requests for implementators
Let us formulate a few areas in which present proof development systems could be 
enhanced. Some of our findings are only valid for type checkers, or even just a 
particular type checker like LEGO, other observations have a more global value.
E x p ressiv e  pow er
Most proof development systems have too little expressive power. As a result, even 
simple mathematical statem ents become unreadable when formalized. For example, 
consider the following lemma.
6.1.1. LEMMA. Let G be an abelian group. Then
Vx, y  e  G [y +  0 +  x  =  x  +  y] .
In LEGO, we formalize this like
lemma611 : Prop
=  {G : AbGroup}{x,y : c a r  G}
Eq (ap (PlusAGG) y (ap (PlusAGG) (UnitAGG) x))
(ap (PlusAG G) x y )  .
Obviously, the expression lemma611 is hard to read. We mention four items for 
improvement.
Annotations. Similar to  programming languages, the expression lemma611 consists 
of a chain of ASCII characters. For example, instead of Vx e  A[4>(x)], we 
have to write {x  : A}phi( x ). Since we do not have annotations like sub- or 
superscript, fonts or typefaces like in type-setting languages, expressions are 
flattened. Annotations would add structure to the expression for easy parsing.
Infix notation. The lack of infix operators1. If we take a look at the part ‘x +  y ’ of 
Lemma 6.1.1, we wish to formalize it not as ‘(ap PlusAG G) x  y ’, but as:
x  (ap PlusAG G) y .
1 In LEGO, infix notation can be imitated up to a certain degree, namely by the dot-application. 
In LEGO, ‘x.plus y’ stands for ‘plus x y’. See the LEGO manual (Luo and Pollack 1992) for details.
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Overloading. The lack of overloading prevents us to write
x  (ap P lu s G) y .
So for example, each time we introduce a new additional structure, we have to 
define a new term  for addition and assign it a unique name. Finding unique 
names which are easy to recall is a hard task.
Context dependent parsing. Argument synthesis, see (Luo and Pollack 1992), is in 
some cases extremely useful. For example, when we apply the polymorphic 
operator of function composition, argument synthesis allows us to leave out 
the types of the applicants. The mechanism is able to derive these types from 
the context in which they appear. So instead of writing
comp T  U V  f  g ,
for types T , U and V , and for functions f  : T  ^  U and g : U ^  V , we may 
just write
comp f  g .
Another example where argument synthesis is very convenient, is the polymor­
phic defined book equality (see Definition 3.1.5). However in some other cases, 
this mechanism is insufficient. For example, let us take a look again at our 
formalization of ‘x +  y ’ in LEGO:
x  (ap P lu s G) y
First, G should be derivable from the type of x  and y, which is c a r  G. Second, 
if we examine the definition of P lus, we will see it consists of two parts, namely 
the product of some function p  together with a proof tha t p  preserves equality. 
Then it should be clear to our proof checker tha t we need the former part of 
P lus. If the type checker could derive this for us, we would be able to simplify 
the running expression to merely
x  P lu s y ,
which very closely resembles the original ‘x  +  y '.
To summarize, we would like th a t our type checker has a lot more expressive power 
in the sense of annotations, infix notation and overloading, together with some kind 
of sophisticated mechanism of sm art context dependent parsing.
Efficiency
Compared to other proof checkers, LEGO seems to be rather inefficient in type 
checking. The system consumes both a lot of processing time, as a lot of system 
memory. We do have to realize tha t LEGO is in fact just a proto-type, and was never 
designed for actually doing really large proofs. However with respect to efficiency, 
we can point out a few areas in which LEGO, and most other proof checkers, could 
be improved.
Arithmetic. Inductively defined natural numbers are essentially represented by lists. 
So it is a unary representation which is totally unsuitable for computations 
involving large numbers. For example, even a simple operation like addition
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already has complexity 0 (n ) . We wish to have types like the natural numbers, 
the integers and the rationals as first class citizens in our system. Only then 
computations may become acceptably fast. For other solutions see (Huisman
1997). Remark th a t one could argue tha t in formalizing mathematics, we never 
deal with canonical natural numbers bigger than perhaps ten.
Annotated lambda terms. LEGO has a mechanism to file the current proof state of 
all verified proofs to disk. All named proofs and their accompanying types 
are saved. The next time the user wishes to restore a LEGO session, the type 
checker does not have to reconstruct all terms again by executing every tactical. 
Loading the saved lambda terms, and checking their types is much quicker. 
Surprisingly enough, in our experience, the opposite is true. Reconstructing 
via tacticals is faster then verifying types. The reason for this is tha t in the 
original interactive session, now-and-then we helped the proof checker by giving 
hints how convert a type to an intermediate term. We sometimes do this to 
speed up the type checking of our interactive session. Besides lambda terms 
and types, also these intermediate steps should be saved to disk as annotations.
Reduction. When running large scale formalisations, fast proof checking is impor­
tant. The implementation of term  rewriting and ¡3-, i- and ¿-reduction must 
be very efficient. Users of proof checkers are almost insatiable with respect to 
speed.
E n v iro n m en t
Another area in which most proof development systems are weak is the proof-
development environment. Already a lot of research is done in user interfaces.
We mention the Centaur project. Among other aspects, part of this project is to
produce textual proofs out of lambda terms (Bertot, Kahn and Thery 1994). When
we focus ourselves on LEGO, we mention two items.
Presenting proofs. We need tools for presenting proofs in various formats. For ex­
ample, a pretty  printer for LTEX is desirable. Sometimes we wish to auto­
matically strip all proofs leaving the plain definitions, lemmas and comments. 
The idea of merging code and documentation is already used in the system 
(C)WEB (Knuth 1983, K nuth 1992). Besides LTEX, another useful output 
format is hypertext m arkup language (HTML). In Appendix A.4.3 we present 
a so-called CGI-program tha t allows us to present LEGO-files via a web server 
via the internet. LEGO source is presented in such a way th a t definitions and 
lemmas become hyperlinks. To unfold a lemma or definition, the user has to 
follow the link.
Modules. LEGO, like some other proof development systems, lacks a well developed 
module mechanism. When working on large projects where large formaliza­
tions of mathematics are done by more people, we need a module mecha­
nism. At least two elements are needed. First, given a source file, it should 
be clear which definitions and lemmas are public and exported, and which 
are local. The implementation should be hidden, or at least clearly sep­
arated from the export part. Second, we need to be able to indicate de­
pendencies between source files in order to properly make theories and load 
all depending files first2. Examples of practical module mechanisms can be
2Recent versions of LEGO do support this via the Module keyword and Make command.
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found in programming languages like Clean, Modula or Ada. Also we refer 
to (Courant 1997, Courant 1998), who studied modules with respect to type 
theory.
Logic
The final two aspects of possible improvement of proof development systems we 
wish to bring up concerns logic.
Forward reasoning. As pointed out in Section 4.1, type checkers mainly construct 
proofs by backwards reasoning. Because this is counter-intuitive to m athem at­
ical practice, we wish to  have a mechanism for forward reasoning. This could 
be achieved by allowing nested lemmas. So while proving a lemma, we wish to 
state and prove a local (sub)lemma, which in turn  may be used in the proof 
of the ‘parent' lemma. A sublemma then is in fact just a definition local to a 
lemma, interactively build by tacticals.
Proof theoretical strength. Most proof development systems are based on a prede­
fined, fixed set of logical environments. For example, Mizar (Trybulec and 
Blair 1985, Rudnicki 1992) verifies proofs based on a variant of Zermelo- 
Fraenkel set theory, and LEGO supports the Calculus of Constructions, with 
the option of inductive types or sigma types. Although not every m athem ati­
cian may be concerned about the logical system he uses to prove a theorem, 
in some occasions it is im portant to know. For example, do we need, or allow, 
second order logic? Or higher order logic? Do we want to build purely con­
structive proofs, and if not, at which steps do we really need classical logic? 
So we wish to be able to tune the logic used in our proof development sys­
tem. W ith respect to type theory, a good mechanism for this seems to be 
Pure Type Systems (PTSs, Barendregt 1992). The type checker Constructor 
(Helmink 1993) does support a large subset of PTSs. However, Constructor is 
not supported anymore.
6.2 Lean proof checking
The proof of the binomial theorem in Section 4.3 shows in extreme how equational 
reasoning can get out of hand. For this reason, we have developed a simple, flexible 
and rather efficient method to solve equational problems in type theory. The main 
ingredients of our method are a two-level formalization of universal algebra based 
on congruence types. The approach chosen is also intimately related to the design 
of hybrid systems and can be seen as an attem pt to lay the foundations for a 
theoretical understanding of the interaction between proof checkers and computer 
algebra systems. In the future, it seems worthwhile to try  to  extend the framework 
to equational theories which do not yield a confluent term inating term  rewriting 
system. A longer term  goal related to this research is the understanding of computer 
algebra algorithms. A full understanding of their nature as term rewriting systems 
is necessary to see whether a type system with (a reasonable variant of) congruence 
types can provide a theoretical framework in which the integration of proof checkers 
and computer algebra systems can be justified.
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6.3 R elated  work
Beside Autom ath (de Bruijn 1970), one of the first projects in which large bodies of 
mathematical texts are verified in a thorough way, is the Mizar project (Trybulec 
and Blair 1985, Rudnicki 1992). In Mizar a so called mathematical vernacular is 
used to represent mathematical texts. Mizar is not based on type theory, but on a 
variant of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Hence it does not produce proof objects as 
first class citizens. During the last decade, a large number of verified mathematical 
texts where added to the Mizar Mathematical Library (MML). More ambitious is 
the QED project(Anonymous 1994), which has as goal to build a repository that 
represents all im portant mathematical knowledge.
Paul Jackson worked on formalizations of abstract algebra in his PhD thesis 
(Jackson 1995). The proof assistant used is the NuPrl system. Also Jackson intro­
duced a notion of reflection which is related to our two-level approach.
Zhaohui Luo introduced the notion of coercive subtyping in (Luo 1997) in type 
theory. The idea is to use subtyping as a mechanism for notational abbreviations. 
For example, if Group is a subtype of Monoid via a coercion function, then a group 
of type Group can be regarded as an object of type Monoid. These ideas are worked 
out furthermore in (Jones, Luo and Soloviev 1998).
In the context of our thesis, we also must refer to Anthony Bailey's work on 
formalizations of abstract algebra (Bailey 1998). Bailey formalized the fundamen­
tal theorem of Galois Theory in the type theory using the LEGO system. For 
this, he designed a variant of LEGO to implement the synthesizing of implicit co­
ercions. Following Bailey, coercions are implemented in the proof system Coq by 
(Sai'bi 1997). Furthermore, Bailey also investigated literate formalizations. Liter­
ate formalization stems from Donald K nuth's concept of literate programming. The 
idea is to write source files of mathematics which can both be mechanically checked, 
as well as easily be pretty  printed for human reading.
6.4 R esults
We end this chapter by repeating some points presented in the previous chapters 3 
and 4.
1. As expressed in the introduction of Chapter 3, we prefer to keep definitions as 
simple as possible. So while formalizing a mathematical notion, we are eager 
to  give a definition as clearly as possible, so tha t it can be easily validated that 
the definition models our intention. The price to pay is th a t some proofs may 
get more involved. But after all, for verification we have the proper tools.
2. Introducing sets as the product type of a type T , a binary relation R  over 
T , and a proof tha t R  is an equivalence relation, appears to be a suitable 
definition for formalizing (constructive) sets (see Section 3.1.2). Following this 
concept, we defined functions over a type T  as a tuple of an arrow f , together 
with a proof tha t f  preserves equality (see Section 3.2.1).
3. When we allow the formation of the set of propositions Q as a setoid using 
if-and-only-if as equivalence relation (see Definition 3.1.7), this implies that:
(a) Predicates (and subsets) can be defined as functions into Q (Section 3.2.4).
(b) The power set of a set is a set again (Section 3.3.2).
4. When we define the or-connective by inductively, the impredicatively defined 
or-connective inherits the strong elimination rule. As a result, we can define 
the case distinction over discrete sets and even the characteristic function of 
a decidable predicate (see Section 3.3.4). For an application, see Section 4.2.3 
where we define a prime generator using bounded minimalization. Because 
all proofs are constructive, the prime generator actually computes primes by 
normalization. Also in some cases, proof objects become much shorter (often 
merely reflexivity).
5. M athematical structures are defined in a generic way using signatures, a carrier 
set and valuation functions (Definition 3.4.3), all packed together by sigma 
types.
6. We formalized a non-constructive proof of the existence of fc-th roots in the 
complex field in Section 4.4.2. For this we introduced in Definition 3.5.15 the 
real number system R as a discrete ordered field such th a t every polynomial 
in R of odd degree has a root, and which has a square root function over R. 
Polynomial rings are defined in Section 4.4.1 as sparse, multi-variate, relaxed 
polynomials.
7. We developed a library of formal mathematics. Over 18,000 lines of code were 
written which consist of roughly 600 definitions and 1200 theorems. It takes a 
few hours for LEGO to load and check all the code on a Sun SparcStation 20 
with TMS390Z55 processors and 384MB of internal memory.
8. We wrote a front-end for LEGO source and proof-objects files to view these 
pretty-printed via a web-server on the world-wide-web3.
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Appendix A
The LEGO System
LEGO is a type checker written by Randy Pollack in the functional language NJ- 
SML (New Jersey Standard Meta Language). The source is freely available from the 
web site h ttp ://w w w .d c s .e d .a c .u k /h o m e /le g o /. There you will also find docu­
mentation, libraries of formalized mathematics, tools, and other useful information.
A .1 Quick introduction  to  LEGO
For an introduction to LEGO the reader is referred to the manual (Luo and Pollack 
1992). In this section we just give some high-lights.
We initialize LEGO by I n i t  XCC;, so we work in the Extended Calculus of 
Constructions ECC  (Luo 1990) with inductive types. Actually we don’t need the 
full power of ECC, but it is the weakest system LEGO offers which has more then 
two sorts and inductive types.
A.1.1 Argument Synthesis
LEGO has a concept of m eta variables, called existential variables, for lambda 
terms. The type checker will try  to resolve existential variables automatically. If 
it fails, we should supply the correct terms ourselves. An existential variable is 
denoted by a question mark. So, suppose we have defined function composition as
Compl : n A , B , C :SET. (A ^  B)  ^  (B ^  C ) ^  (A ^  C )
=  XA, B,  C:SET X f  :A ^  B  Xg.B ^  C  Ax:A. g ( f  x)
and suppose A, B , C  : SET, f  : A  ^  B  and g : B  ^  C , then we may write
Compl ? ? ? f  g
and LEGO will resolve the existential variables to A, B, and C  respectively. Fur­
thermore, in LEGO we can annotate abstractions to indicate tha t they will be 
applied to implicit existential variables. So define
Comp2 : n A , B , C iSET. (A ^  B) ^  (B ^  C ) ^  (A ^  C )
=  XA, B,  CiSET X f  :A ^  B  Xg.B ^  C  Xx:A. g ( f  x)
and suppose once again tha t A, B , C  : SET, f  : A  ^  B  and g : B  ^  C , then we 
may write
Comp2f  g .
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Description LEGO Code Pseudo LEGO
sorts P rop:T ype( 0 ) :T ype(l) PR0P:SET:TYPE
:Type(2) :BIGTYPE
variables x, y, z, A, B .. . x, y , z , A , B , . . .
definitions ap, Eq . .. a p ,E q , . ..
meta-variables 7 ?
A-abstraction [x : A] B Ax\A . B
[_: A] B A\B A_:A B
[x I A] B Xx\A. B
application ap f  x ap f  x
f . ap x ƒ.ap x
EqlA EqiA
II-abstraction {x:A}B IIx:A. B  Vx:A B
{ _ :A}B A -> B A —>B
{ x IA}B Ylx\A. B
S-abstraction <x:A>B YiX'.A. B
<_:A>B A#B A x B
projection z . 1 z . 2 7Tl (z) 7T2(z)
pairing <x,y> <x, y>
Table A.1: Informal definition of LEGO terms and of pseudo LEGO.
A.1.2 Pseudo LEGO
Informally, LEGO terms are build following the lines of Table A.1. This table also 
contains the first part of an informal definition of a pseudo LEGO  we use throughout 
this thesis.
In Table A.2, we extend the pseudo LEGO by adding some syntactical sugar. 
This improves the readability of LEGO source considerably. For example, LEGO 
has only projection of two-tuples as primitives, although it allows us to write 
< x i , . . . , x n >. The scheme for projections in Table A.2 gives us projections of 
n-tuples for arbitrary fixed n  based on n  and n 2.
Description LEGO Code Pseudo LEGO
sets Eq x y x  = y
x :e l  A x  e  A
functions Fun A B A ^ -B
BFun A B C (A  x B ) ^ C
F unction  A B A ^ B
predicates R.ap2 x y <x, y> e  R  (x, y) e  R
S :Pred A S  c  A
interpretation i n t  A m
projection t . r7T^ K ( t )
where r7r p  = 1
n2 — 2
r n *+2 n =  
nj +1 — 2.r 7T*+ln
Table A.2 Extension of pseudo LEGO.
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A.1.3 Recursive definitions
We introduced a definition of the inductively defined natural numbers in Sec­
tion 1.3.1 as follows.
Using the elimination principle eN, we defined the addition by recursion on the 
secord argument:
Because this definition is hard to read, we extent pseudo LEGO to allow a different 
notation for inductive definitions.
So we leave out the term  (Ay:N. N), we drop the abstractions Ay:N Ah:N and sub­
stitute the name of the definiendum (add x) for the induction hypothesis h.
A .2 N am ing conventions
Another topic concerns the ‘type of’ relation which assigns a type to a term  in 
typed A-calculus. W hat might look trivial, but still needs some attention, is how 
one should read ‘A  : B ’ for types A  and B.  Several opportunities come up.
1. A  is of type B, A  lives in B.
2. A  proves B , B  holds, ‘B ’.
3. A  is a member of B , A  is an element of B .
4. A  is a B, let A  be a B.
The first option is used when we don’t want to give an interpretation to the typing 
relation. The second is used for propositions, when B  : PROP. The third is used 
when we want to view types as sets and terms as elements. However, as Table A.3 
shows, option three is not as convenient as the fourth. So although 3 is a more 
literal interpretation, we have chosen to use 4 for readability. The whole point of 
this discussion is tha t Set, e l , S u b se t, ...n o w  should be given singular names 
despite tha t they stand for collections.
By definition, Subset A  and e l  (Powerset A) are ^(.-convertible. Often the first 
is used because it is shorter. The second has an advantage when working with 
equality of subsets.
The LEGO source files have a size of about 580,000 tokens. If printed out, it will 
takeup about 18,000 lines and 300 pages. All definitions and proofs from chapters 3 
and 4 and more are collected as a large LEGO library which is publicly available 
(see below).
N =  i^X : *.(0 : X, 5+ : X  ^  X)
add =  Ax:N.£N (Ay:N. N)0(Ay:N Xh:N.S+h) .
A .3 The LEGO library
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mathematics type theory interpretation
A  is a set A  : Set A  is a  m e m b e r o f the class of sets 
A  is a  set
x e  A x : e l  A x  is a  m e m b e r o f  the elements of A  
x  is a n  element of A
S c  A S  : Subset A S  is a n  e lem e n t of the subsets of A  
S  is a  subset of A
S  g p(A) S  : e l  (Pow ersetA ) S  is a  m e m b e r o f the elements of 
the powerset of A  
S  is a n  element of the powerset of A
f e A ^ B ƒ : Fun A ß f  is a  function
Table A.3: How to read the ‘type of’ relation.
A.3.1 Technical background
From the original LEGO library we only use the file l ib _ lo g ic . l .  For reasons of 
speed we were forced to  make occasionally use of the F reeze command. F reeze 
invalidates Make, so instead all files should be Loaded. Surprisingly, we have expe­
rienced th a t Load is quicker than Make anyway. You may want to increase the limit 
on your heap space (60 Mb should do.) Before you start LEGO you can change 
the limit by typing u l im it  -d  60000 for bash, or l im i t  d a ta  60000 for csh. It 
takes a few hours to load and check all the files on a Sun Sparc Station 20 with 
TMS390Z55 processors and 384MB of internal memory. The files consist of more 
then 18,000 lines of LEGO code.
A.3.2 Availability
The LEGO library we developed is obtainable via the web1. All files are shown by 
the pretty-printer Lego2html. Furthermore, one can use anonymous ftp to get the 
library as single compressed zip file.
f t p  f t p .c s .k u n .n l  
Name: anonymous
Password: e n te r  your e -m a il ad d ress  
cd /pub/CSI/Com pM ath.Found/lego 
b in
g e t RuysLegoLib.zip
The size of this file is approximately 135 Kb, uncompressed about 600 Kb.
A.3.3 Demo Session
As an example of an interactive LEGO session we include a complete screen dump. 
It is the proof of the Drinkers Principle (see Section 4.1). All text after the LEGO 
prompt Lego> is typed by the user. The rest is system output. Note th a t we have 
left out a small unim portant portion of text and replaced it by three consecutive 
dots.
1 http://www.cs.kun.nl/fnds/lego/markr.shtml
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S tandard  ML w ith  LEGO
G enerated Thu J u l 4 16 :58:07  MET DST 1996
u sin g  S tandard  ML of New J e rse y , V ersion  0 .9 3 , February  15, 1993
Sun4 w ith  in v e rs io n  and Then t a c t i c a l
use command ’H elp’ fo r  in fo  on new commands.
’Q rep l’ co n fig u red  
Extended CC: I n i t i a l  S ta te !  
s tro n g  p re d ic a t iv e  Sigm a-types 
Lego> I n i t  XCC; Logic;
’Q rep l’ co n fig u red  
Extended CC: I n i t i a l  S ta te !  
s tro n g  p re d ic a t iv e  Sigm a-types
Lego> [ExFalso = [P :P rop][H :absu rd ] H P ]; 
defn  ExFalso = [P :P rop][H :absurd]H  P 
ExFalso : {P :Prop}absurd->P 
Lego> [Dn : {P:Prop} ~~P->P] [C : Type] [a : C] [D : C->Prop]; 
d ec l Dn : {P :P rop}(no t (no t P ))-> P  
d ec l C : Type 
d ec l a : C 
d ec l D : C->Prop
Lego> [phi = [x:C] (D x) -> {y:C} D y ]; 
defn  ph i = [x:C](D x)->{y:C}D y 
ph i : C->Prop 
Lego> Goal Ex p h i;
Goal
?0 : Ex ph i 
Lego> R efine Dn;
R efine by Dn
?2 : n o t (no t (Ex p h i) )
Lego> In t ro s  H2;
In t ro s  (1) H2
H2 : n o t (Ex p h i)
?3 : absurd  
Lego> R efine H2;
R efine by H2 
?4 : Ex ph i 
Lego> R efine E x In tro ; R efine a;
R efine by E xIn tro  
?7 : C 
?8 : p h i ?7 
R efine by a 
?8 : p h i a 
Lego> In t ro s  H5;
In t ro s  (1) H5 
H5 : D a 
?9 : {y:C}D y 
Lego> In t ro s  z;
In t ro s  (1) z
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z : C 
?10 : D z 
Lego> R efine Dn;
R efine by Dn
?12 : no t (no t (D z ) )
Lego> In t ro s  H8;
In t ro s  (1) H8 
H8 : n o t (D z)
?13 : absurd  
Lego> R efine H2;
R efine by H2 
?14 : Ex phi 
Lego> R efine E x In tro ; R efine z;
R efine by E xIn tro  
?17 : C 
?18 : ph i ?17 
R efine by z 
?18 : ph i z 
Lego> In t ro s  H11;
In t ro s  (1) H11 
H11 : D z 
?19 : {y:C}D y 
Lego> P rf ;
H2 : n o t (Ex p h i)
H5 : D a 
z : C
H8 : n o t (D z)
H11 : D z 
?19 : {y:C}D y 
Lego> R efine ExFalso;
R efine by ExFalso 
?21 : absurd  
Lego> R efine H8; R efine H11;
R efine by H8 
?22 : D z 
R efine by H11 
D isc h a rg e .. H11 
D isc h a rg e .. H8 
D isch a rg e . .  z 
D isch a rg e . .  H5 
D isch a rg e . .  H2 
*** QED ***
Lego> Save D rin k e rs P r in c ip le ;
" D rin k e rsP rin c ip le "  saved as g lo b a l ,  unfrozen
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A .4  Tools
Essentially, LEGO is just a plain command-line program, without an interface. A 
convenient way to sta rt the LEGO system is in a shell inside an editor like emacs. 
In th a t way you can browse through the output and edit your input. Thomas 
Schreiber wrote a very useful LEGO-interface for emacs in elisp for editing LEGO 
proof scripts.
We wrote a few other programs which are quite helpful. These tools can be 
downloaded via the web2.
A.4.1 legogrep
Legogrep is a Perl script which recursively searches through LEGO modules for 
definitions, proved lemmas, et cetera. It takes into account the commands Make, 
Load, Reload, Inc lude , Module, and is aware of the LEGOPATH environment vari­
able. Regular expressions are allowed. An example is to search all occurrences of 
c a n c e l.* p lu s .
omega> leg o g rep  c a n c e l.* p lu s  t e s t _ a l l  
lib _ n a t_ p lu s_ th m s: Save can ce l_ p lu s  
lib _ n a t_ p lu s_ th m s: Save can ce l_ p lu s  
lib _ n a t_ tim es_ th m s: R efine ca n ce l_ p lu s  (suc a) 
lib _ n a t_ L e : R efine can ce l_ p lu s  
lib _ in t_ n at_ lem m as: R efine can ce l_ p lu s  
l ib _ in t_ b a s ic s :  R efine can ce l_ p lu s  n1 
lib _ n a t_ L e : R efine can ce l_ p lu s
A.4.2 legostat
Legostat is also a Perl script for generating statistical information of a LEGO ses­
sion. It is mostly used to measure the speed (or slowness) of checking large LEGO 
files. The output will look like
omega> echo "Load l ib _ n a t" I lego | le g o s ta t
p a ra m e te rs .l time= 0. 02 sec 0 :0 0 :0 0  hms gc= 0.00 sec
l i b _ lo g i c . l time= 2..06 sec 0 :0 0 :0 2  hms gc= 0.10 sec
lib_M L_eq.l time= 0..64 sec 0 :0 0 :0 0  hms gc= 0.01 sec
l ib _ s ta r t_ u p . l time= 0. 38 sec 0 :0 0 :0 0  hms gc= 0.01 sec
l i b _ n a t . l time= 1..72 sec 0 :00 :01  hms gc= 0.06 sec
time= 4. 82 sec 0 :0 0 :0 4  hms gc= 0.18 sec
The column labeled tim e stands for the cumulative execution time. The gc column 
is the amount of time spend at (major) garbage collections.
A.4.3 lego2html
Lego2html is a CGI program written in Perl. It generates HTML pages out of lego 
source files. It is intended to present a lego file or a library of lego files in nice and 
more readable way on the web. Proofs are replaced by hyperlinks. Following this 
link unfolds the proof. A next link goes even one level deeper to a new page which
2http://www.dcs.ed.ac.uk/home/lego/html/tools.html
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shows the actual lambda term  of the proof objects. Also a search form is added 
at the bottom  of each page. It uses the legogrep tool to search for a definitions or 
lemmas in the lego files presented. Our LEGO library can be best viewed using this 
tool. The hyperlink is:
h t tp :/ /w w w .c s .k u n .n l /fn d s /leg o /m ark r .sh tm l
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Samenvatting
Het uitgangspunt van gemechaniseerde bewijsverificatie is het gebruik van compu­
tersystemen om een hoge graad van zekerheid te verkrijgen dat een bepaald bewijs 
een gegeven stelling inderdaad bewijst. Tot op heden worden bewijsverificatie- 
systemen door wiskundigen nog maar sporadisch gebruikt. Door middel van het 
bestuderen van deze systemen is meer inzicht verkregen wat de obstakels zijn en 
hoe de bruikbaarheid van bewijsverificatiesystemen verhoogd kan worden.
Dit proefschrift behandelt een speciale klasse van bewijsverificatiesystemen, na­
melijk zij die op type-theorie gebaseerd zijn. De type-theorie leent zich onder andere 
goed voor bewijsverificatie omdat er een sterke analogie is tussen enerzijds typen 
en haar inwoners en anderzijds, stellingen met hun bewijzen. Reductie van lamda- 
termen correspondeert dan met normalisatie van bewijzen. Omdat inwoners van 
typen geconstrueerd worden door zogeheten lamda-termen, past de constructieve 
logica het beste bij type-theorie. In deze logica wordt de aandacht van waarheid 
en onwaarheid verschoven naar bewijsbaarheid. In hoofdstuk 2 is kort ingegaan op 
een aantal benaderingen van logica, te weten de formalistische, de logicistische en 
de intuitionistische wijze. Ook is hier gekeken hoe logica geformaliseerd kan worden 
in type-theorie.
Het beoefenen van wiskunde kan verdeeld worden in drie handelingen: het bewij­
zen, het definieren en het rekenen. Voordat wiskunde bedreven kan worden, moeten 
eerst alle concepten waarvan gebruik gemaakt wordt, eenduidig gedefinieerd wor­
den. Het is gebleken dat dit proces bij mechanische verificatie uiterst moeizaam 
is, omdat begonnen moet worden vanaf de meest elementaire wiskunde. Hoofd­
stuk 3 richtte zich volledig op het formaliseren van basale wiskundige begrippen als 
‘verzameling’, ‘monoide’ en bijvoorbeeld ‘de complexe getallen’.
Wat betreft het rekenen is in hoofdstuk 4 de stelling van Euclides geformaliseerd 
die zegt dat er oneindig veel priemgetallen zijn: gegeven een willekeurig natuurlijk 
getal is er altijd een groter getal te vinden dat ook priem is. Omdat het bewijs 
constructief gegeven is, kon uit het existentiebewijs een ’getuige’ gevonden worden: 
gegeven een getal rekent het systeem voor ons het eerst volgende priemgetal uit. Dit 
wordt puur verkregen door normalisatie. In hetzelfde hoofdstuk is tevens nog een 
aanzet gemaakt to t de complete formalisatie van de hoofdstelling van de algebra. 
Dit bleek echter te hoog gegrepen met de voorhanden zijnde middelen. Wel zijn we 
gekomen tot de formalisatie van een klassiek bewijs van het bestaan van wortels in 
het complexe vlak van willekeurige graad. Hiervoor is onder andere een korte studie 
gedaan naar mogelijke definities van veeltermen.
Om aan te geven hoe omslachtig het redeneren met gelijkheden is, is als voor­
beeld een bewijs geformaliseerd van de binomiumstelling. In hoofdstuk 5 is een 
methode geïntroduceerd om het redeneren met gelijkheden in bepaalde gevallen te
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kunnen automatiseren. Basisidee is om een scheiding te maken tussen syntax en 
semantiek en om de rekenregels van groepen via herschrijfregels aan het bewijsve- 
rificatiesysteem toe te voegen.
Curriculum Vitae
Op 24 m aart 1966 ben ik geboren in Rochester, N.Y., de Verenigde Staten van 
Amerika. Een paar maanden later ben ik per boot naar Nederland gebracht. In 
Tilburg bezocht ik vanaf 1978 het Theresia Lyceum. Mijn middelbare-schooltijd 
werd in 1984 afgesloten met het behalen van het diploma VWO, met als zevende 
vak Latijn.
Aansluitend ben ik Informatica gaan studeren aan de Katholieke Universiteit 
Nijmegen, om in 1991 af te studeren met als hoofdvak Grondslagen van de Infor­
matica. Vervolgens ben ik in 1992 aangesteld als AIO (assistent in opleiding) door 
dezelfde universiteit. Deze aanstelling werd gefinancieerd door het TLI (Taal Lo­
gica en Informatica) netwerk. Ik was werkzaam bij de afdeling Grondslagen van de 
vakgroep Informatica onder leiding van prof.dr. H.P. Barendregt.
Op 10 mei 1997 ben ik getrouwd met Manon van Lieshout en op 3 juni het jaar 
erna werd onze dochter Ilse geboren. Begin 1997 heb ik het internet-bedrijf Paracas 
Software opgericht. In 1998 ben ik in dienst getreden bij het automatiseringsbedrijf 
Logica.
Adres: Opaalhof 21
3402 ZJ IJsselstein 
the Netherlands 
E-mail: markr@cs.kun.nl 
mark@paracas.nl 
ruysm@logica.com
117
